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Abstract
Using the previously developed concepts of semantic spacetime, I explore the interpretation of knowledge
representations, and their structure, as a semantic system, within the framework of promise theory. By assigning
interpretations to phenomena, from observers to observed, we may approach a simple description of knowledge-
based functional systems, with direct practical utility. The focus is especially on the interpretation of concepts,
associative knowledge, and context awareness. The inference seems to be that most if not all of these concepts
emerge from purely semantic spacetime properties, which opens the possibility for a more generalized under-
standing of what constitutes a learning, or even ‘intelligent’ system.
Some key principles emerge for effective knowledge representation: 1) separation of spacetime scales, 2) the
recurrence of four irreducible types of association, by which intent propagates: aggregation, causation, cooper-
ation, and similarity, 3) the need for discrimination of identities (discrete), which is assisted by distinguishing
timeline simultaneity from sequential events, and 4) the ability to learn (memory). It is at least plausible that
emergent knowledge abstraction capabilities have their origin in basic spacetime structures.
These notes present a unified view of mostly well-known results; they allow us to see information models,
knowledge representations, machine learning, and semantic networking (transport and information base) in a
common framework. The notion of ‘smart spaces’ thus encompasses artificial systems as well as living systems,
across many different scales, e.g. smart cities and organizations.
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1 Introduction
A spacetime is an extended network of interconnected agencies that collectively support the notions of location,
time, direction, and dimension. In a semantic spacetime, special meaning is attributed to locations and times; a
semantic spacetime adds interpretation, and even function, to the experience of space by an observer. Semantic
spacetimes may be models for everything from real structures to virtual collections of objects, in either a solid
or a gaseous state of organization: buildings, warehouses, databases, computers, machines, organisms. Semantic
spacetimes are associated with knowledge systems; however, we should not jump to conclusions about what this
means: a Turkish bathhouse, or a supermarket, could be representable as a knowledge space, not only the library
in Alexandria. As such, semantic spacetimes are intended as a universal theory of functional interpretation within
any extended system, that behaves as a natural generalization of the physics of material scaling to more generally
immaterial worlds.
In paper I of this series [1], it was shown that, if we take a collection of autonomous agents that promise to
collaborate in the construction of a spacetime, then it becomes possible to construct semantics in a simple way,
with clearly defined laws. Paper II [2] showed that, by separating promises that refer to local (scalar) properties
of agents from those relating to relationships between agents (tensors), we identify that a promise spacetime has
both scalar (material) properties and vector (adjacency, cooperative, non-self) properties, and hence we have a
description that scales as a natural generalization of the physics of coarse graining: we can combine agents into
super-agents, or coarse grains, without loss of information as long as we account for both reducible and irreducible
promises. A complete definition of scaling opened the way to a natural definition of tenancy, i.e. the hosting
of functional agencies within a space, with properties or attributes implemented over a region bounded by any
criterion (not necessarily a spatial boundary). Limited range promises imply a horizon for context, in which
dominant ‘rules’ or behavioural patterns may differ across cells. This is also a basis for defining and understanding
biological organisms as smart agencies. It forms a simple basis of a spacetime interpretation of shared context, and
categorization.
In this final part of the promise-spacetime manifesto, I want to build on all these notions to explore how
extended, differentiated structures can interact with one another to encode and encode knowledge. Such structures
would find use both as repositories of information, and as functional machinery, and as ‘smart spaces’1. An obvious
application of this work is to understand the coming age of embedded information technology: the so-called
Internet of Things, Smart Cities, etc, which are non-simply connected spacetimes of significant scale, complexity,
and inhomogeneity. The outline for the topics is as follows:
1. A review of spacetime and its semantics.
2. A description of data as semantic elements, in the language of promise theory.
3. How memory can be constructed, addressed, and used, in order to equip spaces with a capability for data
representation and learning.
4. How knowledge is acquired and represented, by summarization.
5. How reasoning occurs in the shape of constrained spacetime trajectories.
6. The application of the foregoing ideas to functional spaces.
2 The structure and semantics of spacetime
The artificial spaces we create are filled with meaning. Parking spaces are different from living spaces; a beach
is different from a cliff. Meaning is partially engineered, by repeated trial and error, and is partially serendipitous
in its origin. To evolve something to the point where it becomes ‘fit for purpose’, we accept that there must be
selection criteria that prefer one functional form over another; these criteria take on the role of goals, some of
which are engineered and some are emergent, based purely on observed success in a functional role.
This repetitive process, which leads to an island of possible temporary stability, is called learning, and it take
the form of an interactive relationship between and agent and its subject, whose equilibrium outcome is what we
1This includes but goes beyond the current interest in so-called artificial intelligence, e.g. using Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) to rec-
ognize complex patterns. Such a neural view of reasoning is too limited and too specific to represent a comprehensive approach to engineering.
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call knowledge [3]2. Knowledge may decay as quickly as it has been won: it requires maintenance, and we can
talk about its stability, i.e. its usefulness or applicability to a context. In this section, we explore how this process
occurs, with or without the intentional direction of human involvement.
2.1 Semantic spacetime
A semantic spacetime is a structured collection of semantic elements (see section 6.6. of paper I) [1]. To make a
spacetime, with both scalar (material) attributes and vector (adjacency) bindings, from the atomic building blocks
of autonomous agents, one defines the basic elements in a semantic space:
Definition 1 (Semantic element) A semantic element is a tuple 〈Ai, {piscalar j, . . .}〉 consisting of a single au-
tonomous agent, and an optional number of scalar material promises.
A semantic element is an autonomous agent (in the sense of promise theory), surrounded by a halo of promises
that imbue it with semantics (see fig. 4). Examples include any objects that could be relevant within a functional
context: people, machinery, and passive structures like buildings or trees.
Definition 2 (Semantic spacetime) A collection of semantic elements, in any phase (gas or solid) [1], for which
a local change in state, promises or configuration represents a local unit of time.
There are multiple reasons to want to define semantic spacetimes. The definition is a direct match for the day to
day workings of materials, chemistry, biology, and information technology. More generally, the reasons relate to
the communicability of knowledge and functionality between interacting agents:
• To find the requirements of a low level representation for concepts as spacetime patterns.
• To understand arbitrary spacetimes as functional machinery, with conceptual utility.
The field of linguistics provides the essential clue that this agenda is possible, since languages fit both of the
requirements above. Indeed, what we are looking for is a language, but a formal language that can be used to
understand the design of machinery with purpose, or discern the relative purposes of systematic mechanisms.
Semantics are one part of successful functioning, but they are static relationships. To utilize semantics for
purpose we have to place them into a dynamically stable context. This is where the concept of knowledge becomes
important.
2.2 The concept of knowledge as an iterated equilibrium
The concept of knowledge has special status. It is defined, in these notes, by analogy with the knowing of a person
or a friend [3]. Knowledge is not something we acquire by hearsay, not something acquired by reading once in
a book. It is the result of an ongoing relationship of repeated assessment, made by an agent, over time. During
repeated assessment, an agent gauges the relative importance of outcomes and their stability to change. Knowledge
is thus quite different from data: it is a summarized aggregate representation of data, to which we have attached
an interpretation of significance. It has been confirmed iteratively to the point of trust [5], by repeated sampling.
Knowledge is not ‘big data’ or bulk information in raw form: to sieve out knowledge from an extensive stream of
samples, a reduction over equivalences of quantitative and qualitative measures has to take place [3].
The repeated sampling of semantically equivalent data by an agent is called learning. In order for there to be
learning, there must be at least a promise of offered observability (+), and the receiver must promise to accept or
receive (-) data faithfully. The integrity of a measurement cannot exceed the overlap of these two promises [6].
observed +attributes−−−−−−→ observer (1)
observed −attributes←−−−−−− observer (2)
The stability of every sampled observation made is uncertain, because an agent does not know how fast the world is
changing without repeating its observations. Agents choose a sampling rate Tsample which (by the Nyquist theorem)
should be at least twice as fast as the rate of change of the promise it is assessing, and hence also the rate at which
it is able to form a stable assessment of what it observes [3, 7, 8].
2According the the UK government IT infrastructure library [4], the sequence DIKW (data, information, knowledge, wisdom) is the ladder
of increasing meaning that humans go through in the course of their working interactions.
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Definition 3 (Learning about pi) The sampling, equilibration, and summarization of observational assessments
concerning a promise pi made by another agent, repeated over a timescale Tlearn > 2Tsample.
Let α(pi) be an assessment of promise pi, made by some agent. On each sample time t + 1, an observer agent
applies a learning function L to combine the previous average assessment E(α(pi)t) with a new sample α(pi)t+1
to form:
E (α(pi)t+1) = L (α(pi)t, E (α(pi)t)) (3)
Learning defines a clock that ticks at a rate Tsample.
Definition 4 (Knowledge of pi) A stable summary of the iterated assessment α(pi)Tknow , of one or more promises
pi, is formed by equilibration of the samples over a timescale Tknow  2Tsample.
Because knowledge defines a process with a timescale, the failure to confirm it relative to other changes leads to
its decay. Trust in knowledge needs to be replenished. This is the main difference between knowledge and data.
Lemma 1 (Knowledge decay) The uncertainty of knowledge is a geometric function of the time since last learning
took place. If L is a convex or linear function of its arguments, which weights old assessments less favourably than
new by a factor ` < 1, then an assessment α(pi)τ from arbitrary time τ has a geometric rate of attenuation by `r,
where r ' Tlearn/Tsample.
The proof follows from the iteration r times of a convex form, such as Lt = (1− `)si + `Lt−1. Let α(pi)τ → x,
and each new sample be si, for i = 1, 2, . . . r. Then the contribution to Lr is `rx  x. Thus knowledge must
be reassessed, and learning must continue as long as new assessments are available, else the uncertainty of the
knowledge If sampling stops, the value of L fails to track its value. For each sample missed, there is a cumulative
error which grows like (1 − `)r. A corollary is that the significance of data to an assessment decays at the same
rate with its relative age. By virtue of Nyquist’s theorem [7, 9], we can also say that:
Lemma 2 (Fidelity and learning rate) Learning can only represent source values faithfully if the rate of sam-
pling is greater than twice that of the fastest rate of change in the data, i.e. 2/Tsample < ∂pi/∂t.
From the definition of knowledge:
Lemma 3 (Knowability of information) A fact is knowable by agent A if the promise can be assessed by an
agent A as kept over multiple assessments.
where:
Definition 5 (Fact) A promise of information to be taken on trust.
2.3 The concept of knowledge spaces: spaces that can learn and represent knowledge
What do space and time mean to us? Let’s explore the semantics of spacetime further, to better understand how we
experience it. The scaling characteristics of promises were investigated in paper II [2]. One of the challenges facing
us, with respect to understanding knowledge systems as spacetimes and vice versa, is the separation of dynamical
timescales and spatial regions during observation and measurement (see figure 1). This is a stability criterion. In
dynamics, weakly coupled dynamical phenomena separate along distinct timescales, and thus the semantics we
build on top of them must do the same. A natural hypothesis is therefore that promises, which encode information,
separate into at least two timescales: I call these context (fast) and knowledge (slow), such that quickly assessed
context modulates more slowly accumulated knowledge, in order to adjust its relevance. From this, we see that
there is a set of timescales for knowledge to emerge, including:
1. Sample or observation rate.
2. The time to summarize observations (form sense of context).
3. Learning rate (accumulation of experience).
4. Knowledge lifetime (decay rate in the absence of observation).
5. Reasoning about knowledge (associative narratives).
The extraction of what we call reasoning, or stepwise narratives, built from the semantic relationships between
observations have to be identified from the resulting network of associations. This is the agenda for paper III.
What kind of data lead to the kind of functional knowledge about which we can reason? An ability to reason
takes more than single samples; it requires the learning of relationships between the things too. I’ll return to this
in section 4. For now, we may observe that there is a clear role for space and time in data representation, and the
hypothesis we shall explore in these notes is the idea that these spacetime aspects are, in fact, the only basis for
knowledge representation.
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Figure 1: To find a dynamical basis for knowledge semantics, we need to identify separable timescales, from which we can
identify stable ‘knowable’ phenomena. Learning occurs at two timescales: short-lived convergent states we call ‘context’ about
‘now’, and long-lived associative bindings based on accumulated experience, that form the stories on which we base reasoning.
2.4 Spatial semantics
What things do we want to say about space? As described in paper I, a space may be a collection on unrelated
points (like a gas of disconnected bubbles); but, usually, we expect points to be interconnected allowing motion
from one point to another [1]. Adjacency is the most primitive irreducible promise that characterizes space. In
promise theory, adjacency is a directional concept: A may be adjacent to B without B being adjacent to A. This is
a deliberate feature that models functional behaviours like semi-permeable membranes, diodes, and authorization-
access controls.
The semantics of location take on a variety of forms, representing four main concepts to do with space: topol-
ogy, location, distance, and direction. Many of these concepts are intertwined. Most of our familiar conventions
for space and time are based on a history of thinking of a Cartesian theatre model, in which spacetime is a backdrop
on which interactions happen between agents, independently of absolute location, only relative to other agents3.
This separation of spacetime and matter is rooted both in convenience, as well as in the agenda of making science
impartial. Einstein showed, however, that this separation is both misplaced and inconsistent (impartial does not
mean objective) [11]: the presence of material agents within spacetime is closely related, if not actually equivalent
in some sense, to the local promises made by spacetime itself. This hints that a unified description for spacetime
and matter would make more sense [1].
In promise theory, the alphabet of symbols, in a coded structure, is composed of the atoms of space:
Definition 6 (Location agents) These are irreducible sites that take up space and can emit and absorb signal
agents. They may not overlap.
Agents in the role of signal agent form the alphabet of scaled inter-agent language.
Definition 7 (Signal agents) They may be created and destroyed, subsequently emitted and absorbed, by location
agents. They can occupy the same space, since they end up and accumulate at end points.
2.4.1 Distance, similarity, and metrics
The notion of distance is related to the ability to establish a coordinate system on space. The challenge of any
coordinate system is to make locations easy to find, and give meaning to the distance between locations. Two
kinds of distance may be defined in a semantic space: metric and semantic.
3For a background on the concept of this philosophy, see for example [10].
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Definition 8 (Metric (quantitative) distance) A measure of coordinate-similarity in position.
Example 1 (Metric distances) Various aspects of topology and metric distance play into how we understand
space.
1. Adjacency, connectivity, continuity, and dimension - characterizing allowed transitions, doorways, the
existence of dimensions or degrees of freedom, discrete or continuous. Which channels make it possible to
move? What is the smallest distance an agent can move? Are there disallowed transitions? Adjacency is a
cooperative concept (see paper I).
2. Location, position: (nominal) identifying and promising position requires distinguishable coordinates. Lo-
cation does not specifically require numerical coordinatization of a space, as long as the naming of locations
is unique, e.g. using signposts. The villages of our rural past were distinguishable in spite of a lack of maps.
A description of relative locations depends on direction and metric distance.
3. Metric distance between locations: (cooperative) given nominal positions of agents, by cooperation the
agents can form a coordinate system with mutually agreed understanding of the meaning of distance. This
then allows comparative measures.
The concept of distance is related to dimension, because a projection of a spatial relationship onto a ‘screen’
of lesser dimension can distort the ability to measure or observe the distance. What seems to be close, in
one interpretation of the observed world need not be close in the representational facsimile world.
4. Semantics of metric distance: What we do mean by ‘near’, ‘far’, ‘local’, etc (qualitative approximate
discriminants).
5. Direction: favoured adjacency amongst the possible degrees of freedom at a location, often associated with
a coordinate representation, or an external relative marker that breaks a rotational symmetry, like fixed stars
(see paper I).
6. Containment: the constraining of locations within a perimeter or other boundary.
7. State or pattern: configuration patterns of internal degrees of freedom, whose effect may or may not be
visible in the exterior. Hidden variables are like embedded dimensions projected into a subspace of the
observer (e.g. Kaluza Klein theory). This is familiar in physics where properties like charge and spin
are represented as hidden, non-spatial dimensions degrees of freedom, generally characterized by their
symmetries4.
Example 2 (Effectively fixed markers) The fixed stars move so slowly and insignificantly relative to the Earth,
that we can use them as effective boundary conditions, even though they break no symmetries. By pegging a slow
moving phenomenon (e.g. the perceived motions of the fixed stars) to something changing more quickly, one can
create an illusion of symmetry breaking, in the form of an effectively static boundary condition. The propagation
itself may be complicit in the assessments of promises (see figure 2).
There are no cooperative promises between the fixed stars, and yet they hold their formation in such a way that
can be used. Fixed stars may promise something resembling an amorphous solid, that provides a reference without
actual symmetry breaking, by virtue of an almost complete decoupling of timescales.
The fixed stars are a form of gaseous memory, joined together by our observation on Earth. They are (for most
intents and purposes) causally and functionally independent. The promises they are (or were) able to make to us
are rather simple and non-interactive. If this situation happened on a closer scale, we would not easily trust such
unidirectionality. Science places much trust in the constancy of the heavens5.
When we use the term ‘quantitative’, most of us are conditioned to thinking of distances being real-valued contin-
uum measurements. This may or may not be the case, depending on the semantics of the measuring scale.
Definition 9 (Semantic (or qualitative) distance) A measure of similarity in interpretation.
Example 3 (Semantic distances) Semantic distances are based on comparison of symbolic sequences:
• Hamming distance:
The number of symbols that differ between two sequences.
4Kaluza-Klein theory is not capable of representing the known symmetries as spacetime translations on a continuous differentiable space-
time, but continuum translations would not be the correct model in a discrete network.
5”I am constant as the northern star, of whose true-fix’d and resting quality there is no fellow in the firmament.” Julius Caesar (III, i, 60
62) Just before Caesar is stabbed in the back for his intransigence.
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Figure 2: Propagation of signals (latency) can effectively break symmetries too by providing such a separation of scales as to
be indistinguishable from a fixed boundary condition.
• Hop count in an associative network:
An obvious measure of distance in a graphical structure in the number of hops between nodes; i.e. the
adjacency count. The concept of distance in a network of associations may simply be used to define a notion
of similarity of the concepts held at the nodes.
• Semantic hashing:
Semantic hashing [?, 13] has a specific meaning in the literature. It refers to an attempt to reduce text
in a document to a small feature space, based on importance of keywords and tags, in such a way that
similar documents have similar hashes. A hash promises a semantic summary of a superagent collection of
individual words. The metric properties of the feature space are preserved by the hashing, but the choice
of keywords is manual and ad hoc (see example 9). Similarity does not promise to represent semantic
relationships that are not derivable from the tags.
• Sparse distributed representations:
Mapping similar keys to similar locations, in a sparse encoding. Similar to semantic hashes.
• Semantic routing:
The goal we seek in classifying meanings is achieve a consistent semantic routing of observed phenomena.
This is partly the goal of ontology (see section 2.4.4). The ability to bring universal meaning to phenomena
is fraught with misunderstandings, however [14]. Methods fail to be universal because they impose an
ontology from the top down [3], rather than adapting to context.
Example 4 (Nominal addressing) By using semantic labels for locations, instead of metric coordinate, we
can develop different approaches to locating attributes. This idea has been exploited in Name Data Net-
working and Content Centric Networking [15, 16].
Example 5 (Semantic routing and ontology) Before the successes of machine learning and pattern recog-
nition, ontologies were designed by hand, using logical languages like OWL [14]. This was unsuccessful,
as ontologies are not universal; they are spanning sets (see paper I). Today, ontology is assumed to be
discovered in context by machine learning methods like PCA [17].
Unlike metric distances, qualitative aspects are not continuously distributed, but they can still be measured (quan-
titatively) using the notion of sets and basis sets.
2.4.2 Locatability of assets (sorting and discriminating identities)
The ease of learning, representing, and then finding assets stored in a semantic space (e.g. storing and retrieving
concepts, from some starting key), depends on being able to reliably route keys to the same (or at least) similar
locations in a memory every time we detect them. If one could further arrange for similar concepts to map to similar
spatial locations, then an approximate sensation or idea might even trigger a more complete or specific memory,
and vice versa. This would be the beginning of what we mean by representing associative ‘lateral thinking’.
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Example 6 (Closeness of related concepts) Must similar concepts be close together in a knowledge space? This
must depend on the encoding of the space and the mechanism for coordinatizing it. Without this mapping, there is
no a priori link between the two.
Recent work in Nature using MRI scans of English language readings showed how brain activations for words
were hashed to broadly cohesive cortex regions [18], with similarities even across different subjects. The authors
posited that English words fell into clustered meanings that they labelled broadly as the categories: visual, tactile,
outdoors, place, time, social, mental, person, violence, body-part, number. In current parlance, these could be also
called spacetime, state, self, senses, relationships, and danger. These results are based on single words, however
in Hawkins [19], memory is assumed to be formed as temporal fragments, so such individual words may not have
the significance of independent semantic atoms. Nevertheless, the results are intriguing6.
2.4.3 Physical representation of semantic differences
Should semantic distances be proportional to metric distances when representing knowledge as space? Spacetime
accounting principles, like the conservation of energy, and principle of least action suggest that it would be natural
for this to be the case; however, that presumes a continuum model of space. In network structures, small distances
can be quickly amplified into large ones by branching. If we encode processes for structural discrimination, which
sort encoded inputs, these must lead to bifurcations, which in turn can lead to wide (exponentially diverging)
separations at low cost across several spacetime dimensions, so what is ‘close’, in one measure, might actually end
up appearing far apart by another.
Finding an object may or may not imply physical visitation, so the constraints on what ‘easy to find’ means are
relative to the agent concerned. In paper II, the role of directories (content indices), for locating promises within
agent boundaries, was described. A promise directory or index is a structure that acts as a transducer between
the semantics of promises and a metric map of resources. It plays the role of a lookup table or hashing function,
converting roles to locations for interior agents. Directories are intrinsically linked to dynamic and semantic
transparency.
Example 7 (Searching versus coordinatization) An item in a warehouse has to be retrieved by a physical visi-
tation (e.g. person or robot), but retrieval of information about its presence may be looked up in a directory or
inventory.
To map out a space, we need markers and/or graduations to measure distance. Markers that select particular
locations, breaking translational symmetry, are used to locate absolute points. Inequivalent semantics thus break
translation symmetries. To map out knowledge in spacetime, we have only spatial degrees of freedom with which
to encode persistent memory. The distance between locations is significant to the ability to retrieve encoded
information, as it leads to notions like association and locatability.
Example 8 (Map of spatial semantics) How do we find a shop in a city, or an item in a supermarket? Is there
some directory or hashing function, or a funnel that routes messengers to directed locations?
Example 9 (Discriminating and sorting structures) Coin sorting machines sorts coins and eject them into dif-
ferent piles. Passport queues discriminate people by their countries of origin. Baggage handling systems discrim-
inate luggage by origin flight number.
An observer examining another observer’s semantic space might see a projection of points that appears to
bear no resemblance to the relative separation of the original spatial relationships. A metric preserving map M()
exhibits isometry, i.e.:
D′(M(x),M(x′)) = D(x, x′) (4)
Conformal maps preserves angles, shear map preserve areas, and so on. We have to understand these spacetime
concepts and translate them into knowledge representations to appreciate the effects they transmit to our compre-
hension of what we believe to be recorded knowledge.
2.4.4 Metric and semantic coordinate bases, spanning trees
The spanning of graphs and vector spaces with metric coordinate systems was discussed in paper I [1]. Spanning
trees are one of the main approaches to the addressability and navigation of discrete spacetime structures, as they
form natural hierarchies for tuple-based addressing. The same approach may be used for semantic decompositions,
with nominal rather than ordinal values.
6At the time of writing, some of these MRI results are uncertain due to the discovery of a longstanding bug in the software.
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Example 10 (Nominal coordinates) Computer file systems, web documents, markup languages, or document
data formats, like XML and JSON, all have a regular hierarchical structure from the root of each document.
This may be used to define a coordinate systems, based on the names and ordered numberings of identifiable ob-
jects within the document. Locations are specified by URI, URN, URL path identifiers. These path locators provide
nominal semantic coordinates based on a spanning tree formed from the markup elements. This is a generalization
of hierarchical file naming, e.g. C:\parent\children\sarah.
In order for similar things (semantics or meanings) to map to similar locations, the encoding of properties that form
the key must promise to be similar too. Thus ‘car’ and ‘lorry’, as words, would not be likely to occupy a similar
neighbourhood, but if both are associated with wheels and transport, then they can be. Hierarchical classification
can thus play a role in ‘namespacing’ concepts, as we shall see in section 5.1.3. This is the basis for taxonomy by
the idea of ‘prototypes’ [20].
Definition 10 (Taxonomy) A directed acyclic graph (tree) of name agents forming an ordered hierarchy of con-
cepts and exemplars, with the level of generalization increasing towards the root of the tree, and sub-categories
diverging towards the leaves.
Tree structures apply a discrimination criterion to separate and resolve mutually exclusive branches, and separate
conceptual branches into ‘namespaces’ (see paper II). This forms a path-like coordinate system, as is common
in computer file systems, with directories for each nested superagent. A generalization of taxonomy, as used in
computer science, is found in attempts to apply first order logic to relationships between named concepts. This is
called ontology. The specific meaning of ontology has evolved since the widespread use of machine learning.
Definition 11 (Ontology) A network of agents, representing concepts, contexts, and semantic associations, whose
spanning tree forms a taxonomic hierarchy.
It follows from basic promise theory axioms that each agent is free to decompose the world, according to its
perception, into (super)agents by its own criteria and resources [2, 6]. Similarly it is free to associate meanings
to their exterior promises. As one forms spanning trees of such named agencies, physically or conceptually, by
annotating the representation of the physical domains with names and labels (see section 6.7). As an approach
to addressing, taxonomies may be inefficient, if they become too deep because they must be parsed serially and
recursively. Fast hashing aims to reduce the dimensionality of a space for approximate match. Shallow, broad
trees, or balanced trees are often preferred as data storage structures for their predictability and cost during parsing
[21, 22].
2.4.5 Symmetry breaking and deterministic descriptions
Purely relative, differential characterizations of a system (such as the propagation rules we refer to as laws of
motion), are essentially empty of content, in the sense that they make vacuous predictions based on known sym-
metries and constraints. Without fixed boundary information, e.g. about initial or final states, no predictions can
be made, because there is no content, only relative constraints. A propagation rule can thus be made to predict
almost anything; only sources and sinks of information are non-invariant, symmetry breaking, singular states and
transitions [23] that can anchor these predictions to some fixed information. Boundary markers inject information
into a spacetime description (see section 3.11.2).
The kind of deterministic prediction, which follows from a propagation of boundary conditions, tempts the idea
of a rigid universe, with mechanical predictability. The classical notion of Newtonian spacetime is effectively such
a solid-state lattice of points, with rigid adjacencies. It brings a mathematical predictability to spacetime paths: if
we traverse a link in a known direction, we can count where we are in this predictable world. We are so used to
thinking in this way that it is tempting to believe that we cannot represent or encode much information without
such a rigid spacetime. However, this is not the case. Even agents in a fluid phase may imitate the information
in a solid phase, if there is a sufficient separation of timescales. Example 2, about the fixed stars, indicates how
this comes about in a well known astronomical case. Other forms of dynamical symmetry breaking are found in
biology (where membranes and differentiated regions of cells combine from differentiated scale interactions), and
in weather patterns (where clouds, cells, and fronts lead to the formation of spatial cells of high and low pressure
or moisture).
The separation of timescales is how effective local boundary conditions emerge in a dynamical system, allow-
ing symmetry to be effectively locally (dynamically) broken for all intents and purposes, at one timescale, while
actually remaining globally invariant in the greater reckoning. However, there is a conundrum here when we think
of systems as discrete information: how can we understand timescales, when the very clocks that define them are
made of the very stuff they measure.
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2.5 Temporal semantics
Time is the rate at which an observer experiences change, i.e. the rate at which configurations in space are perceived
to change. We don’t need to know why spacetime elements change, but when they do, an observer’s clock ticks.
How an observer perceives time may depend on what context or state of mind the observer is in (e.g. awake,
asleep, busy, idle, and equivalent non-human states). This contextual aspect to temporal interpretation affects an
observer’s ability to assess and characterize existing promises and changes; it affects the granularity of time’s
agency, and its sequential ordering.
Time cannot be defined without a semantic space (i.e. some collection of agents that can represent state),
because time does not happen unless there is a clock to measure it. Thus, without spacetime semantics, there is no
natural justification for a relationship between space and time, and time could not exist in the way we understand
it. To define the smallest clock we need sufficient number degrees of freedom to represent uniquely distinguishable
states. Intervals of time are often defined ad hoc, based on a standard scale for speed, in the mathematical tradition
of imagining time to be an independent theatre, but Einstein showed us that this is not a consistent viewpoint: we
must understand that clocks are made of space, and thus space (agency) and time are inseparable.
Example 11 (Stories, narratives, world line knowledge) Spacetime structures that relate to knowledge modelling
include processes, concepts, associations, contexts, etc. These form storylines or narratives, which in turn describe
an experience of ‘proper time’ for an observer7. For example: a person comes into the entrance, goes through a
changing room that promises lockers for storage, then the bathing rooms, and so on.
Example 12 (Temporal semantics) The many interpretational semantics of time include the following examples.
1. Local metric/sequential time: (e.g. a stopwatch counting). In practice, all clocks have finite number of
configurations to use for memory and thus can count only for a limited interval After this, time must repeat,
though not necessarily in the same order on each covering.
e.g. we may construct a precise equational specification of metric time TC as a simple counting mechanism
that satisfies the algebra an image Alg(ΣΦ, EΦ) of a clock C. This is a simple clock that wraps around to
zero when it reaches a maximum counting value. The value ‘1’ represents a tick of the clock. Let’s give a
detailed explication of this one case to illustrate.
signature ΣC
sorts : TC ∈ (Z)
constants
0 : → TC
1 : → TC
Tmax > 1 : → TC
operations :
· : TC × TC → TC .
equations ΦC
(∀T ∈ TC) T + 0 = T,
0 + T = T,
T + Tmax = T
Tmax + T = T
T1 + T2 = T2 + T1,
T1 + (T2 + T3) = (T1 + T2) + T3,
(∀T, ∃ − T ∈ TC) T + (−T ) = 0
(−T ) + T = 0
end (5)
This is a discrete representation of ZN where N = Tmax. Quasi-continuous versions of a clock can be
constructed by increasing the size of Tmax. We can extend this approach to specify formal semantics for any
measure on a collection of agents.
7The concept of proper time is well known in general theory of relativity as the time experienced by an observer along its path [24].
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2. Clock/calendar time:
A tuple of metric time clocks that accumulate state in a cylindrical coordinate system e.g. (seconds, minutes,
hours, days, . . .), or ‘12:06:22’. Each dimension is a different granular decompositions of accumulated
state, representable as a metric clock. As the second hand of the clock wraps around, the next counter
advances, in a cylindrical wrapping.
Example 13 (Coordination by fixed clock) The temporal analogy to measuring positions relative to the
fixed stars, or fixed markers, is measuring time relative to a common clock. Agents can coordinate their
activities relative to a fixed clock, or (if they have sufficient internal time-keeping capabilities) they can
synchronize their own internal clocks by extensive peer to peer coordination.
3. Time as a state and as an agent:
A map Tstate of string names SN to clock or calendar times TC that characterize all of the times on a calendar
or clock times, e.g. ‘now’, ‘Monday morning’, ‘Friday afternoon’, ‘then’, ‘recently’, ‘last week’,... It could
be distance travelled from an origin, or amount of sand fallen.
4. Global metric/sequential time:
In which an entire system is its own clock, i.e. any change represents a tick of a global clock. This behaves
exactly like a transaction log or software version control system, in which a tick corresponds to an ordered
transactional ‘commit’ to a database i.e. each tick is the record of a change between adjacent spacelike
hypersurface.
5. Rate of change:
Distinguishability of temporal state, at fixed location, relative to an observer’s separate clock.
6. Time as a resource:
Do you have time?
7. Trajectories:
Open spacetime patterns: non-repeating spacetime path.
8. Orbits:
Closed spacetime patterns: circling, waiting, eating, sleeping.
Absolute and relative notions of time do exist (see [23] for a discussion in the framework of equational speci-
fications and state machines). A discrete aggregate concept of time is essential to creating spacetime associations,
because if time had infinite resolution, it would be infinitely improbable that coordinate pairs would identify the
intended points.
Definition 12 (Concurrent interval) A collection of events, signals, or ticks, arriving either serially or in paral-
lel, that are considered to occur ‘simultaneously’, during a single tick of a clock.
Clocks cannot have infinite resolution, as this would lead to the need for infinite information.
Example 14 (Concurrent data) Any discrete aggregation process leads to a concurrent time approximation.
Each time we bake a cake, we assemble inputs into a unit output. There is no discernable order to the mixture
at the granularity of the cake. Each time a population census is taken, the counting result stands as a single mo-
ment in time until the next one it performed, and there is no memory of the process by which the counting took
place. The entire process is a concurrent interval, coarse grained into a single output. The uncertainty about
associating concurrent events grows with the coarseness of the concurrent interval.
Concurrent intervals include discretizations of streams: network packets, single promises, packages, enveloped
messages, containers, words, etc. Any natural, discrete unit of aggregation may be coarse grained into an effective
unit of time.
The concept of concurrent or simultaneous events is only possible in a discrete spacetime. The discretization of
spacetime, whether one chooses to think of it as fundamental or a limitation of an observer’s faculties, is essential
to the ability to limit the resolution of measurement information, and generate repeatable sensory experiences that
can become knowledge. In this sense, approximation is the key to be able to represent stable knowledge.
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2.6 The semantics of spacetimes and dynamical systems
For dynamical and functional interaction, space and time interact in inseparable ways, so it is convenient to simply
talk about spacetime. The temporal aspect of ‘world lines’, or paths that trace the linear experience of an observer,
play a significant role in staging experiences into storylines that we associate with meaning. The selection of a
preferred path is a form of directional symmetry breaking in spacetime. Direction is one dimensional, thus time is
one-dimensional.
In any extended structure, which links agents together in chains by adjacency, sequential partial ordering is
a necessary phenomenon. Thus, timelines, world lines, and storylines are a necessary outcome of understanding
interaction trajectories for localized observers8. This unidirectional sequencing manifests in a number of ways:
• Bottom up representation of communicated language, as symbolic streams.
• Top down reduction of patterns to find atomic symbol alphabet (reductionism).
Processes that are bounded at a spacetime location lead also to a directionality:
1. Converging towards a fixed end state.
2. Diverging from a fixed start state.
2.6.1 Assigning coordinates
Ordering of agents and signals is a cooperative spacetime phenomenon (see paper I) that requires there to be sym-
metry breaking, i.e. the definition of a preferred direction in the degrees of freedom of a collection of agents. How
one assigns ordered labels to a collection of agents goes beyond the scope of this work, but has been considered
elsewhere9. The use of a central coordinator or observer, connected directly like a routing hub, with the ability to
discriminate paths has many advantages, because it can be the discriminator of order as well as the agent by which
messages are routed. This obviates the need for the end node agents to promise a specific identity. A hub agent
would naturally double as a router for passing signals10.
Example 15 (Cooperative waves) Waves that pass through agents by local or global cooperation are spacetime
relative phenomena based on symmetry breaking. For example, green waves that move through traffic lights to
keep traffic moving are timed relative to a fixed wall clock, or controlled by a single controller. All traffic lights
promise to turn green at a coordinated time relative to a fixed marker (like the fixed stars/fixed wall clock examples).
Similarly, fan waves at sports games propagate by observation of nearest neighbours.
2.6.2 Time series
Time series are a form of data that expresses a trend or a pattern over an interval of sequential times. The meaning
of time series depends on the semantics of the time-base. Time series may represent open ended trajectories or
closed circuit periodograms to respect and model the underlying freedoms of a spacetime trajectory [28–30].
Example 16 (Periodic time-series) Behavioural data form time series with distinct patterns (see figure 3). In
the figure, we can imagine measuring resource consumption in a workplace, or the rate of information flow in a
computer network. The time base covers a single working week from Monday to Sunday. When we reach the end
of one week of samples, we overlay new data at the corresponding time of weekday by modulo arithmetic. The
aggregations occur with the same temporal semantics for each interval, assuming that there is a repeated pattern of
behaviour each working week. Unbiased data measurements reveal strongly auto-correlated patterns that confirm
this pattern in many systems driven by human behaviour. By representing the pattern in the semantics of the time-
base, we can effectively learn the temporal pattern efficiently, and compare only semantically equivalent times.
This temporal cyclicity traces back to the rotation of the planets.
Example 17 (Linear time-series) Discrete time series are found in symbolic strings, whose time series form syn-
tax. In computational and linguistic literature, a grammar is an alphabet with a number of generative rules,
leading to computable patterns. In bio-informatics, grammars may be seen in DNA [31]. Grammars are classified
8Even if the goal is to manufacture an artificial representation of a problem, such as the layout of a department store, such a structure has to
be able to learn and adapt by evolving in relation to interactions with the agents that parse its structure.
9Unique addresses can be assigned to a gas of agents too in a self-organizing manner in ad hoc networks [25,26]. If addressing comes with
crystallization of a addressable lattice, e.g. a collection of cells that self-organize into a regular pattern...then we need a notion of di-polarity or
orientation for the joining of independent fragments to bring about monotonicity in the numbering. In an already solid phase, the problem is
simpler, and the symmetry is broken by choosing an end point, e.g see the self-organizing spanning trees [27].
10This is true in the design of IPv6, for example.
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Monday morning Monday afternoon Monday evening Monday night Tuesday morning
graduated data
Figure 3: A time series measures sampled data against a semantically significant ordinal timescale. The ordering might be
open, bifurcating or periodic. The vertical scale resolution is the self-calibrated perception of sensors, and the horizontal scale
resolution is based on sampling frequency relative to some larger model that is identified as meaningful in this context (e.g. the
working week).
by the kind of computer needed to parse the pattern faithfully [32,33]. In promise theory we phrase it as a voluntary
cooperation construction: a grammar is a collection of agents and superagents that make promises, and whose top
level adjacency has the form of a one dimensional chain11. Languages are related to algorithmic state machines,
according to Chomsky’s theorem [34]: they are spacetime phenomena, with concurrent words/symbols/statements
and temporal progression.
Lemma 4 (Inseparable space and discrete time (including time pattern)) The representation of a timeseries,
as a concurrent phenomenon, involves spatial pattern representation within a concurrent time slice.
Any repeated pattern marks out a discrete interval whose semantics represent a scaled concurrent phenomenon.
3 The structure and semantics of data patterns and representations
Underlying all communication is the ability to attach meaning to patterns. It is the basis of information transfer
in communications theory, linguistics, and computation. Grammars are scaling patterns of the agencies by which
linguistic symbols are carried, and projected into sequential (one dimensional) streams. Sequential streams are,
by their nature, temporal when communicated, but may be stored in a spatial memory. Chomsky showed that
grammars are associated with transition systems operating on discrete linear patterns [34]; from this we have a
theory of signalling and data encoding [32] that goes beyond Shannon’s basic information theory [9].
The encoding of information signals may take a variety of representations, of which natural languages are
the most complex forms. In information technology, it has become the norm to speak simply of ‘data’, as a
stream of symbolism for encoding by a plethora of underlying binary formats (ASCII, EBCDIC, UNICODE, least
significant byte first, binary-coded decimal, big-endian, little-endian, etc) is taken for granted, precisely because it
is of fundamental importance.
3.1 Information content of space
Consider a set of agentsAi, forming a semantic space. At each point, an agent may have an alphabet of promisable
characteristics Ci, with index αi = 1, 2, . . . Ci. We can define the distribution of promises by
pαi =
p if αi is promised, i.e.Ai
+αi−−→ A?
0 otherwise
(6)
11Human language is linear too, but thinking is not: we experience flashes of insight, in which it is not necessary to recount a story in our
minds, step by step (though we may do so later to rationalize it). This is evidence that thinking is not performed in the manner of a Turing
machine.
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and
Ci∑
αi=1
pαi = 1. (7)
Then the intrinsic information at point Ai is the Shannon entropy [9]
Si = −
Ci∑
αi=1
pαi log pαi . (8)
We note that the information at each point is potentially based on a different alphabet Ci 6= Cj , and is therefore a
priori uncalibrated. In order to compare the information over a path or region of spacetime, a common alphabet is
needed (see also the discussion in paper II, section 2).
In order to information to propagate to neighbouring agents, e.g. to act as a fixed marker signpost, agents need
to have a non-empty overlap in their promisable states, i.e. a common sub-alphabet
Ai
+C−−→ Aj (9)
Aj
−C−−→ Ai. (10)
Thus, over an extended region or path, spacetime agents must have a minimum common alphabet of symbolic
promises (see also paper II, section 2). This issue is related to the notion of schemas in data.
Definition 13 (Translation invariance of information alphabet) A region of space may be said to be transla-
tionally invariant over its information alphabet if the alphabet of each agent is everywhere constant, i.e.
d+C
∣∣∣
i
= Ci+ − Ci = 0. (11)
This is a non-local coordination, or long range ordering. See paper I about derivative d+.
The injection of new information, at a particular location i, is an insertion of information that can be promised to
agents capable of recognizing the same alphabet.
Definition 14 (Non-local informational entropy) The distribution information of alphabetic type α is defined by:
SR(α) = −
∑
i∈R
pαi log pαi . (12)
This represents the intrinsic information in the variation of property α over a region of space.
Lemma 5 (Breaking translation invariance reduces information) If the space is translationally invariant for
all α, then it has maximum entropy log |R|. If the α invariance is broken, then SR(α) < log |R|, for any or all α.
This is proof is self-explanatory. It refers to changes in the promises at points within a region, for fixed alphabet.
A change in alphabet can also break translational invariance, as observed by an independent observer who can
recognize the alphabets of all the agents, however this change is not generally recognizable to neighbouring agents
whose alphabets are not equivalent, because they may only be able to recognize the alphabetic properties they have
in common.
3.2 Data and data types
Any encoded pattern, in any medium, represents data, and may be measured for its information content. We
should distinguish data as a promise from the promise concept of data containers or agency. Data are represented
by promised values, while the containers of the representation are agents. Thus, even non-scalar data type may be
represented by scalar promises (scalar refers to two different things here).
Definition 15 (Data) A stable pattern promised by any kind of agent or superagent structure.
The significance of the pattern depends on the overlap of promiser and promisee’s interpretation [6]. In promise
theory, agents are the only medium in which patterns can be represented, by design. Data are thus the pattern
values promised by agents. Data values fall into two major interpretations:
16
Definition 16 (Nominal data values) The mapping of patterns indicating into a set of symbols with distinct iden-
tity.
Definition 17 (Numerical (ordinal/cardinal) data values) Quantitative representations indicating relative mag-
nitude on some tuple of generally real-valued scales.
Example 18 (Tuple spanning of values) The representation of numbers in the Arabic system uses tuples based on
powers of 10, using symbols 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9. For instance, one thousand and twenty three is written (1,0,2,3)
or simply 1023, where the coordinate tuples map powers of ten (103, 102, 101, 100).
Example 19 (Data containers) In computer programming languages, the agents that promise data are called
variables, constants, buffers, etc; in communications protocols, and documents, the agents are called fields, etc.
When communicating data, a sender S agent might copy data from one representation, in its internal memory, into
another, within signal agent, which is then emitted and absorbed by the receiver R.
Definition 18 (Scalar data) The promise of scalar data, e.g. X = 8 has the form
AX
+8−−→ R (13)
In general data must be ‘typed’, i.e. must promise an intended interpretation in order to make sense to a recipient:
Definition 19 (Typed scalar data) A typed promise of scalar data, is a body doublet including an intended type
and a value, e.g.
AX
+(integer,3)−−−−−−−−→ R (14)
AY
+(string,3)−−−−−−−→ R (15)
Aggregate data are promised in the same way.
Definition 20 (Aggregate typed data) The promise of non-scalar typed data, e.g.
X = (integer1, integer 3, string ‘nine′) has the form
AX
+(integer1,integer 3,string ‘nine′)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ R (16)
Lemma 6 (Scalar representation) All data promised by a single agent may be represented by scalar promises.
The proof of this is trivial: promise body can contain any bundle of promises:
A
+b−−→ R (17)
where b can represent any tuple: a scalar value, an array, a bundle of values, and even a number of internal agents.
In other words, scalar promises are not the same as scalar values. Scalar data refer to single named values. A scalar
promise refers to an internal property of a single agent [1]. We may also remark that agents that promise data form
Scalar
Scalar
Scalar
Scalar
Scalar
Scalar
A
A
A
Vector Vector
Vector
Thing /element
Thing/element Thing/element
Figure 4: Elements of semantic space may be viewed as autonomous agents surrounded by a cloud of scalar promises, joined
into a semantic web by vector promise bindings.
a semantic space.
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Lemma 7 (Data form a semantic space) Agents promising data are the elements of a semantic space.
The proof is straightforward: a semantic space is a collection of agents that make scalar promises. They make
vector promises to coordinate in groups. Data values are spacetime scalars, whether single valued or aggregate
types12. Objects promise non-ordered adjacency (superagency) in clusters of non-similar agents. Arrays promise
ordered adjacency in clusters of similar agents. The phase of the space (i.e. its adjacency structure) need not be
defined.
3.3 Schemas, types, and the chemistry of composition
If combinations of atomic data are received on a regular basis, it makes sense to bind them into homogeneous
‘molecules’ of fixed types, which can be recognized and stacked efficiently in space. Aggregated data thus form
superagents that promise multiple internal data items under a single identity. The members inside form a ‘schema’
which is given by the superagent directory [2]. This leads to a simple form of hierarchical containment. Heuristi-
cally, schemas are molecular scale superagents, formed from atomic agents.
Definition 21 (Schema, data class, or compound type) A schema S is a bundle of sub-agents and concurrent
promises within a superagent. A schema is thus closely linked with the superagent directory, revealing its specific
internal structure.
A schema acts as a declaration of constraint on the form of a superagent’s composition, without fixing the values
of any instance of the pattern.
Example 20 (Data schema) An object X may contain internal members, whose directory is a set of promises
about structure, but not value.
X : {
integer subagent1;
real subagent2;
string subagent3;
}
The schema promises three sub-agents, each of which makes scalar promises about their type, from an alphabet,
which contains at least integer, real, and string.
Definition 22 (Schema instance) An manifest superagent whose directory is assessed to be an instance of schema
S.
Schemas are well known in database theory, where tabular structures are ubiquitous [35].
Lemma 8 (A schema has constant semantics) A schema, and all instances of a schema imply constant semantics
for each distinct promise.
As key-value pairs, the semantics of keys are constant, but the values of data are not. The purpose of a schema is to
promise constant semantics across a collection of data, whose values may vary. This promises semantic calibration,
ensuring that data can be compared meaningfully.
Example 21 (Schemaless data) Data that do not have a homogeneous spatial template are schemaless. Their
representation does not have a bounded alphabet. A JSON file used as a specification with an ad hoc schema
(sometimes called schemaless) has only a single data point, so we have no statistically significant basis for building
a relationship with it, unless it is re-iterated intentionally to underline its authority. This kind of data may crave
greater trust, based on an external authority, to reliably interpret the schema.
Example 22 (Fixed or homogeneous schemas) A repeated schema, such as sensor data in the same format, but
which never repeat the same value are uncertain in value, but one has increasing confidence in the meaning of the
schema.
The formation of a schema is a form of spacetime symmetry reduction: agents take on a restricted pattern, instead
of one exploring all possible freedoms, which may be then repeated like a template. This is an alphabet reduction
in the informational sense of section 3.1.
In a space whose agents promise a homogeneous schema, locations may not be equivalent in their data values,
but locations are semantically equivalent in their alphabets. There is still residual symmetry between agents with
12The term scalar is also used about single value data types, but that is a different meaning. Here we mean the tensor meaning of scalar.
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the same schema. If agents are schemaless, there is complete symmetry breaking, with neither a common alphabet
nor a common value. The breaking of data symmetry establishes identifiable anchors or signposts by which data
can be compared and aligned, but the ability to use these as anchors assumes that neighbouring agents can recognize
the inhomogeneity, and position themselves relative to it.
Lemma 9 (Schema translation) If a collection of agents has different schemas, they may interact with external
agents via any agent whose schema alphabet overlaps with all of the different schemas.
The proof of this follows from the propagation criterion in (10). An intermediate agent can select and expose only
those parts of a schema that are common, and present a calibrated interface to the irregular schemas.
A schema alphabet is a simple grammar. The information contained in its labels may be used to separate data
into different contexts, as it is parsed sequentially. If a schema changes over time, that too could indicate a change
of context in the data, but it could be a challenge for the semantics of the data. In learning, we normally wish to
compare to similar data at several times, with a calibrated schema, so that we may assume the data have the same
interpretation on each sampling (this is the cornerstone of the scientific method). If a schema changes, there is
additional uncertainty about data interpretation, which cannot be easily quantified. The need for a stable schema
thus depends on the extent to which one expects to form a stable iterative knowledge relationship with a data
source.
Rare events Regular events
Ad hoc search/detection Specialized sensor/cached assumptions
No representative Represented by an average
Variable schema Fixed schema
The usefulness of cooperation over schema calibration may change the criterion for spacetime organization.
Different types of agent (i.e. agents with different schemas) lead to compound that express a functional chemistry
with different functional properties.
Example 23 (Components and compounds) Electronic components fall into schemas we could call resistors,
capacitors, inductors, transistors, etc. For the purpose of searching it is natural to store instances of the same
schema close together in a semantic space, e.g. in a warehouse. When exploiting the chemistry of interaction, e.g.
to build a television, the chief concern becomes to mix these components efficiently, so that their unique functions
are near to where they are needed. Then keeping all resistors together is no longer supports the intended semantics.
3.4 Type calibration, bases, and matroids (recap)
In a promise graph, scalar data type promises may be represented as vector promises, connecting to an authori-
tative calibration agent (matroid basis), which acts as a ‘standard candle’. Or, they may be calibrated by mutual
equilibrium over a collection of agents that claim similar promises (see figure 5, and the discussion in paper I).
For the former case, each such singularity represents one unique scalar property (see figure 5): this is how one
forms a matroid or spanning set for nominal properties (see [1]). Thus conceptual linkage becomes associated with
spacetime singular agents, or anchors, that ensure mutual calibration, and semantic stability. The alternative of
mutual linkage into a complete graph involves labelling not just a single agent, but pairs of links between all the
agents, with O(N2).
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
Blue
+You are Blue
− Yes, I’ll buy that
R G B
(1,0,0)
(2,0,0)
(3,0,1)
(4,1,0) (5,2,0)
Figure 5: Calibrating a type property, either by equilibrating with a single reference source (singularity), or by normalizing a
clique.. Right, an explicit matroid basis for global properties with three property hubs adding three components to the coordinate
tuples.
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The desire for uniqueness and stability often leads us to construct the single source model for property/type
attribution. This makes concepts rigid, localized, and standardized rather than plastic, distributed and subject to
shifting equilibria. Equilibration with a central source has a cost advantage (O(N) versus O(N2)), and turns
the scalar property into its own dimensional coordinate index, as there is now a direct route from this to every
instance of it (see figure 5). This choice of basis is related to the centralization or decentralization of knowledge
representations.
Definition 23 (Symmetry breaking) The loss of locational equivalence under arbitrary spatial translations. Spa-
tially distributed promises take on only a restricted set of values or patterns, compared to what is otherwise possible
at only a subset of particular locations.
In this sense, symmetry breaking is involved in the crystallization of a gas with arbirary positions to a solid state, as
well as any introduction of edges, boundaries or markers, whether by equilibration or singular agent representation.
3.5 Trust and certainty in data calibration
Accepting an authoritative matroid basis-agent as a calibrated standard for a spanning property assumes a level of
trust. Trust is acquired by a learning process, i.e. it is based on extended relationships [5]. A promise theoretical
subtlety here is that the property represented by a matroid basis agent (e.g. blue in figure 5) is promised by the basis
agent, and is accepted by the associated clients. Any agent could set itself up as the authoritative source for ‘blue’,
and stand in competition, e.g. namespaces and scoped blocks limit the reach of definitions. This becomes particular
relevant as we consider representations of authoritative identity in humans spaces , such as homes, communities,
and cities.
Example 24 (Types in natural science) What agency is the authoritative source for the scalar property of being
an electron?
3.6 Data dimensionality: aggregates
Data are processed serially (each transaction generating the notion of system time); however, concurrent promises
or parallelism may be used to represent data in parallel threads, and nested superagency may be used to bundle
orthogonal degrees of freedom as concurrent promises. Concurrent promises are thus the basis for aggregate data
representations.
We can use the scaling arguments of paper II [2] to express data representations in terms of agents and su-
peragents. By wrapping data inside layers of containers (agents within agents), we combine schemas, promise
independent names, and form namespaces to limit scope. Internal structure is promised by a superagent directory
or index [2].
Two kinds of aggregation may be formed from scalar values:
Definition 24 (Data structure or data object) A uniquely named superagent S, formed from uniquely named
subagents Ai, each of which promises values. Let S = {A1, . . . , An}, where each subagent promises typed
scalar values
S
+nameS−−−−−→ R (18)
Ai
+namei−−−−→ S (19)
Ai
+(typei,valuei)−−−−−−−−−−→ R (20)
Some structures may be transparent, while others maybe opaque to external agents.
Definition 25 (Transparent, typed structure or object) An object Sτ , of aggregate type τ is transparent, iff it
promises directory of members to R:
Sτ
+directoryτ−−−−−−→ R. (21)
The directory of type τ contains the types and data member names of the superagent S. See section 3.7 of paper
II [2] on superagency and directories.
See paper II for a description of directories.
Example 25 (Data object) An object X may contain internal members:
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X : {
subagent1 : 3,
subagent2 : 4,
subagent3 : 5
}
If the object is opaque, it promises only its exterior name X , and the interior structure is not promised, i.e. it is
unknown to outside agents. We might then call X a ‘blob’. If it is transparent, there is a directory of its internal
agents and their promises:
X.subagent1 = 3
X.subagent2 = 4
X.subagent3 = 5
Objects are inhomogeneous collections of subagents that promise any kind or type. Arrays are totally ordered
collections of agents promising symmetrical types (see section 5.4 of paper I [1] concerning ordering).
Definition 26 (Array) A totally ordered collection of semantically equivalent, symmetrical objects, under a single
common name. Each member of an array makes all the same type promises, as the others, but may have different
values. A uniquely named superagent S, formed from uniquely ordered subagents Ai, each of which promises
different values of the same type. Let S = {A1, . . . , An}, where each subagent promises typed scalar values
Sτ
+(+τ,nameS)−−−−−−−−→ R (22)
Ai
+(Sτ ,namei)−−−−−−−→ R (23)
The type and value may themselves be uniformly compound objects.
Each element in an array thus promises:
• Membership to the compound ordered structure.
• A value promise, indicating its primary function.
• An index number or name promise (elements may be associative, i.e. nominal rather than ordinal in general),
indicating its intended position within the collective.
Example 26 (Data array) An array X may contain internal members of any type, including composite objects,
as long as they all have the same schema. Suppose the type τ is a doublet object (integer, real)
X[0] = (integer, 3) (real, 2.72)
X[1] = (integer, 4) (real, 3.14)
X[2] = (integer, 5) (real, 1.0)
The dimension of an object class is the number of scalar degrees of freedom, promised by it. The dimension of a
representation is the number of promised scalar values, or occupied slots. In an instantiated object, all degrees of
freedom are filled, thus the dimension of an instance could be considered zero, but it is more useful to refer to the
dimension of its schema.
3.7 The role of agent phase in data representation
If we follow the axiomatic approach, and represent each independently variable property of data by a separate
agent, perhaps within the collected boundary of a superagent, then the three levels of data aggregation are repre-
sented by the ordered and disordered material phases of semantic space:
• Scalars are atomic, ad hoc agents with only external promises.
• Objects are composite scalars, i.e. connected molecular superagents, with both internal and external promises,
and inhomogeneous composition.
• Arrays are homogeneous lattices of scalar promises, i.e. agents in crystalline lattice, with homogeneous
long range order. Arrays offer limited translational symmetry, with a homogeneous schema, by chaining
together agents into a regular ordered structure.
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Example 27 (Promise graph vs JSON) Consider a typed data stream (e.g. JSON encoded data). We can extract
values and model their agency in representing functional behaviour in a system.
{
"kind": "Service",
"metadata": {
"name": "myagent"
},
"spec": {
"ports": [ 8765, 9376 ],
"selector": {
"agent": "example"
},
"type": "LoadBalancer"
}
}
This stream is composed of a signal agent named ‘kind’, and two signal superagents called ‘metadata’ and ‘spec’.
The signal agents represent concurrent promise bundles within their interiors.
type
LoadBalancer
ports
selector
example
name
metadata
kind
+service
8766
9376
0
1
agent
Figure 6: Promise graph for the JSON data representation in the example 27. Scalar promises are simple aliases for the agent
names, while the aggregate superagent ports vector requires an additional solid-state vector ordering agreement between the
agents.
3.8 Data encoding relative to fixed markers (protocols)
Data may be transmitted as an array of raw values, or pre-annotated with labels and significant symbols, in the
form of a protocol. Smart sensory apparatus may perform preprocessing that annotates data values in a predictable
protocol, while raw sensors pass only simple signal sequences. Decoding the significance of data adds to its
semantic value and assists in building knowledge representations, by reducing the amount of recognition that is
needed relative to the behaviour of the sensors. How we utilize markers (signposts) to ground and punctuate
patterns is therefore of the utmost importance to understanding and deriving value from the structure of data. This
encoding and decoding is the realm of formal grammars, and grammatical protocol is the basis for language and
communication. Markers and delimiters break the equivalence of array positions for raw data, establishing anchor
points for aligning expectations between a sender and a receiver, i.e. a promiser and a promisee.
Definition 27 (Encoding) The establishment of boundary conditions in a semantic space that break free symme-
tries for the purpose of anchoring an interpretation of a collection of data promises.
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In promise theory, scalar promises at fixed agent locations represent boundaries and boundary values (see paper I).
Data encoding involves an alphabet Σ. Some symbols are reserved with special meanings, e.g.
• Parentheses signify containment. Spatially, this plays the role of an embedded dimension.
• Arrays signify collections of agency that are equivalent under the membership, i.e. they have the same
semantics.
Definition 28 (Data stream or sequence) A data stream is a totally ordered set of signal agents emitted from a
source agent, and absorbed by a receiver agent.
A sequence transmitted from one agent to another involves a number of promises. The transmitted signal is
composed of signal agents that may or may not promise a total ordering. These promises are made both to the
sender and the receiver, else the sequence order cannot be transmitted faithfully. All symbolic language (including
phonetic language) depends on this construction.
S R
6
5
4
3
2
1
Figure 7: A sequence is a spacetime coordinated promises. this is identical to figure 8 except that the source of the data
encoding is absent.
Example 28 (Parsing) In the traversal or parsing of streams, an agent13 assesses a stream of samples to identify
agents within the stream that have assumed meanings. These are called tokens in parsing. It searches a partially
ordered list of patterns (normally sorted by largest pattern first) and guesses the interpretation of these tokens.
Context free languages may have specific token orders, but do not attach different semantics to different spacetime
locations. Context specific languages (e.g. markup languages) may attach different semantics to different contexts,
or embedded regions within a stream.
Encoding may be serial (timelike) or parallel (spacelike):
Definition 29 (Serial, temporal encoding) In a temporal encoding there is an alphabet of symbols, some of which
are special symbols to mark out space and time: parentheses for spatial digressions. Item separators, like whites-
pace and punctuation, indicate the boundaries of agency. This is a stream or a protocol.
.
Example 29 (Non atomic symbols) Not all alphabets are atomic. In written Chinese, the symbols are formed
from a deeper level of atomic motifs, combined into a collections of overlapping symbols. Words too are symbols
that function collectively as concurrent data representations.
Definition 30 (Parallel, spatial encoding) In a parallel encoding, spatial dimensions are encoded either by direct
mapping in representation space, or by indexing with a tuple basis set. This is a memory array.
.
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Figure 8: A possibly ordered collection of agents may represent aggregate data in a distributed manner. The interpretation of
the collection is entirely up to the receiving agent R.
Example 30 (Parallel distributed data encoding) Agents may cooperate with each other to represent structures
in a variety of ways (see figure 8). Parallel encoding of concurrent data, rather than sequential streams, are
common in disk striping, RAID configurations for disks, etc.
Definition 31 (Boundary markers and anchors (temporal punctuation)) Special points along a stream trajec-
tory may imbue locations with a particular significance. Such anchor points include boundaries, signal delimiters,
parentheses, initial and final points, etc.
Example 31 (Anchoring by agent type (spatial signposts)) Any exterior promise (name, charge, spin, service
type, identity, etc) may be used to label an interstitial location within a homogeneous space. This is an explicit
symmetry breaking that injects information about location, by a reduction in non-local information.
Example 32 (Recursion markers) Parentheses may or may not be labelled to indicate different semantics. Inside
parentheses, special context dependent meanings may also apply, e.g. separators:
( , , ) [ , , ] { ; ; } (* ; ; *) ($ ; ; $)
3.9 Coordinates: spanning trees and tuples over data
Data may be coordinatized in two principal ways: by spanning tree, as a graph using nominal tuples, and as a
dimensional lattice or grid, using tuples (nominal or ordinal). Nominal tuples might look like this:
(grandmother,mother,child) -> scalar value
(grandfather,mother,child) -> scalar value
This may or may not assume ordering. Ordinal tuples have to assume an ordering:
(0,0,0) -> scalar value
(1,0,1) -> scalar values
An association with hierarchy is common, especially when the dimensionality is used to reduce spaces into subdi-
visions (see figure 9).
Spanning trees may be recursive by reference only, e.g. in linked type structures, objects can point to an object
of the same type, i.e. with symmetrical semantics:
type data_chain
{
integer value;
data_chain *pointer_to_next;
}
Example 33 (JSON and YAML data formats) The JSON data format is intended as a generic interchange for-
mat. JSON data structures are composed of three main kinds of value:
13Such an agent is called a parser or lexer.
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left  right
parentheses
paragraphs
sections
chapters
document (root)
sentences
Figure 9: Spanning tree and data hierarchy. Ordering may be preserved by promising a policy of depth-first, left-first recursion.
• Named values (scalars), represented as assignments lval : rval.
• Named lists of values (arrays), delimited by [ and ], with comma separator.
• Lists of named values and named lists of values (objects or structs), delimited by { and }.
Order is mainly important inside arrays, where order is the only semantic distinction as the elements are homo-
geneous. These correspond to the agent structures above, identifying data as agents that promise both identities
(names) and values., e.g.
{
"kind": "Service",
"metadata": {
"name": "myagent"
},
"spec": {
"ports": [ 8765, 9376 ],
"selector": {
"agent": "example"
},
"type": "LoadBalancer"
}
}
This structure can be coordinatized in a number of ways: e.g.
/kind -> Service
/metadata/name -> myagent
/spec/ports[0] -> 8765
/spec/ports[1] -> 9376
/spec/selector/agent -> example
/spec/type -> LoadBalancer
In this format, we understand the relational semantics as a spanning tree of absolute paths from a root node, and
the order is preserved as a ‘first in first out’ queue structure.
A less opinionated coordinatization may be assigned by ordinals. Here we cannot easily see the intended
naming of regions:
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( 1, 1{, 0, 0, )[0] -> "kind")
( 1, 1{, 0, 0, )[1] -> :
( 1, 1{, 0, 0, )[2] -> "Service"
( 1, 1{, 0, 0, )[3] -> "metadata"
( 1, 1{, 0, 0, )[4] -> :
( 1, 2{, 1{, 0, )[0] -> "name"
( 1, 2{, 1{, 0, )[1] -> :
( 1, 2{, 1{, 0, )[2] -> "myagent"
( 1, 3{, 0, 0, )[0] -> "spec"
( 1, 3{, 0, 0, )[1] -> :
( 1, 4{, 1{, 0, )[0] -> "ports"
( 1, 4{, 1{, 0, )[1] -> :
( 1, 4{, 2{, 1[, )[0] -> 8765
( 1, 4{, 2{, 1[, )[1] -> 9376
( 1, 4{, 3{, 0, )[0] -> "selector"
( 1, 4{, 3{, 0, )[1] -> :
( 1, 4{, 4{, 1{, )[0] -> "agent"
( 1, 4{, 4{, 1{, )[1] -> :
( 1, 4{, 4{, 1{, )[2] -> "example"
( 1, 4{, 5{, 0, )[0] -> "type"
( 1, 4{, 5{, 0, )[1] -> :
( 1, 4{, 5{, 0, )[2] -> "LoadBalancer"
( 1, 5{, 0, 0, ) ->
( 2, 0, 0, 0, ) ->
See appendix A. In YAML format, different delimiters are used:
kind: Service
metadata:
name: myagent
spec:
ports:
- 8765
- 9376
selector:
agent: example
type: LoadBalancer
YAML emphasizes temporal structure and relative state, Now the structure can only be understood in relative
terms, as parentheses are based on indentation level, i.e. ordinal coordinates within a two dimensional embedding
of the data within a page. Section markers are denoted by ‘- ’ and association is denoted by ‘: ’. These assume a
state machine rather than a stack for parentheses. A JSON or YAML structure is a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG).
The coordinatization of a JSON structure is by name and container path (a spanning tree).
Example 34 (CSV data formats) Comma Separated Values (CSV) are an array format. The names of data are
represented by their position in a regular spacial array. Names are not provided as table headers, but are assumed
to have been agreed by the implicit schema. This is a tuple coordinatization.
3.10 Streams, state, and memory
In any system that observes input through some sensory stream, assessments are converted into state, and memory
is involved in storing that state. The timescales of real world events and occurrences span all possible scales.
Events might be ephemeral, relative to an observer, in which case they could only contribute to the observer’s
context, or they might persist for repeated sampling as statistical ensemble averages.
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3.10.1 Assessment and timescales
There are three stages to assessing data, which are explored as a simple model for sensory knowledge in the
remainder of these notes:
1. Data sampling, with timescale Tsample.
2. Symbolization/tokenization/digitization, with timescale Ttoken.
3. Contextualization (combination of multiple sources), with timescale Tcontext.
Contextualization uses a short term memory to accumulate state, and keeps it as an short term assessment of the
state of the world. It is the ‘awareness’ of the agent’s situation.
Example 35 (Short term memory, modulation, and timescales) In later sections, we shall see how the short
term memory modulates the long term memory, allowing large amounts of stable information (slow) to be switched
on or off, by small amounts of context information (fast) (see figure 10). The modulation of long term learning by
situation awareness is a form of conditional switching.
Context contributes to defining the boundaries of applicability for memories, by allowing more permanent memo-
ries to be switched on and off in order to adapt to situations.
sensor/parser
context / meta
e.g. json
Input streampromises
+data visibility+policy
adaptation
serialization
Figure 10: Input stream is combined with a context according to promised policy, which is based on what has previously been
learned. The initial promise to learn and adapt are the way we bootstrap a system without pre-supervised training.
Example 36 (Feeding back learned patterns) The working week is a pattern that humans can learn, to bring
clarity to many processes that we sample and observe. However, this model may not be applicable to a train
journey, or a light switch, or a satellite’s environment. The major patterns of influence, experienced by an agent,
need to be learned over time, and calibrated for each kind of environment individually. Feeding back these patterns
to condition the way assessments are made leads to a form of anomaly detection, or immediate abnormality alert
[30].
Patterns are crucial to the identification and learning of semantics. If a stable pattern is already known, it can be
assumed, and learnt permanently by hardcoding to save the cost of repeated recognition. This is what happens in
the separation between DNA and protein networks, which are stable over very different timescales.
3.10.2 Mapping input state to concurrent context
A sensor is an input channel that is monitored by an agent. Sensors are designed to select specific signals from
what is promised by the exterior environmental source.
Definition 32 (Sensor) A promise by an agent R to accept specific data d through a filter F , from a source S:
S
+d−−→ R (24)
R
−F |d−−−→ S, (25)
combined with the promise to relate an instantaneous assessment to a subsequent agent A:
R
α
(
R
−d−−→S
)
−−−−−−−−→ A. (26)
Assessments form a data stream, which obey the Markov property [36] in the absence of memory, i.e. in the absence
of memory, every sample is assessed independently of what came before.
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Sensors contribute to the state of the agentA, i.e. to the snapshot of an agent’s promisable characteristics. Memory
may be added to this later to enhance discrimination.
Definition 33 (State) A collection of concurrent assessments over an agent’s acceptance (-) promises.
The ability to assess concurrently assumes memory sufficient to promise the persistence of the assessments over
the interval, and perhaps beyond. The process by which assessments are made is familiar from information theory.
Definition 34 (Sampling) The projection of a sensor’s assessment into the alphabet of states of the receiver sys-
tem.
As an autonomous agent, a sensor may filter input as it likes.
Lemma 10 (Sensor resolution) The information resolution of the sensor is less than or equal to the resolution of
the sample.
This is assumed obvious, and is stated without proof.
Definition 35 (Parsing) The repeated sampling of a sequential stream to decode its concurrent symbols.
Closely related to state is the notion of context:
Definition 36 (Context (version 1)) A cumulative assessment of the state of promises, given and received by an
agent, over a concurrent interval of time.
An equivalent restatement of this definition is used in section 5.3.2.
Context is a short term model of a system; it is a self-assessment of an agent’s place within its surroundings.
Because it needs to change quickly, in step with its environment, its complexity has to be limited relative to what
could potentially be stored in a long term knowledge model. The status of context is thus a bit like ‘hearsay’, as
contrasted with confirmed evidential knowledge.
Definition 37 (Situation awareness) The assessment of context, from a set of interior and exterior sensory inputs,
relative to an agent, in comparison to an on-going longer term path of intent.
To maintain context in an operational system, there has to be a process within an agent that can work fast enough to
make assessments. This defines a timescale, which we call Tsample. The process of digital sampling (symbolization)
and contextualization must be of a similar order of magnitude in their timescales, and could well be closely related.
We may assume that these timescales are of the same order of magnitude, since sampling and symbolization are
interdependent in any representation of assessment14.
• The process of parsing structural information has state itself (Chomsky hierarchy). This can be referenced
in the interpretation of the data.
• The particular path taken in reading sensory input, i.e. a story or temporal structure can form a basis for an
evolving context.
• The state may be persistent or ephemeral.
3.10.3 Transmuting temporal association into spatial representation
A system’s spacetime state is its assessment of the present. It provides a notion of ‘here and now’, which, in
turn, provides a primary original foundation for associative linkage. Each frame of ‘here and now’ is like a
film reel that overlays new experiences and previously experienced concepts. It can be characterized only by
the combination of exterior sampled states with what has previously been learned and replayed from interior
knowledge representations. Interior representations can, moreover, only be based on interior spatial degrees of
freedom, i.e. what memory agents can promise. Labelled states could be assigned semantics directly, by linking
context tokens immediately into concepts, and they may take on semantics emergently over many iterations. Both
processes must be possible for non-trivial knowledge representation.
Example 37 (From sensor input to concept) Suppose we have sensors that sample and assess the exterior envi-
ronment in an aircraft. How could we reach assessments that have the semantics of high level concepts, e.g.
14Even if we imagine that the resolution of a sensor is real valued, with infinite resolution, it must be represented by internal states that can
be read in a finite amount of time, and hence must be finite. Thus all observations have finite resolution.
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Agent Context State
Plane flying, crashing, standing still in a hangar.
Wheel revolving, stationary, braking.
from the sensory measurements of speed, temperature, acceleration, etc.
A stream of assessments, by an observer agent, leads to a spacetime structure in which assessments become
connected. Shared semantics in a cluster could be used to define concepts from these.
Definition 38 (Temporally associated concepts (simultaneous activation)) Concepts may be called temporally
associated if they occur simultaneously within a concurrent interval, such as a context interval, or within the body
of a single promise.
The perceived simultaneity of context is where the association of long term concepts must begin (see figure 11).
This is a strategy used not only in cognition, but also in sensory systems like the immune response where lympho-
cytes require co-stimulation from antigen presenting cells to provide contextual confirmation of pathogen recog-
nition. Initially, during the bootstrapping of a knowledge system, there is no longer term memory of concepts or
their associations to rely on for self-calibration of context, but sensory context is continuously available.
),(
t3
t2
t1
,( ( ) ( )), =>
simultaneous
simultaneous
transitive
context
context
Figure 11: As concurrent units of data are received by an observer, associations happen in each interval by the co-stimulation
or co-activation of conceptual agents. This becomes transitive, by mutual association with intermediary. at a timescale greater
than the simultaneous/coincident signal agents.
key2
value1key1
value2
context
sensor group
additional interpretation by clustering
Figure 12: An observer can annotate what is observed, in context, by adding associations between tokens (names and values)
within a context. Depending on the memory of the observer, the annotation may include short relative times, or be limited
to simultaneity: e.g. key 1 preceded key 2, or when key1 was used value 2 was also in play, where key1 and key2 represent
different but related aspects of a common sensor interpretation, in (partial) pattern.
Context is cumulative, over successive concurrent intervals, hence it is a spatiotemporal state. It can thus
represent regions and paths. A context may represent spacetime locale. It might be what just happened, or where
we are currently located.
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Example 38 (Parsing a sentence (linguistics as cognition)) The parsing of a sentence involves short term state
memory (identified by the classifications of Chomsky theorem [34], and stochastic generalizations). An agent
parsing a stream must be able to hold all the input tokens that belong within a concurrent interval, and are
assigned semantics collectively, in order to represent the grammar faithfully. This suggests that the transmutation,
from individually sensed input words to semantics, divides into three stages: sensor recognition (words), short
term context (clauses, sentences, etc), and long term memory (meaning):
Word︸ ︷︷ ︸
sensor
input−−→ State→ Context︸ ︷︷ ︸
awareness
feedback←−−−−
feed forward−−−−−−→ Concepts→ Associations︸ ︷︷ ︸
meaning
. (27)
As words accumulate in context, the scaled ‘simultaneity’ of the complete sentence fragment triggers associations
and concepts in long term memory. The long term memory may conceivably feed back into short term context
to further discriminate based on learning. From this perspective, language representations are indistinguishable
from sensor arrays, in which words represent different classes of virtual sensor stimuli. Next consider the sentence:
“I’m walking the dog.”. Taken at units, each word has meaning, and the sentence also has meaning. Additionally,
in the city of Newcastle Upon Tyne, in the UK, the phrase ‘walking the dog’ is a code ‘euphemism’ for ‘having
a beer at the pub’; thus, the sentence fragment has meaning at a larger scale. Meaning may be perceived at any
scale, and patterns may trigger quite different associations in different contexts.
Example 39 (Parsing a document) The parsing of a document is a scaled version of the parsing of a sentence.
In order to maintain longer term context, there needs to be continuity through short term memory. Thus, if an
agent puts down a book and picks it up later, it needs to reconstruct some context from long term memory before
continuing. The process of parsing a linear document, or other sequence of events, leads to an evolving historical
timeline which is cached as context. Context must expire and be replaced by a new context at approximately the
same timescale as sensing takes place. Sometimes new context might replace, other times it might accumulate. The
running context is built on spatial structure (titles and section containers), as well as associations and concepts
triggered from memory.
The low level semantic units are parsable (i.e. observable) senses, based on words or sounds, depending
on what sensory input channel is active. Then clusters of words attain independent meaning. Thus, spacetime
considerations alone suggest that, externally, linguistic words and phrases are just sensory fragments (as imag-
ined in generative linguistics [37]), while internally they are transduced into concepts (as imagined in cognitive
linguistics [20]).
The examples above illustrate how context can be both a container for perceived short term correlation or a
dependency for switching on and off long-term promises. Thus context is about scaling of agent roles, by recursion
and by association.
3.11 Data classification and summarization
Looping back memory along side a fresh input stream, iteratively, in order to calibrate samples against expectations,
is how a knowledge equilibrium can be formed from assessments. Repeated measurement is a basic element of
experimental scientific method [3], and it is easy to see how this leads to a subjective notion of certainty in the
observer. Convergence to an attractor is one way to achieve stability; pre-existing memory acts as a seed for such
an attractor.
The reliance on repetition is a robust strategy, but it is also data intensive. It would be impractical and inefficient
to remember every individual assessment (i.e. every data point acquired) forever, so one needs to be able to
summarize data into representative characterizations (tokens) that are cheaper to store in memory15. Several forms
of summarization of data may be used to form the basis of knowledge representations over different timescales:
• Context awareness (short term passive summarization): Tsample, Tconcurrent.
• Learning (long term reinforced or stabilized passive summarization): Tknow ' Tlearn, Ttoken, Tpattern.
• Adaptation (short or long term feedback based on active summarization): Tadaptation, Tattractor.
The principal distinctions in this list are about timescales; indeed, this is the spacetime lesson that allows stability
to converge. The cyclic repetition of the learning process, over a noisy inputs, supplies a constant stream of such
perturbations, so persistence is a form of noise reduction that allows stability of semantics. Stable semantics reduce
the cost of reevaluating meaning at every turn.
15There is some empirical evidence for single neurons in the brain being able to represent complex tokenized concepts, in so-called ‘invariant
representations’ [38].
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3.11.1 Stable summarizations: attractors
In order for random inputs to converge into clusters, at a stable location, there must be a mapping whose properties
are both flexible enough to adapt to unknown inputs and robust enough to recognize the same patterns repeatedly.
Small variations in a pattern would preferably map to locations that were associated with attractors, else every
variation of input would lead to an unstable and random new conceptualization. The implication is that even
associative memory would benefit from a metric quality (see section 2.4.1).
Iterative learning avoids data explosion by integrating samples into a form that is more stable than raw data.
Aggregate data measures, with a metric nature offer such a representative value for a collection of samples. In
promise theoretic terms, a data aggregation is formally an external promise made by the superagent over all se-
mantically equivalent samples16. Summarization of data leads to concepts like averages. Dynamical or quantitative
averages are well known from statistics. A semantic average, on the other hand is a qualitative value that represents
the common promises of a cluster of agents.
Definition 39 (Dynamical summary) Any single representative measure that assesses an ensemble of observa-
tions: Tknow ' Tlearn.
Definition 40 (Semantic summary) The formation of a semantic average over a bundle of related promises, from
any number of agents, leading to i) a superagent, and ii) and exterior promise for the superagent ensemble:
Tknow ' Tlearn.
Both dynamical and semantic summaries are formed using the available characteristics of data, described in section
3.11. For numerical data, the available characteristics are the modalities and moments of data distributions, while
for symbolic or qualitative interpretations, the averaging takes the form of semantic generalizations and collective
interpretations.
Definition 41 (Metric (dynamical) average) A standard ordinal scalar value that promises to represents a body
of dissimilar ordinal scalar values: Tknow ' Tlearn.
Definition 42 (Semantic average) A single nominal interpretative assessment that promises to represents a body
of dissimilar promises or assessments: Tknow ' Tlearn.
Example 40 (Averages) Averages are aggregations yielding a representative result. Dynamic or metric averaging
takes a number of quantitative scalar values and combines them to result in a value that promises a scalar result
to represent the bulk data: Tknow ' Tlearn.
summary
Figure 13: Averages and representative values are exterior promises belonging to a superagent. Averaging, or summarization,
is thus a form of spacetime coarse graining, i.e. a scale transformation.
Example 41 (Semantic averages as scaling generalizations) Semantic averages take a number of dissimilar promises
and represent them by a common standard, e.g. extracting what is meant by ‘a vehicle’ from ‘a car’, ‘a bus’, ‘a
train’, etc.
A trivial lemma may be noted, relating to these:
Lemma 11 (Averages express exterior promises for an ensemble superagent) Any collection of agents making
promises or assessments may collectively promise a scaled average to represent the samples; such a promise is
exterior to the superagent formed by the ensemble (see figure 13).
16So-called ‘big data’ (unstructured data) do not constitute knowledge, but patterns revealed within them might.
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The proof is simple (see paper II): let each assessment by observer agent A be represented by a signal agent ai.
Let each agent ai promise to be members of an ensemble (sample set)so that they form a superagent. Now, at
super-signal-agent scale there must be new external promises. An average is a external promise of the ensemble
superagent.
3.11.2 Repeated sampling, significance of data and attached meaning
We attribute meaning to distinguishable discrete measures, i.e. symbols, that stand out against background noise.
How we transform signal information into meaning is thus related to a signal’s entropy.
Example 42 (Significance and entropy) Culturally significant markers, signposts, and directional beacons, are
towers, statues, monuments, obelisks in a landscape that is relatively flat. Low entropy, low information structures
stand out symbolically, and we attribute them with special semantics.
Hypothesis 1 (Significance is inverse information) At some information scale σ, we can identify a significance,
of the general form: ∣∣∣Significance(σ)∣∣∣ ∝ MaxEntropy− ∣∣∣Entropy of representation∣∣∣. (28)
Significance gives an anchor point to which we attach meaning. For graphs, network centrality can be used as the
source of the entropy distribution [39].
The more times data are collected in semantically equivalent contexts the more robust an average summariza-
tion of the data can be to new variation. By repeating a measurement, we can make one interpretation stand out
against all the others. This brings not only increasing certainty, but increasing significance. This is the idea behind
histograms. Regardless of the data classification alphabet used for the sampling procedure, repeated sampling will
lead to a histogram whose scales of variation, measured subject to Nyquist’s sampling limit, that represent the true
alphabet of variation in data.
Assumption 1 (Knowledge is an equilibrium state) Learning happens by iteration, and knowledge is the sum-
mary of iterative learning, over a timescale Tlearn. Without continually revisiting and re-testing observations, both
the certainty and significance of the data lose meaning. Stable knowledge is therefore the result of an equilibrium
cycle, fed by observation, pattern discrimination, and repeated resampling.
The remainder of this work rests on this assumption.
3.12 Distributions, patterns, and their information content
From the summarization scaling argument, we conclude that knowledge begins effectively with stable histograms.
Memory of multiple episodes builds up a summary over data episodes, from which we derive information, and
thence contextualized knowledge. Summary representation takes the form of a frequency distribution, relative to
a set of sampling classes, which, in turn, may be tokenized into an alphabet of effective recognizable tokens or
symbols. These may be found within the spatial characteristics of the frequency distributions:
• Modality (how many peaks does the distribution have?)
• Moments of the distribution (is it localized, symmetrical, skew, long tailed, etc).
• Smooth, discrete (bar chart histogram or smooth bell curve, etc).
• Wavy, frequency amplitude (what is its Fourier decomposition?)
• Continuous, broken, discontinuous (is it a differentiable total function, or a partial function?).
To transmute statistical weights into symbolic representations, one may re-digitize these different characterizations
into manageable, discrete characteristics:
Definition 43 (Tokenization) The process of mapping a set of assessed patterns and characteristics P into names
N :
C : P → N (29)
over a timescale Ttoken.
In so doing, we must be clear that the mapping of a symbolic context C, based on observed data, is a function of the
promisable capabilities of the agent’s sensory apparatus. Thus, there is no way to separate concept or interpretation
from cognition. The ability to identify patterns is critical to forming certain kinds of associations (see figure 30
(b),(c),(d)).
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3.12.1 Ontological structure
In a world model, there may be both observed phenomena and imagined phenomena. We have names of things,
and relationships between them. Both of these can be imagined or real. Thus a knowledge model can grow to be
richer than the sensory model, as it feeds back on itself.
BASIS/index
Memory
Long−termShort−term
Memory
CONCEPTS
numbers
situational metadata
classes/tags
Exemplars
Things
Docs
THINGS
SAMPLES
MEASUREMENTS
values
OCCURRENCES
THE WORLD
THE MIND
sensory horizonsensory horizon
Figure 14: Occurrences/exemplars live in their own world, with their own adjacencies. Conceptual models form aggregate
representations that are smaller than the sets of exemplars, and act as indices (coordinate bases) for them, with aggregate
meaning.
To learn an ontology, rather than assert one [14], we can assume that samples promise consistent semantics up
front [40]. It is then possible to learn structural relationships, i.e. clustering by divining a definition of distance,
using some arbitrary dimensional spanning set, e.g. using clustering methods like Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) [17], assuming that the spanning set is known. There is a bootstrap issue, by which observational data have
to stabilize into ‘knowledge’.
Hypothesis 2 (Stability hypothesis) Knowledge consists only of those phenomena that are dynamically stable,
hence from which we may assign consistent semantics.
Before the widespread use of dynamical pattern recognition, it was a long standing assumption that a model
of knowledge had to begin with an ontology, or a pre-imposed arrangement of ‘things’, subjects, issues, and
relationships into a tree. That approach failed to explain how understandings of relationships could come about
by learning, or be adapted to a changing world. Emergent models of an environment, on the other hand, with
identifiably separable clusters could be the basis of a time-varying emergent ontology. The concept of strongly
connected clusters (SCC) from graph theory [41] may serve as an emergent definition of ontological structure;
one could imagine using different semantic filters to select directed subgraphs to form overlapping ontological
islands17.
The prediction of promise theory would be that concepts form from as a result of two processes, based on
observer independence:
• Intrinsic properties posited by a source (+ promises).
• Perceived and learned properties perceived by a receiver (- promises).
This basic promise theoretic theme follows from the ± propagation law, and runs throughout these notes, and
recurs on in many scenarios to explain subtleties of information propagation.
3.12.2 Pattern acquisition: generalization and discrimination
Concepts and their associations emerge through encodings that cluster related concurrent things. This can be
immediate, like a Markov process:
17Indeed, this observation was the beginning of successful web search with PageRank [42].
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• Classification of concepts by senses alone.
• Simultaneous activation of concepts across parallel inputs.
and it can be enhanced by long term memory, in a Non-Markov process:
• Approximately simultaneous activation (coarse persistence in concurrent chunks).
• Feedback from previous learning into sensor stream.
We search for the most significant patterns in order to attribute meaning to them, by:
• Identification by aggregation: The precise accumulation of attributes by pattern activation. If every pattern
can only be activated once without context dependency, this leads to a limited number of traits, which are
stable by aggregation.
• Identification by division: A precise branching of attributes, leads to the discrimination of patterns into
modules, which are fragile by branching. Within any branch, any sub-branchings can bring further discrim-
ination. Branching is not an idempotent operation.
The formation of a branching tree of concepts is called taxonomy or ontology span. Since decomposition is
arbitrary (we can branch or group arbitrarily and as many times as we like), the implication is that there cannot be
a single taxonomy or ontology based on a universal set of mutually exclusive properties.
3.13 Summary
A few main themes are behind the construction of knowledge from data:
1. The separation of scales, according to a principle of weak coupling. Each scale has its own semantics and
cohesion, structurally connected, but independently identifiable, with independent agency.
2. The identification of types, schemas, from the separation of spatial scales, i.e. the formation of regularized
superagents, and the identification of context from the separation of time into concurrent chunks (simultane-
ous and sequential).
3. The breaking of ‘translational’ symmetries is the key to encoding data reliably using anchors and signposts
to align semantics relative to distinguishable markers (fixed stars to steer by).
4. Four mechanisms occur, by which intent is passed along from one agent to another:
• Nested containment (scaling).
• Causal history (dependency).
• Composition, or cooperative refinement.
• Similarity (proximity).
Data are encoded in the form of patterns, which are subjectively identifiable as discrete symbols. The patterns are
transmitted, or written, in any semantic medium, by variations in the scalar promises of spatial agents over spatial
trajectories. Symbols may be combined into larger patterns, e.g. words and sequences, by tracing out spacetime
trajectories in the representation medium. Data are parsed in scaled, sequential streams of quasi-concurrent sym-
bols. The order of the stream has meaning, but may not be deterministically related to the interpretation. To alter
and extend the interpretation of sequential orderings, one may define language semantics for the encoded patterns,
that are partially ordered at a larger scale (superagency). The representation of data as scalar promises is a clue
about how we may form memory out of any semantic space.
4 Memory, addressing, and spacetime patterns
A central part of what we consider knowledge and ‘smartness’ to be about is the ability to learn and recall concepts
and patterns. This requires memory, which, in turn, is naturally built on spacetime concepts. By choosing a
language of semantic spaces for memory, we acknowledge that almost any agent medium may be used to store
information: whether it be atoms, molecules, transistors, brains, or cities.
This section concerns how semantic spacetime can be used as a representation of addressable memory, one of
the key requirements for learning and knowledge representation.
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Definition 44 (Memory agent) An agent M may be said to promise the role of memory (like a service) if it
promises to forward data d accepted from input source S, previously, to another agent R, upon receipt of an
appropriate request r:
S
d
M (30)
M
−d−−→ S (31)
R
r
M (32)
M
+d|r−−−→ R (33)
R
−d−−→ M (34)
(see figure 15). The replacement of impositions with promises, in these interactions, is also acceptable for voluntary
−rR
M
R
S
RS M
Figure 15: Memory acts as a switch, with the promises here likened to a transistor. Data are pushed to memory, and accepted
on trust. Requests for data are pushed to memory and a conditional response is returned, as a service transaction.
cooperation lookup, such as in scheduled access. In that case, the request r → ∅ may be empty, for spontaneous
delivery, like a repeating beacon.
A memory agent is thus a kind of delayed forwarding device for information. This is explored in more detail below.
4.1 Relationship between switching and memory
In order to write to memory, by changing the patterns represented by a spacetime configuration, agents must be
capable of keeping conditional promises, which are the representation of switching interactions [6].
4.1.1 Conditional promises
Conditional promises are the basic atomic representation for a variable memory representation, because properties
are promised subject to conditional biases, e.g. an agent may promise to record sensor data subject to prevailing
conditions, or may promise to return a data value, subject to providing the agent address.
Definition 45 (Switch) An agent, which promises a distinct outcome, for each distinct assessment it makes of a
promised input.
switch
output(condition)|condition−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ A (35)
In other words, the output is a function of the condition. The condition modulates the promised role.
Lemma 12 (Dependencies are switches) Any functional dependency represents the modulation of a promise, and
hence acts as a memory element.
The proof follows from the structure of a dependency (see figure 15):
S
+b|dependency−−−−−−−−→ R, (36)
where b is effectively a trivial function of the dependency, as the promise body is +b if the dependency is given,
and ∅ is not. Switches may be more complex than a single input, and may give up their stored data by different
channels (see figure 16). More complex switching structures can be used for forwarding or routing of information
that can perform sorting functionality, which is important for addressing specific elements.
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Figure 16: The flow of data through discriminator switches: with this generic form, we have the basis for predictable address-
ing. The ability to uniquely address locations in space, and to promising routing of data to that single destination is what allows
spacetime to encode data reliably, and for us humans to attach significance to the values.
Definition 46 (Routing (multi)switch slave) An agent with several imposed input channels Si and several output
channels Rj (see figure 16). For example, a simple configuration might impose:
Si
di
Mij (37)
Mij
−di−−→ Si (38)
Rj
rj
Mij (39)
Mij
+d|rj−−−→ Rj (40)
The switching agent M is now a matrix whose promise to forward depends on the request issued by a receiver.
Again, the imposed request may be null to represent a pull request for data by the receiver.
By extending the conditionals to a matrix, a policy for forwarding can be hardwired into the intermediate agent, as
an explicitly programmable relay.
Definition 47 (Forwarding or relay agent) An agent F which promises to accept data from an input channel Si
and relay it to an output channel Rj unaltered, subject to a promised condition rij:
Si
di
F (41)
F
−di−−→ Si (42)
F
+di|rij−−−−−→ Rj (43)
A?
+rij−−−→ F (44)
The condition rij is called the routing or forwarding table and may be promised by any agent A?, including F
itself.
If we allow the intermediate agent to promise with full generality, the implication of this matrix of promises is that
the router acts as memory in the form of a routing table.
Lemma 13 (A routing switch can act as memory agents) Mij is equivalent to a collection of memory agents
with dim j retrievable values.
The proof is trivial from definition 44 by identifying M → Mij , S → Si and R → Rj , with data d → dj for
requests r → rj . Similarly:
Lemma 14 (A routing switch can act as a data forwarder) The multi-switch Mij contains a forwarding agent
F .
The proof follows by identification Mij → F , Rj → A?.
Example 43 (Network routers and forwarders) It might seem that a routing agent does not store data for very
long, but this is only a design choice of most routing switches. The definition above states that data values can be
retrieved from memory at some later time, which is a sufficient condition to act as memory. It does not specify how
many times values can be retrieved, or even how quickly. Routing switches could, in principle, keep all the data
they receive permanently, as long as they have sufficient internal capacity, and a sufficient number of addressable
channels, but that is not usually of interest. Some firewalls retain more detailed information for forensic analysis.
36
The configurations and examples above illustrate how memory retrieval by address is directly analogous to the
routing of information by request, and that the requests may be pre-determined in the form of a memory policy.
We can apply these structures to the problem of learning systems, and knowledge representation, by thinking of
memory addresses or data requests as being conditional biases which come via a sensor or input channel, arriving
as a queue of changing impulses. What this shows is that almost any spatial structure capable of being modulated
through its adjacencies to neighbours can store and retrieve state under the right circumstances.
Example 44 (Artificial Neural Networks) Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) are sequential fabrics made of non-
linear aggregating switches, whose agent connections promise weighted threshold values to other agents. By
training, i.e. adjusting, the weights of the whole layered fabric to match a desired state output, for given input,
they approximate something like N : 1 attractors. ANNs are effective on complex patterns, e.g. facial recognition.
They are used for sensor pattern recognition, in the language of this work.
4.1.2 Timescales for deterministic switching
To be able to construct stable knowledge systems from switching agents, their promises need to be kept over
timescales that support predictability even with non-deterministic inputs. The timescales for change and operation
of a conditional promise tell us about the dynamic and semantic stability of switching. We may define the stability
of this promise. Let us denote the timescale for change of promise components by T (·).
Definition 48 (Semantic stability of a switch or conditional promise) Consider a promise
S
+b|c−−−→ R (45)
with timescale T (∆b) meaning the timescale over which one expects a change in the promise body, and T (∆c)
meaning the timescale over which one expects a change in the dependency modulation. The stability of the promise
means
T (∆b) T (∆c), (46)
i.e. the body of the promise b is constant over the switching on and off by modulation. If b, c are continuous
functions, then we may express this as
∂b
∂t
 ∂c
∂t
. (47)
If these stability criteria are not met, subsequent switching operations will lead to inconsistent results, i.e. the
promised behaviour will not be a total function of c.
Definition 49 (Dynamic stability of a switch or conditional promise) Consider a promise
S
+b|c−−−→ R (48)
with timescale T (b) meaning the timescale it takes to keep a promise b from any starting state, and T (∆c) means
the timescale over which one expects a change in the dependency modulation.
T (b|c) T (∆c), (49)
i.e. the promise b must be keepable quicker than the conditionals vary by modulation.
Lemma 15 (Non-deterministic switching) If the dynamical stability condition in (49) is not met, there must be
either a queueing instability or an overlapping and inconsistent state in the switch.
The proof is straightforward. Let the arrival rate be λ ' 1/T (c) and the service rate be µ ' 1/T (b|c). If
T (b|c)  T (∆c) then λ  µ, and there is no queue, else there must be a finite queue length. If the agent S does
not support queueing, then its state must be a superposition of all the queue states, i.e. cmust be in an indeterminate
state.
Example 45 (Memory and learning network stability) Memory networks, such as computer memory, Bayesian
or neural networks, etc., are dynamically and semantically stable if their training b does not change significantly
for the duration of their operational usage c.
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4.2 Spatial representation of encoded memory
Data are encoded and represented as strings of symbols. Symbols are represented as discrete (but possibly overlap-
ping) patterns in a spatial medium, i.e. they are patterns in the properties of spacetime. Symbols are thus promise
theoretic agents (or superagents).
Definition 50 (Alphabet) A collection of unique symbols, represented as discrete spacetime patterns over any
configurable spacetime property.
Alphabetic symbols form serial structures called strings. Some strings may promise to conform to languages [32]
(see also the discussion in paper II).
Definition 51 (Language) Aggregate superagents of symbols that promise constraints L on their interior compo-
sition, classified by Chomsky rules and their stochastic generalizations, etc.
Natural languages comprise strings of words and phrases (such as in this document or in spoken words). Formal
languages, used in control systems, typesetting, protocols, etc, make more rigid promises about internal structure
of language objects. For the purpose of this work, it is not necessary to go into more detail than this.
Data may be transmuted through many different alphabets during the course of reading, copying, transmitting,
and storing sampled data in different memory representations.
Example 46 (Multiple language representations) Imagine reading aloud from a book, to an illustrator, who de-
picts a story in pictures, with captions written in another language. Each version of the story represents the story
in a different semantic (spacetime) medium.
Representations may not be fully equivalent.
Example 47 (Binary representation of languages) The alphabet of symbols for contemporary computers com-
prises the binary symbols 0 and 1. These are combined in fixed size strings (superagents) or tuples to represent
arbitrary pattern. At a higher level, these are grouped into 8 bit words over ASCII symbols, or 16 bit Unicode
symbols. These symbols form strings in different human and computer languages.
Example 48 (Codons) In biology, two alphabets of the genetic language are composed of the four almost identical
sets of symbols for DNA/RNA: G,A,T/U,C. The language of proteins is encoded by codons (triplets of DNA/RNA
symbols). These cluster into words formed of three letters, called codons, which represent amino acids.
The symbols in an alphabet represent a collection of states which can be promised by spacetime agents. Signal
agents, promising messages in these languages, can be emitted and absorbed in streams, as promise bodies, and
act as symbols themselves in order to communicate between location agents [2]. These few points about language
should be enough to describe serial communication in a general way.
4.3 Spatial addressability of memory
Storing information as spatial structures is, by far, the dominant form of memory representation at every scale. The
interior nature of available spacetime agents is central in determining the sophistication of the patterns that can be
supported by a memory representation. Simple agents, technological or biological, promise limited interior capa-
bilities but can make up for information density through numbers. On the hand, a medium like the biomolecular
language of proteins has immeasurable complexity.
A minimum requirement for agents is that they must promise labels to be individually addressable, in such a
way that information stored may be retrieved from the either the same location, or one that is deterministically
equivalent. For this to be true, there must be cooperation between the agents, and each must promise a unique
identity, as either a name or a number, within their localized namespace (see paper II).
Example 49 (Pages of a book) A book is a collection of pages. Each page agent is numbered allowing address-
ability of its contents.
Two approaches may be used for addressability.
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4.3.1 Address discrimination by constrained flooding or broadcast propagation (-)
All agents promise to recognize their own address or unique name. A sender imposes (floods) addressed informa-
tion to all the agents, and every agent promises to only accept information labelled with its own address.
Let Mi be a set of memory agents, and A be any agent that can read of write to the memory. Each agent Mi
promises a value vi, and a unique address addri, sometimes referred to as its media access control address, to all
other agents:
Mi
+(vi,addri)−−−−−−−→ A,Mj ∀i, j. (50)
In general, address uniqueness cannot be promised without coordination. Such coordination could be expensive,
requiring 4N2 promises amongst N agents, or 2N promises with a centralized source authority. In practice,
memory addresses are imposed on memory agents, by a single source authority, which we may call the factory F :
F
addri
Mi (51)
Mi
−addri−−−−→ F. (52)
To write a value to a particular Mp, and agent A imposes a data value v, along with the intended address onto all
agents (this is called broadcasting or flooding=:
A
+(v,addrp) {Mi} (53)
All agents promise to accept such messages, conditionally if addri = addrp:
Mi
−v|addri=addrp−−−−−−−−−−→ A,Mj , ∀i, j. (54)
These promises are hardwired into the agents in many cases, however, unreliable agents may or may not promise
not to accept messages not addressed to them.
Example 50 (Unreliable agent addressing) If we chose the Mi at the scale of representing students in a class-
room, then we could not assume that they would all promise to behave in such a simple mechanistic manner.
Several students could have the same name, as they originate from different ‘factories’, and so on. In other words,
depending in the scale and nature of the agents, we should be careful about what assumptions are made.
As the number of addressable agents grows, a flooding scheme imposes an increasing burden on the capabilities
of the receivers, to i) recognize longer and longer addresses, and ii) to respond quickly and unblock the channel
for future messages.
Example 51 The biological immune system uses a flooding mechanism to signal cells. It is impractical for cells
to have unique addresses, but cells of a given type are considered redundant, and have the same function. Bio-
addressability targets classes of cells rather than individual cells. Cells have antigen receptors (Major Histocom-
patability Complices (MHC), etc.), which act as addresses for classes of equivalent cells. These sites bind only to
particular messenger cells like antibodies, and thus receive only the signals intended for them.
4.3.2 Address discrimination by routed propagation (+)
A way around the scaling limitations of flooding is to hardwire spacetime adjacencies so that there is a unique
and direct path to each agent from a source (see figure 17). An intermediate agent R, which we call a router, is
introduced between the sender of a message A and a finite number of receivers Mi, say in the range 0 < i < N .
Each leaf agent now has a unique identity to the intermediate routing agent, by virtue of its unique adjacency
relationship, and being isolated in its own cul de sac of the hub R. The router R accepts data from an agent A, if
the address lies in its range:
A
+(v,addrp)
R (55)
R
−(v,addrp)|0<p<N−−−−−−−−−−−−→ A (56)
Further, it promises (or imposes) to forward the message to the Mi, without broadcasting it to all its children:
R
+(v,addrp)|p=i−−−−−−−−−−→Mi (57)
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Figure 17: Individual identity promise, and voluntary identity recognition is a part of both flooding and non-flooding address-
ing schemes, if one considers the scaling of routed addresses. A router accepts a certain range of addresses and routes precisely.
If the paths (or ports in the language of [43]) to 1,2,3 were not unique, the end nodes would also have to promise to know their
identities and discriminate. Routing allows end nodes to operate with few promises. The principle can be applied recursively
to address arbitrarily large numbers of agents, at the cost of an increasing number of trusted intermediaries.
and Mi accepts:
Mi
−(v,addrp)−−−−−−−→ R. (58)
It is no longer strictly necessary for Mi to make acceptance conditional on the address, if one assumes that the
configuration of agents is fixed and that R is a trusted intermediary and delivers the data correctly. Promise theory
makes it clear that one cannot place complete trust in intermediaries: they may be unable or unwilling to keep their
promises to relay information.
An alternative (which is more in keeping with the agent autonomy) is that the relationship between R and Mi
is reversed. Mi can promise its identity or leaf address to R, to be placed in a routing table (and index or directory)
for forwarding:
Mi
+addri−−−−→ R. (59)
R
−addri−−−−→ Mi. (60)
The difficulty with this is that the Mi have no way to make their addresses unique, without exterior coordination18.
This conundrum is a namespace management issue, which I won’t explore further in these notes.
In summary, the intermediary R has a topology that gives it a unique path to each memory address. The router
promises to keep an index overview, or directory map, enabling it to switch on connected routes (see paper I).
It selects the path corresponding to the promised address, and forwards information accordingly, i.e. it acts as a
switch that discriminates direction, based on the promise of an address.
To scale this further, addresses may be made hierarchical, be splitting them into a routing prefix address and
a leaf address. Then router would modify its promise to accept data only if the routing prefix were addressed to
it specifically. This principle can be applied hierarchically to provide tuple addressing with direct memory access
along dedicated connections.
Example 52 Computer networks use both kinds of address discrimination. Bus architectures, like Ethernet or
WiFi, assign a factory unique machine (MAC) address to each network agent. Messages containing serially en-
coded addresses, are flooded to all agents in a region and receivers promise to accept messages addressed to them.
No ordering of addresses is needed: the agents are as a gas. For routed architectures, like the Internet protocol
(IP), addresses are routed by selecting the known pathway to the destination. This presumes a cooperative ordered
arrangement of IP addresses, in a solid state.
Example 53 Computer memory chips assign addresses to memory locations by using a discriminatory switch,
attached to an address bus. The address bus acts as the envelope for messages on the data bus, imposing addresses
on to the leaves. Collaborating memory chips are arranged in an order with hardwired signals to tell them their
address ranges. A hierarchical system of relative addressing, with bit discrimination, allows memory chips to
accept messages only for the address ranges they represent, and single out the addressable memory registers
uniquely.
18In Internet addressing, which uses this scheme, the uniqueness of addresses must be handled manually, out of band, with an additional
network of promises.
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4.3.3 Criteria for addressability of data in memory
By either of the foregoing methods, absolute addressability of memory implies the ability to uniquely signal or
retrieve information from every agent. Some basic promises enable this.
Names or addresses19 must be unique for all agents within a hierarchy of namespaces that connect senders
and receivers of data, i.e. every memory agent must promise an identity that is uniquely distinguishable by its
neighbours within its scope. Every agent must be distinguishable from every other locally, else it would be impos-
sible to intentionally retrieve data stored in a memory agent, or for a memory agent to forward to another agent
deterministically.
Lemma 16 (Deterministic addresses) Let Mi be a collection of memory agents. Mi may be deterministically
addressed by any other agent Mj 6=i, iff Mi promises a unique distinguishable identity.
The proof may be found by considering the properties of memory agents. If Mi and Mj cannot be distinguished,
then
Sk
dk
Mi (61)
Sk
dk
Mj (62)
cannot be distinguished, and data may be stored in unknowable locations, and may overwrite existing values.
Moreover,
Mi
+d|r−−−→ R (63)
Mj
+d|r−−−→ R (64)
cannot be distinguished, thus an agent would retrieve an arbitrary value from an unknowable location. If the agents
are distinguishable, the agents act independently and deterministically according to definition 44.
The ability to coordinatize a space, to assign unique tuple addresses, depends on its topology, i.e. on agent
adjacency. Non-trivial topologies may have loops and multi-valued coordinate, causing significant difficulties. This
is why most artificial structures are based on trees (directed acyclic graphs) or partially ordered lattice structures.
The acceptance of address labelled data cannot be avoided, even in a direct tree routing approach, however. Agents
need to recognize their own messages (see figure 17).
Further to this, we may say that in networks, where there is not direct adjacency with memory locations, the
existence of a complete name or address has to propagate from every memory location to all remote agents in order
to become addressable in practice, i.e. readable or writable20.
Lemma 17 (Name/address propagation) An agent R may be addressed or signalled directly by an agent S iff
the full name of R propagates through all intermediary agents I1 . . . In to S, and I1 . . . In commit the route by
which the information propagated to memory (see figure 18).
S R
start end
I In1
send to R who is R? R is on interface/port 3
3
1 2
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Figure 18: Agent names or addresses have to propagate out from their location R throughout a semantic space, before other
agents S can i) know that they exist, and ii) know how to reach them as a destination. Messages could be given a maximum
range, relative to a current position, iff the geometry of the space is fully understood by all agents.
19Whether we call this a name or an address is not really important. An address is just a long name, usually given relative to a namespace.
20Note that the ability to route to R should not be confused with the ability to locate named data objects stored in the memory network
without pointing to their specific location, as in [15]. The latter is an independent problem. Only the forwarders that connect the address space
need full unique addresses.
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The implications of this lemma are that deep hierarchical naming or addressing of agents requires a routing infras-
tructure based itself on memory agents, thus scaling of memory may require recursively nested memory. To prove
this, we may assume that R promises its own identity:
R ≡ AR +R−−→ . (65)
In order for any other agent Ai to learn this identity, we must have
Ai
−R−−→ R. (66)
Knowledge of R′s identity can propagate iff
Ai
−R−−→ Aj (67)
Ai
+R−−→ Aj 6=R, ∀i, j 6= R. (68)
Since S ∈ Ai 6=R, S can learn of R′s identity, and may try to promise or signal to R. The name of R may not
be private. All agents must be in scope of its name promise. Now, in order for S to signal R, there must be a
connected path along intermediaries I1 . . . In, all of which promise to forward data to an output interface along the
path. This information can only come from back-propagation from R to S, I1 . . . In, and these agents remember
R and the route ‘rij’ to select the appropriate interface direction. The intermediaries must therefore have memory
of their own.
The costs of routing or flooding a network are quite different. In a pure flooding approach, with no optimized
routing, all agents are blocked by a single agent’s use of a shared network, locked into a single concurrent timeslice.
In a routed network, there is a setup cost of propagating addresses to the forwarding tables, and then a latency
proportional to rN for path length N .
Lemma 18 (Forwarding, name/address scope, and embedded memory) If intermediate agents I1 . . . In forge
a path from S to R, in a hierarchical spanning tree of non-overlapping nested regions (‘subnets’) with N tiers,
then N -tuple addresses may be used to bound (but not eliminate) the memory required for forwarding messages,
at each level of agency:
• R needs only R
• In needs only R, Im<n
• S needs the full path.
We can see this as follows. In order to route at each stage of the path, the intermediaries must have a routing table
‘rij’. Without embedded memory, this cannot be achieved. In order to discriminate its own level, as well as pass
on data to all sub-levels, unidirectionally, this information is used. Other parts of a tuple address can be discarded.
Example 54 (IP addressing) The IP address subnet mask divides an encoded IP address into a prefix and a local
address part: (prefix,local). This is a two level spanning hierarchy, where local addresses are used at the end node,
and prefix is used for forwarding. With only two levels, the approach is simple but not very efficient, leading to high
memory usage in forwarding agents. If a deeper hierarchy, with longer tuples were used, the memory required to
forward could be reduced to enable local uniqueness.
Example 55 (Ethernet MAC addressing) Ethernet addresses have no namespaces (ignoring VLAN), and so de-
livery has to be by public flooding and self recognition. No memory is required for this, but each data transmission
occupies the entire channel for all agents, blocking their ability to promise simultaneous availability.
The foregoing results show how hierarchy plays a key role in scaling the local uniqueness of addresses. By
exploiting superagent structures as ‘fixed star’ markers, the addresses of individual agents can be made relative to
the superagent containers. This includes the addresses of sub-agents within them, and so on, recursively down the
levels.
Example 56 (Tuples, namespaces, and the Arabic numerals) Hierarchical namespaces are what allows us to
represent arbitrary numbers with only the Arabic symbols 0-9. By forming tuples of numbers we allow multiple
digits to represent different blocks of the final digit, e.g. 13 is address 3 in bank 1, and 23 is address 3 in bank
2. Without such tuple addressing, ordinal values would have to be represented by nominals, i.e. we would need
a different symbol for every number. For example, singlets, using nominal alphabet [A-Z], can encode only the
addresses [1..26], but doublets (a,b) using relative addresses [0-9][0-9] can encode numbers from 0..99, as they
two values vary independently, with tuple elements counting as logarithmic partitions.
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4.3.4 Non-local link memory
In spatial memory, key-value networks may be approached in two ways: by storing data locally at fixed agent
locations, and non-locally by storing data as processes that span links. The memory models described thus far
may be called deterministic, local models of storage: they map a fixed address to a fixed location. A different
kind of memory is possible, based on network linkage, by observing that, between any number N of agents, there
may be as many as N2 − N links. Thus, for large memory spaces, storing memory in the links rather than the
locations could be very efficient. The challenge lies in addressing and encoding the memories. This is the idea
behind Bayesian networks, and the related Neural Networks (for a review, see for example [17, 44, 45]).
Figure 19: Mapping an observed exterior space into an interior representation, through a sensory apparatus, may imply an
essentially isomorphic representation.
4.3.5 Teaching spacetime to tokenize patterns
Sensors are often designed, shaped, or honed, over their evolution, specifically to register particular spacetime
phenomena21. Such sensor ‘designs’ favour the recognition of patterns by virtue of their structural properties, and
minimize the need for data analysis and post-processing of interpretation. For example, the ability to judge distance
might be enhanced by a sensor array with constantly spaced pattern between locations, acting as a graduated
measuring stick. Through this specific adaptation, sensors are made efficient as pattern discriminators, by learning
that is cached by evolutionary selection, over longer timescales. There is evidence that this is true in the human
senses: eyes and ear do not merely pass data to the brain but perform staged preprocessing and limited ‘type’
recognition, through the existence of specific cells for the measurement of motion. Research has further identified
fabrics of place cells, grid cells, head direction cells, border cells for seeing navigation of spacetime, and even
facial recognition regions, and so on [47–51].
Software techniques, using machine-learning, can simulate this preprocessing, by long-term sensor adaptation,
to train sensors with particular semantics; this is typically done by training artificial neural networks (ANN) to
identify patterns [52]22. This ability to optimize the recognition by evolutionary learning should be considered
highly significant from a spacetime viewpoint. If one can ask a specific question about external phenomena,
with a specific answer, it is possible to build a discriminator based on the scaling of a fabric that uses semantic
addressing to yield a direct symbol token. This amounts to a large compression of information being forwarded into
a knowledge representation, and suggests that tokenization is a powerful strategy for making cognition efficient.
In sensor training, implicit associations become encoded, over multiple link patterns, by traversing spatial
memory lattices, whose geometry is specialized to play the role of parsers that trigger a specific tokenization
of the inputs. This is somewhat analogous to the creation of a directory or index for fast lookup. A particular
symbolic token may be recalled because it is adjacent, in the index coordinatization, for the context we are currently
exploring. With non-local link encoding, this process is still somewhat mysterious, but it amounts to a form of
semantic hashing.
This training of specialized sensors seems almost fantastic, however, it makes considerable sense from a pro-
cessing viewpoint. Without a pre-seeded similarity of structure to lay out boundary markers, there is no obvious
way in which an unbiased associative structure could spontaneously break a symmetry to recognize spacetime char-
acteristics like distance, direction, dimension, location, etc; yet we know that they do. What long term learning
enables is the caching of environmental boundary conditions that train discrimination structures by selection.
21This seems to be what Ashby called homomorphic machines [46] in his work on cybernetics.
22Thus ANNs are more akin to the preprocessing of a visual cortex than perhaps the brain that receives the interpreted signals.
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Example 57 (Head direction cells) These are cells that perform a form of context assessment, approximately
tracking a compass direction of the head by relative motion. Grid cells and place cells in the brain have a regular
lattice structure that allow an image of space to be projected into an array of agents that mimic the same kind of
connectivity.
This partial mimicry of patterns by spatial structure goes beyond the recognition of exterior sensory patterns.
It applies internally too, in the representations of concepts. In a knowledge system, we have to answer how similar
patterns may be mapped to similar regions, so that uniqueness is assured over an appropriate region, (e.g. in a
brain network, how does the same concept avoid being senselessly repeated at different locations, like a plague?).
A notion of idempotent convergence seems important to maintain stability (i.e. concepts as singular desired end-
states)
Example 58 (Deep learning applied to reasoning) Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) or deep learning networks
have proven to be effective at forming stable attractors in the recognition of discernable patterns, even though they
may be inefficient in terms of computational resources. Foreknowledge of a pattern, combined with system design
(where possible), can sometimes be used to simplify the recognition of patterns with much lower cost.
In [52–54], a multi-stage, highly trained series of ANNs is used as an advanced discriminator for sentence
parsing. This approach is interesting, as it does not attempt to preserve grammatical structure, except in word
compound groupings. Moreover, using multiply, individually trained stages, it approximates intentional promises
through a mixture of emergent behaviours and hand-crafted training design. The naming of concepts is emergent
(non-intentional), buried in the internal layers of of the neural network. Thus intermediate concepts may be
presumed to exist, but are only accessible from the encoding at the input, and the associative weights that lead
to particular network activations: their internal names are non human-readable. The use of specific associative
forms, belonging to the four irreducible types features in the authors’ solution.
The model in this work leads to the kind of representation one expects for the processing of an intentional
process: information is promised at the inputs and outputs, and training shapes the network weights to propagate
input to output conditions, assuming the existence of sufficient internal degrees of freedom to compute stable
attractors. We can thus understand ANN training as an approximate, non-linear, best-fit propagator matrix for
input/output, with hand-crafted spacetime symmetry breaking.
A working hypothesis, based on a semantic spacetime model, is that one would expect a successful sensor
apparatus to align its operation with causal structure and precedence, and operate like a ‘prism’ which transmutes
spatial patterns into separated sequential frames of input to be parsed in chunks23. This hypothesis further seems
to be a necessary condition for remembering location, and navigating in artificial memory, e.g. chips, cities.
4.4 Temporal addressability of memory
Temporal memory includes the encoding of data like transaction logs, melodies, video, and any sensory stream.
How do we encode and recall such sequences in a reliable way?
4.4.1 Sequences and oriented paths
To encode an arrow of time, i.e. a directed sequence, it’s necessary to break the symmetry of a memory space in
some way, by establishing a precedence relation. One way is to distinguish locations and order their consecutive
addresses, either by labelled addressing or by using a hardwired discriminator structure. These may be formed by
any of the causal, irreducible promise types:
Lemma 19 (Partially ordered promises) Partially ordered addressable structures are representable as partially
ordered promise types:
• Precedence adjacency gradient (queues):
A1
precedes−−−−→ A2 precedes−−−−→ A3. (69)
• Conditional dependence or prerequisite:
A3
later|earlier−−−−−−→ A2 earlier−−−→ A1. (70)
23Might we even show that the brain cannot simply be an aggregation of homogeneous autonomous agents, as the cortex seems to be, without
some pre-seeded symmetry breaking from sensory arrangements? There must be symmetry reduction in order to support the different tenant
modules as well as to distinguish different datatypes?
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• Superagency and encapsulation:
A
inside−−−→ S inside−−−→ S′. (71)
By breaking the symmetry with an arrow of time, one finds a representation for sequential memory. Since learning
is not sequential but cyclic, long term memory must be able to reliably revisit such sequences to reach an equilib-
rium along the time vector to end in a summary state. It is plausible that each agent, as part of a sequence, could
reach some kind of independent averaged equilibrium, with multiple sequences representing the same semantics.
This begs the question: how does an observer know whether two sequences have the same intended semantics or
not?
Example 59 (Sequences with constant semantics) When does it make sense to compare two sequences (e.g.
comparing a shopping list with wedding invitations does not make sense)? The simple answer to this question is
that such comparisons must be baked into the immutable aspects of the sensory stream. The boundary conditions of
sensory experience are the only source of information on which to base such semantics. Thus we hypothesize that
this is where long term evolutionary adaptation of sensor recognition play a role. A separation of timescales allows
long term adaptation to similar spacetime processes to feedback and shape the short term sensory recognition of
similar patterns.
4.4.2 Knowledge as equilibrium, with constant semantics
I have proposed that knowledge is to be understood not as information but as an the stable equilibrium of an active
relationship [3, 14]. We may state this hypothesis as a less ambitious lemma:
Lemma 20 (Learning with immutable semantics) Learning by repeated observation over semantic sequences,
is possible iff all samples promise to be piecewise graph homomorphic to one another.
Without a consistent promise graph, data cannot be combined or mapped into a coordinate system reliably, with
preservation of structure. The simplest way to make measurements promise similar graphs is to use the same
sampling apparatus or sensor for all samples. This fixes the boundary conditions, and suggests that, even if sen-
sors share certain infrastructure, it is natural for specific intermediary stages to be routed to specific spacetime
discriminating structures that encode graph-isomorphic structures with the appropriate ordering and interpretation.
Example 60 The eye shares a lens and optical infrastructure. The captured light may be processed by different
specialized memory cells as part of decoding or imposing semantics on the data:
Lens→ Retina→

Colour
Grid shape
Orientation
. . .
→ . . .Concepts (72)
Even with substitution of an element in the process, these have shared structure, and can share semantics.
4.4.3 Advanced-retarded spacetime propagation and addressability
The promises needed for propagating addressability of space, by comparing agent identities, are related to the
concepts of so-called advanced and retarded boundary conditions in the physics of field propagation and quantum
mechanics [55]. Referring to the discussion in section 4.3.3, we may define.
Definition 52 (Advanced propagation) Information originates from an end point and expands towards possible
starting points.
R
−d−−→ {I1 . . . In, S}. (73)
Advanced propagation is like ‘back propagation’, as referred to in the training of learning networks.
Definition 53 (Retarded propagation) Information originates from a starting point and expands towards possi-
ble end points.
S
+d−−→ {I1 . . . In, R}. (74)
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These two propagation methods are conjugates of one another, and both processes are involved in determining a
route from start to end in a complete path. (see figure 18).
Only the end points represent information sources, assuming that intermediaries admit zero distortion24. The
propagation of a message d from one to the other is possibly universal and carries no significance. However, the
joining of these defines an overlap of information transfer (what is sometimes called a transaction).
Lemma 21 (Path overlap of advanced and retarded propagation) The set of oriented transitions from S to R,
or vice versa is given by the overlap of advanced and retarded propagations for data ±d originating from R and
S respectively.
If there exists one or more connected paths from S to R, involving an arbitrary number of intermediate agents,
then it make be possible to propagate information in one or both directions to connect S with R. These mutual
flooding processes can be joined at any intermediate location along a viable path, provided the message types are
compatible (±d as a lock and key).
Example 61 (Quantum mechanics as an address routing protocol) This construction is very like Feynman’s no-
tion of a spacetime path formulation of quantum mechanics [56], and the Feynman Wheeler absorber theory [57],
as well as Schwinger’s source theory [58]. This is discussed in the Transactional Interpretation of Quantum Me-
chanics [59]. Between an interacting system and observer, there is an ‘offer wave’ ψ(x, t) described by the wave
function of the system, and a ‘confirmation wave’ ψ†(x, t) travelling from the observer back to the system. The
overlap between these ψ†ψ is the probability of a connected path between them, as 〈ψ|T |ψ〉 are matrix elements
for specific path transitions. In Feynman’s construction is represents a sum over all possible connected paths that
satisfy the energy conservation payment conditions (see figure 20).
ψ
past future
ψ
Figure 20: A handshake between two propagating waves represents a set of overlap path transitions connecting them.
In this view, the wavefunction of a system plays the role of a pre-arranged address structure (like a directory,
or name service) to distinguish spacetime locations. Indistinguishable locations cannot have different connection
probabilities, else they would be distinguishable. The wavefunction is thus an equilibrium information map of a
system at the snapshot instant of an interaction, and the solutions for ψ(x, t) have the status of an on-going knowl-
edge relationship between observer and observed. Note that, although the time t appears in as an evolutionary
learning parameter in ψ(x, t), this is not the same time as is represented by the propagation from boundary points
S to R. Moreover, the time-reversal invariance represents path-reversal (route) invariance rather than absolute
time.
4.4.4 Splitters and oriented discriminators, encoding decisions
How is a preferred direction realized (reified) in a representational spacetime? There any may processes that
routinely break directional symmetries in the exterior world: the position of the sun, rivers, etc. On the interior of
a knowledge representation, there are no such landmarks, so associations are always relative to something in the
interior. There are two ways around this:
• Encode absolute boundary conditions spatially in memory as homomorphic ‘concepts’, and then associate
directions relative to those concepts.
• Form a Cartesian theatre [10] facsimile of the outer world and use interior properties to represent directional
processes: electrical currents (e.g. in a brain, or an electronic circuit) select a direction of flow; the act of
pushing a memory by imposition or force breaks its directional symmetry; start and end boundary conditions
select a direction, e.g. , like a contact potential, or being inside the plates of a capacitor, or a temperature
field, where some field gradient sets a bias.
Certain spacetime processes break symmetries, by virtue of their nature, e.g. prisms, gradient fields, etc (see figure
21). Sensors can make use of these devices in adapting to pattern encoding. Directional memory exhibit any axial
24This is a common assumption, but also one that is wholly unjustified. The presence of intermediate agents is likely to distort the propagation
of information, without a considerable infrastructure of promises (see the discussion of common knowledge and the end-to-end problem in [6]).
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Figure 21: Ordered spacetime structures form directed graphs, either by autonomous cooperation of memory locations, or by
external calibration through discriminators, routers, prisms, etc.
symmetry. Branching treelike (conical) structures are sequential and directional, with discrimination built in. In a
treelike bifurcation, semantically close concepts could end up close or very far apart in memory space25.
Example 62 (Optical interferometry and correlation) The optical versions of neural networks, which have much
the same kind of spacetime structure, are diffraction gratings, optical correlators, holographic systems, and other
interferoemeters. These encode information in frequency and phase and yield fringe patterns that can be used for
optical processing. This underlines the point that massively parallel ‘spatial computation’ may be performed in
many ways [62].
4.4.5 Role of separated timescales in tokenizing
As usual, the separation of scales informs the dynamical basis for the semantic machinery. Three timescales for
memory are generally accepted in human learning, and translate naturally for other learning systems by spacetime
considerations [63]:
1. Immediate memory: for data collection, i.e. the ability to hold ongoing experiences from fractions of a
second to seconds. The capacity of this register is very large, involves all modalities (visual, verbal, tactile,
and so on), and provides the ongoing sense of awareness or context.
2. Short-term memory: allows humans to hold information in mind for seconds to minutes. This is associated
with gathering of context.
A special sort of (procedural) short-term memory is called working memory, which refers to the ability to
hold information in mind long enough to carry out sequential actions. An example is searching for a lost
object; working memory allows the hunt to proceed efficiently, avoiding places already inspected.
3. Long-term memory entails the retention of information in a more permanent form of storage for days,
weeks, or even a lifetime. This is the equilibrated memory of a learning process.
4.5 Nominally addressed memory
Numerical addresses, based on metric coordinates are well suited to the labelling of ordered structures [1]. Nominal
addresses (semantic addresses) may also be used to represent ordered structures, if an intermediary supplies the
partial ordering of names by transmuting names into partial ordering, through its spacetime structure.
Address discrimination, using names and locations, is made using the two approaches in section 4.3, i.e. inter-
mediary forwarding switch or broadcast flooding (called a bus architecture)26 . Flooding is an inefficient approach
since it occupies an entire region of space for the duration of a transaction.
Lemma 22 (Address routing) To transport a signal or agent from one location to another, it is necessary and
sufficient for agents to promise the ability to distinguish direction, and a map between a unique absolute identity
and the desired spacetime location.
25Hawkins has presented ideas about Hierarchical Temporal Memory, in which sparse distributed representations are used to store sequences,
however too few details are in the public domain to evaluate the claims [19, 47, 60, 61].
26If the brain were a bus architecture, memory would be routed by address. We know of no way in which individual neurons or clusters could
know their own addresses in a coordinated way, nor of a unique routing structure that discriminates on conceptual lines. It is plausible that
sensory bundles from major sensory regions: colour cells, place cells, frequency range cells, etc, could provide some of the labelling needed
for form an approximate regional (digital) address.
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The proof is as follows. If an agent does not promise a unique name, i.e. a unique public scalar promise, it cannot
be distinguished from other agents. If the location has a unique identifier, and other agents promise to recognize
this unique name, the location will self identify once it has been located. It can now be searched for by covering
the entire space. Once located, sign posts or complete paths can be left to mark routes. A signpost is a lookup
table (map) that associates a class of locations with an identity. If agents do not promise a unique identity, we have
to be able to measure metric distance from a signpost or origin. Then we can assign numerical coordinates based
in distance and direction. Each coordinate system breaks translational invariance by choosing an origin. Either
the map is fixed in the name (coordinates) or paths are encoded into spacetime itself The topology of tuples has to
match the promised directional topology of the spacetime. If neither direction nor some encoded name are given,
unique locatability is impossible. We can now define semantic routing as routing without a metric coordinate
system:
Definition 54 (Semantic routing) The use of conditional forwarding based on persistently promised directions
and the use of lookup tables (directories) to match names and forwarding directions to the next signpost. Signposts
form a vector field that converge onto an externally stable set of destinations [64].
Example 58 illustrates the use of multi-stage semantic routing without explicitly known names. Another example
that uses naming based on weighted paths is the following.
Example 63 (Breadcrumbs, ants, and road-signs) Road signs use nominal addressing, with arrows pointing to
the direction to follow to find the next clue about a named object. The formation of a trail for nominal addressing
is basically a stigmergic process of discovery and breadcrumbs or pheromone trails [65].
Names (and thus nominal addresses) need not only be based on written language. To our senses, the name of a
door handle is given by its shape and relative position, just as the name of a protein is an attached protein with a
shape that gives it the ability to bind to a receptor, like a lock and key.
Example 64 (Machine addressing) Memory addressing in integrated circuitry and layer 2 (e.g. Ethernet) net-
works attached to buses makes use of self identification addresses. Data are addressed to a destination and flooded
to all agents in their region of space. The owner of the intended address accepts the data.
Example 65 (Named Data and Content Centric Networking) Named Data Networking [15], and other name-
based location addressing schemes, like Content Centric Networking [16], Content Delivery Networks [66] use
names as the destination addresses of locations on the Internet.
Source Source
Receiver
+cache
+F(n)|D(n),I(n)
+D(n)
n
Figure 22: In Named Data Networking (NDN), a trusted intermediary caches and passes along data by name.
Unlike the impositional approaches to data transmission, NDN is based on the idea of voluntary cooperation
[67], and is a form of conditional forwarding based on identity [6,68–70]. Sources of data promises promise their
data +D(n) by name n, with a signature of the originator to specify provenance (see figure 22). Willing receivers
promise that they want data by name +I(n) using ‘interest promises’ also using the name. Name discovery requires
some kind of directory. Forwarding agents (routers) promise to accept both kinds of promise and forward data them
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by name, if they have received both voluntary declarations, with a conditional forwarding promise F |D, I:
Source
+D(n)−−−−→ Router (75)
Router
−D(n)−−−−→ Source (76)
Router
+cache(n)−−−−−−→ Source (77)
Receiver
−I(n)−−−−→ Router (78)
Router
−I(n)−−−−→ Receiver (79)
Router
+F (n)|+D(n),−I(n)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Receiver. (80)
The intermediate router must be completely trustworthy to both parties, as it has the ability to distort the data
and even replace it [6, 68]. The authenticity is presumed by virtue of signing. Although neither the publishing of
the data, nor the interest request specify where to find the data (i.e. they need not have any concept of location
address), the router and the end points do need to understand one anothers’ locations or addresses. Identity
might be encoded by direct and unique adjacency (signpost or interface direction), if the routes are unique. There
is always the possibility that the source and recipient may have moved relative to the router’s understanding of
topology (e.g. in a wireless of gaseous network, where broadcast flooding is the only approach). Thus the router
has to make further promises to give spacetime structure, but which do not involve data:
Source ±addr−−−→ Router (81)
Router ±addr−−−→ Source (82)
Receiver ±addr−−−→ Router (83)
Router ±addr−−−→ Receiver. (84)
Example 66 (Sparse Distributed Representations) Sparse Distributed Representations [71, 72] use a kind of
semantic hashing to map similar things to similar locations. Some distance measure is used for this, e.g. the
Hamming distance of keywords. An interesting property of Sparse Distributed Memory is that each keyword is its
own memory address, i.e. data and index hash are the same.
Example 67 (Conceptual memory) An intelligent agent has to be able to process multiple concepts and draw an
imaginary boundary around them in order to deem them related, like in a namespace. A simple machine needs to
be able to do this based on a mechanical principle, without some brain-like reasoning skills presumed27.
4.6 Long range ordered spacetimes: cellular automata
A priori oriented structures are not the only way of breaking spacetime symmetries to distinguish memory loca-
tions. In discrete spacetimes, with sufficient symmetry, edge effects and interactions can also lead to dynamical
effects that form memory representations. Regular edge geometries encode directional information.
Many of the spacetime notions that we take for granted in the classical formalization of dynamical systems do
not apply to networks or arbitrary graphs (see paper I). For example, translation, velocity, momentum, derivatives,
conjugate pairs, phase space (position and momentum), waves, Fourier transforms, etc—all these concepts derive
from the existence of a smooth manifold, with a clearly definable set of coordinates28. In generalized graphs,
where the topology of space changes at every hop, the idea of continuity and conservation are simply nonsense.
If so many of the classical concepts are absent or non-trivial to define, then how can we relate the concepts of
a discrete spacetime to classical notions? Finite state machines are the dynamical equivalent to canonical phase
space for discrete graphs. The correspondence is
(~x, ~p)↔ (Ai, piij) (85)
where ~x is a position coordinate, ~p is a momentum vector, and Ai is an agent, piij is the promise graph over Ai29.
Although analogous, these constructions are in no way comparable structures, unless there is a basic homogeneity
or long range order in the spacetime adjacencies (the long range ordering of the scalar promises on top of the graph
is a separate issue). The study of such graphs as dynamical systems (rather than as approximations to Euclidean
27We may ask: how does the brain itself associate concepts? Simultaneous activation is one of few possibilities, as explained later.
28I don’t want to get into a discussion of differential or algebraic geometric ideas here, so I am being intentionally simplistic.
29A half-hearted attempt to relate graphs to a Hamiltonian formulation has been posed in [73], leaving many questions unanswered.
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or Riemannian space) has only received attention very recently [43, 74, 75], and turns out to be a quite non-trivial
problem. To make progress, one needs to fix a coordinate system (naming convention) for the links emanating
from each node agent (referred to as ‘ports’ in [43]). Graphs with this property are related to Cellular Automata
(CA) [76–78].
The hypothesis explored in these notes is that any stable spacetime phenomenon can be used as a form of
memory, and be attributed semantics by context. The behaviours of cellular automata models are essentially those
of reaction-diffusion models, and their study goes far beyond the scope of this work, but they are related to the
propagation of intent discussed in [79]. What is important to note here is that only special cases of CA may be
used to act as memory that does not simply leak away.
Example 68 Cellular automata (CA) have been used, in combination with learning methods, to model the evolu-
tion of land use in Geographical Information Systems (GIS) [80–84]. By modelling each point in space as an agent
(cell), with promises based on on iterative dependency on nearest neighbours, one achieves a local CA model. The
challenge with CA models is in matching boundary conditions around the edges, in order to break the symme-
tries of the lattice. This is how one injects information about actual models. To accomplish this, neural network
techniques of back-propagation have been combined with the CA models.
Even with a notion of propagation, it is not trivial to define something like a momentum, related to a graph
transition function (see section 4.7), and the usual formulations of Poisson brackets and Hamiltonian or action
principles make little sense without a scaling limit to a Euclidean space.
Example 69 (Self-healing communication trees) The cellular connection network infrastructure, proposed by
Borrill [27], to self-organize a self-stabilizing spanning tree on top of a homogeneous trusted lattice of agents with
a fixed number of ports, is a cellular automation whose function is to route messages using an optimized flooding
scheme and nominal addressing (flooding is optimized by learning of routing tables by the memory agents). The
operation is similar in concept to NDN, and makes use of purely local agent adaptation, with only emergent
organization. The aim is not to stabilize a rigidly addressed memory, but rather to stabilize an adaptive spanning
network across fixed nodes, each of which can act as memory. This is best suited for retrieving encoded memories,
already placed at the nodes, but does not immediately support a natural ordering of locations for storing distributed
sequences from an external source. The latter can be arranged by adding a globally ordered naming convention,
in accordance with the reduction law [2].
4.7 Graph dynamics, thinking, and reasoning
Knowledge spaces of concepts, adjacent by association, go beyond memory systems. The fact that they can
propagate intent, means that can they also compute results, in the sense of executing algorithms. As feedback
networks, the stability of concepts and outcomes is thus a matter for serious investigation. Our understanding of
the dynamics of generalized graphs is still in its infancy, but a number of special cases submit to analysis, and
challenge us to think about spacetime concepts more carefully.
Example 70 (Causal Graph Dynamics) The dynamical evolution of labelled graph systems is a theme that can
be related to a vast number of fields of study practical examples, from cellular automata models of land use, to
biological tissue, to ecological systems, and so on. Recent work, which tries to address the dynamics at a formal
level, builds on notions of dynamical systems from physics [43,74,75], by using labelled graphs, without explicitly
modelled semantic constraints. Graph vertices (analogous to promise theory agents) make connections to other
agents by named ‘ports’, i.e. links that are promise labels from a fixed alphabet of types. The semantics of the
types are unspecified, and agents do not have to have all kinds of ports. The type alphabet thus acts as a matroid
basis for vector promises. The model of causation is based on locality of interactions, i.e. neighbours, within some
adjacency radius. The locality is provably related to causality.
Causal Graph Dynamics shows that it can be a model of computation, thus (as a constrained subset) a fuller
spacetime dynamics can also represent computation. This ought to be obvious, since computers are made from
labelled spacetime, but it is still a source of controversy in some fields. There is also a tangible similarity with
quantum field theory.
Example 71 (Differentiated spaces) Spaces like rooms, buildings, and cities are strongly differentiated spaces,
where the forces of morphology have already reached an equilibrium that decouples their function from the dynam-
ics within. However, the origin of that morphology presumably begins from a less differentiated state somehow.
Modelling the emergence of structure by exploring boundary conditions and symmetry breaking mechanisms is
also a major industry in science.
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Example 72 (Cellular automata) Cellular automata have been studied since the pioneering work of Baricelli
and von Neumann and others [76–78, 85, 86]. A cellular automaton is a graph that normally forms a regular
degree graph of neighbouring cells, forming a lattice, each of which is an autonomous agent. Each agent has state
and that state evolves according to a promise dependent on its neighbouring cells. The dynamics are local, but
the relative times of transitions of each neighbour are not completely defined. A normal approach is to consider
a complete cellular automaton as a rigid spacelike hypersurface that evolves according to a global clock, with a
transition function mapping all cell states ci(t) synchronously:
T : ci(t+ 1)→ ci(t), ∀i. (86)
The state at t + 1 for all agents is thus based on the frozen snapshot of states at time t, and all update syn-
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Figure 23: Cellular automata are regular degree graphs whose cellular agents promise to modify their state based on the states
of their nearest neighbours.
chronously. This does not imply infinite speed of propagation, because influence is restricted to nearest neighbour
interactions (see figure 23): the velocity of influence is one hop per time tick. However, it implies infinite speed of
coordination: i.e. long range order in spacetime is assumed, which is phenomenonologically plausible for small
scale living systems observed by light and sound, etc. Monte Carlo updating is also possible to simulate quan-
tum physical systems like the XY-spin model [87]. Due to the multi-dimensional dependency of cellular automata
state transitions, the evolutionary outcome of the system is strongly dependent on the updating semantics of the
transition function.
Cellular automata act as computers (e.g. see [3, 78]), and can perform routing functions as addressable
networks (e.g. see [27]).
Example 73 (Directed eigenvector centrality) Eigenvector centrality is a measure of a graph based on the ob-
servation that the graph adjacency matrix is a transition matrix, whose self-stable flows result in a shift of link
weights onto nodes, through the principle eigenvector (a consequence of the Frobenius-Perron theorem). This was
well understood for undirected graphs. A variant of this technique was used by Google search for its PageRank
method of search ranking [42]. The result was extended for directed graph flows in [41]. For a directed graph, the
result is somewhat different to that for a non-directed graph. Only absorbing sinks nodes end up with any weight,
because transitive adjacencies funnel all the flows into sinks. If we apply this to a reasoning process, it would
imply that directed learning networks would not be able to distinguish between reasoned outcomes by relative
weight. However, a number of remedies were noted in [41], including the equivalent of back-propagation, and
feedback by pumping results back into the sensory input end of a network. This link between search ranking and
reasoning illustrates how search ranking acts as a simple kind of Bayesian network. The technique is particularly
interesting as it leads to stable regions [39] that could naturally be associated with concepts, based purely on
spacetime connectivity, and thus it offers insight into the way concepts may emerge without deliberate supervised
training in a true artificial intelligence.
Much remains to be understood about the behaviours of systems on which we are relying for artificial knowl-
edge representation and reasoning. It is tempting to think that, because certain applications approximate determin-
istic behaviour, when driven by a dominant directional process, like input sensing, all behaviours must be therefore
be deterministic. That is far from the case. Indeed, even in the case of humans, we know that when external input
is switched off, the brain enters states of hallucination and dreaming, where reason seems to follow quite different
rules. Several questions stand out:
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• How do graph dynamics play a role in knowledge representation?
• Is knowledge storage and recovery stable to the dynamical states of a knowledge system?
• Can all concepts be observed (read or written) simultaneously, or are is it possible to excite partial eigenvec-
tors that are not simultaneously compatible, as in the case quantum mechanical canonical pairs [88]?
• What role do pointed graphs [75] and spanning trees play in bounding the determinism of reasoning?
• How does parallelism affect the linear nature of sequential reasoning?
We return to the matter of reasoning in section 6.
4.8 Agent phase and conditions for memory, smart behaviour
Agents may be in a free gaseous state, as atomic or molecular agents, or bound together into a solid lattice with
limited long range order (see paper I [1]).
• In a gaseous phase, agents mix freely and encounter one another by random walk, with short-lived adja-
cencies. This is a useful way of mixing and discovering new information. Coordinates in a gas can only
be through arbitrary numbering and message broadcast. Think of people milling around the lobby of a
hotel, meeting by chance, or calling out “Come in number 9, your time is up!”. Extended structures like
strings, stories, paths, cannot be remembered in a gaseous phase, because they have no stable or persistent
relationships.
• In a solid phase, information is located in a very regular, ordered way. Adjacency is a lasting knowable rela-
tionship. One can form a regular coordinate system with purely local predictability. Search is not required.
Think of visiting a specific tenant in a numbered hotel room.
The transfer of intent (including structure) requires both (+) and (-) promises to propagate, mutual bindings or
tensor promises are involved in structuring of data.
Lemma 23 (Sequential memory implies vector promises) To promise stable sequences, agents must bind with
vector promises.
This was discussed under temporal memory. To the extent that a solid implies a stable ordered sequence of vector
bonded agents, without necessarily having significant long range order, then memory requires a kind of permanent
solid state. Given this, there may be something to learn from cellular automata about how a smart knowledge
representation (i.e. ‘mind’) can remain sufficiently plastic to change.
Example 74 (Immunology and neurology) Memory structures and pattern recognition discriminators are often
constructed from solid state regular lattices, that provide regular calibration grids for observation. The brain
cortex, and other related memory structures are form a largely solid state network, albeit irregular on a small
scale. The immune system, by contrast, is capable of learning and rememberings previous infections based on
populations of antigen carrying lymphocytes (B and T cells). In order to accomplish this, the individual agents
must be able to promise greater capabilities as individuals. Thus, in a gaseous phase, they substitute scalar
promises for vector and tensor linkage. For a review, see [89, 90].
4.9 Summary
Information may be encoded as memory by using the familiar spacetime properties of spacetime:
• If a spacetime is deterministically addressable, it can store patterns of information in a retrievable manner.
• Separation of scales enables scale-free addressability.
• Consistent addressability is possible if memory agents are distinguishable, and there is end-to-end propaga-
tion of data between the agents in two directions between readers/writers, and memory agents.
• Four encoding methods may be matched with mechanisms for propagation of intent:
– Containment and aggregation.
– Causal ordering.
– Composition or cooperation of parts.
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– Proximity or topological nearness.
These elementary considerations show that any semantic spacetime can perform a learning function, and can
therefore acquire information, and store it, leading to a knowledge representation. We can now study the structures
of tokenized knowledge in detail.
5 The structure and semantics of knowledge
The hypothesis, which forms the basis for this work, is that knowledge is the sum of an observer’s tokenized
sensory inputs, iteratively confirmed, over multiple observations, and laced with a feedback that is integrated into
a running assessment of ‘here and now’. This process leads to a unique world-view, for each observer, resulting
from each agent’s unique world line history. The non-linear feedback amplifies the fact that experience is non-
deterministic, but if knowledge emerges around stable attractors, it may be cached in a compressed, tokenized
form. This is essentially like a linguistic representation of experience30.
Constructing a plausible model for this is the subject of this section. Given the network complexity of associa-
tions formed during full-sensory learning, it is unrealistic to expect tokenized concepts and associations, committed
to memory, to be complete and faithful representations of the input. It would be a misunderstanding of knowledge
systems to expect any such thing. A symbolic knowledge representation can only be a tokenized approximation
of the fruits of learning31. The tokenized form is not a substitute for the actual experience, only a summary of
its interpretation. The implication is that we cannot pass on complete experience in a tokenized (linguistic) form,
because it enters a system through different sensors and touches fewer concurrent sensations.
5.1 Learning, familiarity, and linguistic tokens
The implications of learning are profound. They suggest that deep knowledge cannot easily be imposed onto an
agent from the ‘top-down’, in symbolic form. In other words, one cannot induce knowledge by a short-cut, like
reading or listening to a lecture. One may try to simulate a complex experience, in a linearized stream of communi-
cation, just as a Turing machine can simulate any information based process eventually, assuming perfect fidelity,
but it cannot be done efficiently or with a predictable outcome, especially under the shadow of approximation,
because the process of learning is iterative and non-linear32. The implications of this are not well understood, and
yet we work hard to represent knowledge in a variety of media, and design ‘artificial intelligence’ that has its own
approaches to learning.
Example 75 (Is a book knowledge?) Is knowledge the same as a representation or facsimile of knowledge? Do
we possess knowledge simply by owning a book? Is the process of knowing the content of a book about revisiting
it to gain familiarity? There is a clear temporal aspect to knowledge that we need to address. The taking of a
photographic snapshot of a space (a time-slice) may capture information, but we do not ‘know’ that information
by simply capturing the image: knowledge comes from revisiting the snapshot, relating it to other familiar concepts,
to the point of familiarity. Thus even an approximate representation does not become knowledge simply by being
disentangled from its network and encoded into a form that can be passed on.
To understand the implications of these remarks, in as broad a range of scenarios as possible, we need to get to
grips with how knowledge is valuable to different kinds of processes, without preconceived notions! Knowledge
is not just that which is familiar, but also descriptive of context.
5.1.1 Can familiarity be passed on?
Familiarity is a major part of our understanding of knowledge.
Definition 55 (Familiarity and significance of knowledge) The attribution of a weight or score that grows with
frequency of use or accumulated usage, in a memory network.
The non-linearity of learning and memory networks leads to a simple point:
30This might help to explain why we experience such a close connection between thinking (in the sense of storytelling and reasoning) and
language.
31In principle, the same level of approximation need not be a limitation of an artificial knowledge systems, with simple sensors, but the
economics of learning point to a diverging need for resources, and hence the eventual importance of approximation.
32Promises of knowledge, made by other agents, can be assessed by a receiver and either accepted as trusted facts or merely as data. When
concepts and semantics are taken as authoritative standards, they change from being voluntary emergent promises to impositions, and hence
they lose their ability to avoid inconsistency and be represent local circumstances. Standards may be useful as scoped definitions, but their
validity is fragile to variation in the environment.
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Lemma 24 (Familiarity cannot be propagated) Familiarity of a learning network cannot be transmitted faith-
fully through a serial (linguistic) representation.
This observation follows from the sensitivity to boundary conditions in non-linear systems, and the relativity of
familiarity with each concept to neighbouring concepts, in spite of intentionally deterministic procedures [91].
No two agents can be prepared and maintained in exactly the same state for an extended process of simulated
learning. They would have need to have to begin with identical initial conditions, and maintain identical external
conditions throughout the process of information acquisition. It could not be identical to the knowledge acquired
by experience, because a serial stream cannot be processed in the same way as a parallel sensory experience,
simultaneously, this is impossible (on many levels).
The network aspect of knowledge is crucial. Knowledge is not isolated: it has lasting bonds to notions of con-
text. If lasting connection were enough for represent knowledge, any solid object (a building, a vase, a book) could
be used as a representation of knowledge. Any specific arrangement of space, persistent in time with sufficient
stability, or thing rendered timeless by isolation from change, could encode what has been accumulated, and could
be transmuted into familiar knowledge by repeated interaction.
5.1.2 Tokenized knowledge: topic maps and semantic indices
Knowledge management has been studied for many years in the context of library systems and of the semantic
web. One of the early technologies for representing concepts formally was the idea of Topic Maps (for a review,
see [92]). This emerged from the need for document classification and indexing. An approximate rendition of the
models is as follows:
• The world consists of subjects (things, people, ideas, etc) about which we can say something.
• These subjects map to ‘topics’ in a software data model.
• Our linguistic understanding of subjects is glued together with associations we make. These are descriptive
relationships between linguistic (nominal) data.
• Associations are made by individuals, making topic maps subjective viewpoints. They can be merged to
mimic learning from one individual to another, or a blending of experiences.
The net result of a topic map is a graph structure whose nodes are topics and whose links are associations. Addi-
tional structure is given to type concepts, which are meant to model context. The information model is simple to
parse and to search, in the manner of an index.
The strength of Topic Maps lies in their autonomous, subjective viewpoints, based on keywords. This further
allows topic maps to be merged without conflict (the language is promise oriented). However, their weakness
stems from a model that is deliberately abstract. Nonetheless, it supplied much of the inspiration for the present
work33. By re-examining the ideas without those constraints, using an independent framework of semantic spaces,
we end up with a more detailed model that retains the simplicity of the old at a particular scale. A critique of topic
map knowledge representation was given in [14].
The idea that we can take a complex set of observed attributes, from a mixture of sensory inputs and pre-learned
concepts, and project them into a simplified ‘symbolic’ representation is profound; it is the key to ‘approximation’,
without which it would be likely impossible to bound the resources associated with reasoning (see section 6.4).
Tokenization solves three issues:
• Reduction of the dimensionality of sensory data.
• Compression of sensory information to a singular alphabetic form.
• Mapping variable inputs to an invariant representation.
5.1.3 A minimal observational ontology for knowledge, based on promise theory
Starting with agents and promises as a simple axiomatic framework, we can try to formulate a minimal set of
agencies¡ and promises that would be needed to represent knowledge. In order for concepts to be encoded, there
must exist some form of semantic space. The precise nature of the space may limit what knowledge it can learn
and encode. Based on a scaled view of spatial agency, and the axiom that knowledge is acquired independently
33Topic maps probably suffered from premature standardization, an artificially taxonomic approach to classification ontology (to fit into a
data model technology based on typing), and closeness to a particular imagined use-case; thus the scaling of the model was never considered
at all.
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by each observer, based on a context of its temporal interactions with exterior agents, we can now develop some
minimal number of structures for knowledge representation, by mapping the parts systematically to agents and
promises.
(−)
(+)(+)
(−)mind
world
interior things
observing agent
memory
spacetime
exterior THINGS
senses
horizon
Figure 24: Knowledge representation is based on the viewpoint of an observer agent, assessing the sensory promises made by
the agents in its exterior, and encoding its understanding in a system of interior agents making ‘knowledge promises’. These
knowledge promises map to ‘associations’ in semantic memory.
Example 76 (What happens in space stays in space) Is every familiar solid object something that can represent
knowledge? Certainly, why not. However, knowledge tokens are only isolated characterizations: a kind of knowl-
edge, but not a faithful copy of the process that made them. They are discretized tokens that have been isolated
from their origins, i.e. abstracted representations. The fidelity of knowledge is not guaranteed.
5.2 Labelling and naming conventions: the observer’s view of the world
With reference to figures 24 and the original figure 1, we begin by with a model of a single agent observing
the exterior by assessing exterior agents through a number of sensors. Inside the observer (within its superagent
interior) are conceptual agents, which we may refer to as its ‘mind’, of unspecified nature, used to equip the
superagent observer with memory and knowledge representations. The primary distinction is thus the sensory
horizon between interior and exterior agencies.
5.2.1 Interior and exterior spaces of an observer
Distinguishing the exterior or physical world of an agent (that which can be sensed) from its internal representa-
tions34 is the first step in discussion knowledge.
• Exterior ‘world’ agents promise varying levels of transparency and predictability. The host agent’s under-
standing of the world comes from interacting with and assessing these, if it can.
• Interior mind agents: memory agents that record a semantic imprint in the form of concepts. Each interior
represents a single observer viewpoint, and an independent knowledge representation.
• Interface sensors promise to observe and assess that which has been promised observable.
We need not be more specific about how the representations work until a particular realization is needed.
34Art is the lie that enables us to realize the truth, said Picasso.
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5.2.2 Interior and exterior agents
I use caps for exterior agents and lower case for interior representational agents, thus we may define:
Definition 56 (Exterior THING) An agent that makes promises in the exterior world of a specific agent, which
observes. Whatever the nature of the THING, it is the promises it makes that make it observable.
This maps to an observer’s characterization and concept:
Definition 57 (Interior thing) The interior representation of something promised on the exterior of an observing
agent, i.e. a full or partial concept.
The agent structures we need include the following35.
Definition 58 (Exterior (real) agents) Agents that can be distinguished by any observer in the exterior world.
These are not interpretations, but structural spacetime identifications.
exterior physical source agent
THING Exterior agent
(+) PROMISE Information supplied by a thing agent.
CONNECTION a physical adjacency between things.
PATTERN A geometric configuration of agents.
PATH A one-dimensional ordered pattern of THINGS.
These basic exterior agencies require a memory representation within the observer. The interior representations
are one to one, but the representations have the ability to make different kinds of promises:
Definition 59 (Interior (representational) agents) Internal structural agencies needed to map THINGS in the ex-
terior world to interior ‘thing’ representations.
interior mental representation receiving agent
Thing An internal representation of a THING.
Concept A scaled aggregate ‘thing’.
(-) Promise Information accepted from the THING to condition the internal thing.
Connection (association) An adjacency between interior things, with interpretation added.
Pattern A geometric configuration of agents.
Path A one-dimensional ordered pattern of THINGS.
5.2.3 The named roles in knowledge representation
The basic roles for categorization may be formed from the irreducible association types, by alias.
Definition 60 (Role promises by interior agents) Roles are promise patterns, common to a variety of agents.
These translate into concepts in an interior representation. A subset of knowledge structural relationships promised
by interior agents. Some examples:
interior agent promise mental promises
image / representation (default) internal representation of a thing
location a thing that represents a spatial position
event a thing that represents a spacetime position
concept a generalizing label representing common promises
pattern a geometric configuration of agents/promises
association a promise relating subjects
story a linear collection of agents ordered by associations
topic / theme image of a Thing or Object
subject /theme image of a Thing or Object
model a superagent promise of complex spacetime representation
categories a generalization of several concepts
class ”
idea a selection of things taken together
35I hope the following definitions suffice as plausible to most readers (without trying to appease other nomenclature in the literature).
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Note that, by contrast with Topic Maps, I treat the term ‘subject’ as an interior ‘mental’ agent, rather than a physical
agent. Associations between the interior concepts are explicit vector promises. Any scalar attribute can be made
into a generic vector promise by introducing a central matroid agent which represents the named attribute and
serves as a membership hub for all agents that possess the attribute.
These conventions follow from the basic promise theory representation of types (see paper II, section 2.6) as
agents that make specific behavioural promises, i.e. what we call roles. Thus types are simply aliases for roles. A
basis agent ‘thing’ can thus play many roles in knowledge representation without being a fundamentally different
type of object: roles, concepts, exemplars, generalizations, classes, categories, models, ideas, etc are all roles
played by thing representations rather than different fundamental types of thing/THING. There are relatively few
agent roles in the exterior world, because there are fewer ways to make feedbacks and links to form more complex
representations. In the interior (what we can refer to as ‘mind’), there are many more possibilities, unconstrained by
reality. Imaginations and analogies that result from feedback and mixing of patterns provide the richer menagerie
of forms that we use to describe knowledge.
5.2.4 The observer’s clock, and sense of time
When an agent samples its sensory stream, the formation of a context from the samples sets a timescale associated
with the input Tsensor. This is the clock by which observations are accepted (not the rate at which impulses are
THINGS sensors
stateinput memory  model
concepts
associations
context
introspectionsensing
behaviour
Figure 25: The functional roles involved in continual transmutation of observation into state and then concepts (memory
model), from left to right. Notice that agents’ promises (not the agents per se), on the left, determine what later agents, on the
right, can learn and know. Memory feedback, from the right, can also cycle back around, and be placed on a par with direct
observation. We could speculatively refer to memory feedback, without new input, as dreaming.
necessarily given). It determines an agent’s ability to receive information and pattern it into a sense of ‘now’.
Lemma 25 (An agent’s internal observational clock completely determines its sense of time) LetA be an agent
promised a steam of data that arrive with an average interval of T+ units, and are accepted every T− units. Thus
the expectation time to receive a sensory signal is greater than or equal to T−.
The proof follows from agent autonomy: no change can occur in the agent unless it accepts the external data or
modifies its own internal data by its own mechanisms. This is what is meant by its internal clock.
5.3 Concepts, interior structure, and semantic superagents
The obvious function of concepts is to aggregate observed THINGS into summarizable tokens, labelled by the
context in which they were observed. Concepts begin as representations of external spacetime phenomena, in the
internal spacetime of an observer. However, one there is a sufficient library of concepts, new ones can also be
invented ad hoc from within, by mixing and distorting existing ones. If an agent forms a ‘new’ idea, this can be
learnt and remembered, as a separate internal concept, with the iterative learning replaced by repeatedly rehearsing
the idea, simply by thinking a lot about it.
Definition 61 (Concept) An agent, or superagent, within the internal semantic memory space of an observer,
which promises a representation of some identifying characteristics, associated with imaginable or externally
observed phenomena, and addressable by a locally unique name, for each context in which it arises.
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This slightly involved definition allows for concepts to be observed directly, modified internally, or even invented
randomly. Concepts are distinguished from one another, by their agent boundaries. Being discrete, they can be
thought about separately, thus they are discrete semantic units. However, the fact that they can be thought about
independently of sensory input means they can also be invented without observation. Their physical encoding
in spacetime may overlap with other concepts, depending on the scale and composition of their representation.
Concepts need not be mutually exclusive: they may overlap with one another. Their contextual (conditional)
nature means that they are unlikely to be completely reducible to unique, mutually exclusive semantic sets (like a
periodic table of atomic elements); rather, they will be like a rich and varied chemistry of nuanced compounds.
New concepts are created all the time in our human minds, and it makes sense to extend this process, by
analogy, to recognize the possibility for ideation in any kind of learning system. The graphical representation of
concepts then takes the form of patchworks, i.e. non-orthogonal networks of connections, linking to matroidal
basis members. This structure reflects how the concepts coalesce from rough, noisy environmental interactions
over a range of contexts. Concepts (including synonyms, aliases, etc) might well reach into a postulated ‘space of
all notions’ pervasively, in some regions, and barely cover at all in others. Concepts may also overlap by sharing
crucial sensory ingredients.
thing
thing
thing
thing
"generalizes"
"exemplifies"
span
+concept
Figure 26: Concepts promise a basic set of characteristics that generalize the things that play the role of its exemplars. Note
the spacetime structure is a very familiar one of aggregation and scaled representation (a scaling transformation).
5.3.1 Encoding or realization of concepts (reification)
To represent, encode, or ‘reify’ (in knowledge jargon) concepts in a knowledge representation, we identify the
available agents, belonging to the representational medium, at the representational scale (see figure 27). It seems
natural to assume that any concept may be a superagent, formed from collaborative subagents, in the general case.
This means that concepts may overlap in two ways: through the presence of shared interior subagents that belong
to more than one concept, and through the repetition of exterior promises made between concepts (see figure 27).
Example 77 (Concept representation medium) Concepts may be attributed to memory configurations written
on any semantic space or medium, e.g. a crystal lattice, a collection of proteins, an agricultural planting pattern,
the layout of a town or city, etc.
Figure 27: The overlap of two conceptual regions might involve agents who represent common concepts, but might only
include their promises.
It may be assumed that there is a ground state for the conceptual fabric, i.e. that there exist basic building blocks
for concept agents, in the form of discrete semantic units. All concepts would be broken down into these, but there
may be no upper limit to their combination into superagents, allowing concepts of any aggregate size. This ground
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state set must be finite, but might be infinitely extensible. Limits on the size of conceptual agent clusters would
likely be economic in nature.
Definition 62 (Continuity of concepts) An overlapping collection of clusters, composed from base agents, and
linked by association, bridges clusters into a single continuous cluster.
From these simple speculative proposals, grounded in graph theoretic parsimony, we arrive at a natural picture of
concepts. Concept space is continuous, in the sense that it contains the overlap of open collections of clustered
basis agents, but concepts themselves are more or less discretely identifiable, with the caveat that it might be
difficult to decide exactly where the boundaries between them lie in general.
Example 78 (Cognitive linguistics) In the field of cognitive linguistics, concepts are treated as ‘semantic units’,
(i.e. signal agents in PT parlance) that exist independently of language [20]. Although the concepts of cognitive
linguistics are not well developed in a formal sense (even by their own criteria), they seem to be broadly compatible
with a promise theory view in which concepts act as spanning sets for words in contexts. This is the view I take here,
based on experiences with systems of agents in CFEngine [93], etc. Langacker is vague on what constitutes the
spanning sets, but indicates that the following general containers are involved in classifying concepts: space, size,
shape, orientation, function (container, force, motion, role), material nature or composition, and also economic
issues like cost. These regions are called ‘spaces’, and have a close resemblance to the notion of namespaces [2]
as containers of concepts, analogous to directories of files on a computer. In Langacker’s view. metaphors like in
the associative overlap between conceptual classifications36 .
There is a superficial similarity in structure between Cognitive Grammar [20] and the spacetime view taken in
this note series. It is plausible that this spacetime view could provide a more rigorous notion of conceptualization
that is compatible with it.
5.3.2 Discreteness of concepts
Some properties of concept agent representations:
• The discreteness of concepts does not imply discreteness of their semantics, and vice versa.
• Concepts need not be mutually exclusive in their degrees of freedom (orthogonal with respect to a basis
set, as described in paper I): just as vectors may be partially independent without actually being totally
orthogonal (e.g. East and North-East are linearly independent, but not orthogonal). So we can think of
concepts as tensors in the promise matroids of knowledge representation space.
Example 79 (Non-orthogonal concepts) The concept of blue is independent of the concepts of colour or turquoise,
but it is not completely orthogonal or unrelated to them.
Example 80 (Artificial learning networks) Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) can be used to learn concepts from
a curated input stream. Due to the nature of ANNs, concepts are not represented by any single node, but rather
as virtual knowledge space agents that are distributed throughout links between aggregated basis agents in a
distributed and overlapping way. This contrasts with a semantic network, e.g. Topic Maps (TM), where concepts
are pre-curated without learning. In ANN, concepts are decentralized in their representation in order to promote
fuzzy matching (as a non-linear function of a sum over weighted bases from multiple network layers, with i, j
running schematically over layers and members); in TM concepts are completely centralized in single graph nodes
(with matroid basis vector eˆi and i running over the graph nodes) and have no representation that can be matched
to data:
concept
ANN' V
∑
ij
wij eˆij
 (87)
concept
TM' eˆi. (88)
Thus TM has simplicity and efficiency of representation, while ANN has generality and a basis in sensory learning.
36Langacker riles against the notion that concepts must be discrete structures, presumably in protest against the discrete mutually exclusive
treelike structures of generative linguistics [37], suggesting instead that concepts might overlap; however, there is no contradiction between
discreteness of superagency and the possibility of overlap.
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Real world objects are composed of discrete elementary properties combined into compounds (like the table
of atomic elements, or the 19th century preoccupation with taxonomies), while the conceptual models need not
be limited to that. An appeal to topology allows us to formulate concepts as patches, which (together) form a
covering of a space of basis parts. This shows that, even without such a fundamental ‘table of elemental concepts’,
it is possible for a finite number of agencies to encode properties to span an effectively infinite realm of possible
multiset combinations.
5.3.3 Role of context in discretization
Contextualization of concepts further allow single concepts to be represented as a set of agents, distributed over the
combinatoric contexts. The encoding of concepts in the neuronal space of the human brain is one of the mysterious
but highly relevant examples of encoding of concepts.
Example 81 Recent studies of brain activity using MRI [18] to scan the brains of listeners during English lan-
guage readings showed how brain activations were grouped into to broadly cohesive cortical regions [18], with
similarities even across different subjects. The authors posited that English words were mapped by brains into
broad clustered meanings that they labelled with the following categories: visual, tactile, outdoors, place, time,
social, mental, person, violence, body part, number. In current parlance, these could be also called spacetime,
state, self, senses, relationships, and danger. The status of these studies is currently under scrutiny, at the time of
writing, due to the discovery of software bugs going back several years, that may be showing false positive results.
The aggregation of observables in this example suggests how apparent ‘types’ or categories of knowledge
emerge, which could, in turn, be identified with tokenized context states (see later discussion around figure 39).
Context-delineated aspects of a concept representation are ‘roles’ in the promise theoretic sense. Since these are
stable under repetition, by the assumption that context is stable, they must be shaped, relative to a network spanning
set, by the same semantic discriminator that fashions context, working in a predictable manner.
A closer look at context is thus warranted, based on the foregoing remarks, and a rephrasing of the definition
of context may also be posited:
Definition 63 (Context (version 2)) The accumulation of state, over the recent history of an observer, such as to
form the basis for the semantics of long term observations.
This rough description will be the model of context for explaining how tokenized names themselves become
concepts. From this starting point, we can obtain trains of thought, patterns of usage, and so on, just by linking
agents together. Because context linkage plays the same role as matroid representation, context effectively becomes
a part of the semantic coordinate system for observational memory.
5.3.4 How are concepts acquired?
Concepts are memory agents (and clusters of agents, linked by association) in knowledge space; that is, they are
interior agents, within the interior of an observer horizon. The promises they can make are about being associated
with one another in different ways, their strength of association, freshness, etc (note the difference between a
promise and an association). A concept may be promised internally (i.e. constructed) as a mirror of a promised
relationship in the exterior ‘objective’ world of the observer; alternatively, it may be promised entirely on the basis
of interior patterns, by introspective thinking about tokenized patterns and their perceived similarities.
For an imprint to be memorized, a THING Oi, in the objective exterior, promises its visible ‘essence’ ei to an
observer’s eyes or sensors Si, allowing the observer to sample it (see the left hand view in figure 28):
O1
+e1−−→ S (89)
S
−e1−−→ O1 (90)
If the promises are kept, this sampling occurs on a timescale Texterior. The agent E imposes a representation into
the memory container whose image is some agency C1:
S
+R1|e1
C1 (91)
C1
−R1−−−→ S (92)
If kept, the latter exchange happens a timescale Tinterior. For this to work, one must have
Tinterior ≤ Texterior, (93)
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Figure 28: Associations are formed in the mind of an observer. on the left, the association is formed without external impetus.
On the right, the observation of a link (perhaps through an intermediary L) is observed and represented as an association.
Associations may or may not reflect actual structure of the real world: some we call abstract, imaginary, or conceptual.
i.e. a mind must work quickly relative to what it hopes to observe.
The importance of these timescales is particularly significant when sensor discriminators are chained together,
in order to modulate one anothers’ capabilities. In that case, the timescales modulate and throttle one another.
Chaining is a technique attempted as a way of using neural networks for non-trivial reasoning (see example 111).
Example 82 (Social networks as concepts) The formation of social networks has the same basic structure as the
knowledge networks alluded to above. A social network may be considered a smart space, and indeed an intrinsic
knowledge representation. Links between members of a social network lead to clustering of cliques and regions.
Recommendations by one member of a group get passed on to others until a group also represents an interest in
that topic, by epidemic transmission [94, 95].
Members who are not interested in the mentioned topic will fall away or start new groups. Thus overlapping
memory locations cluster around topics to which they feel an affinity, forming concepts. Their affinity depends on
a context in the wider world that brings about the topics in question. Parts of the concept cluster may come at the
topic from different angles, triggered by different atoms of context during a concurrent activation.
5.3.5 Concept feedback, or introspection about THINGS through things
Once learnt, the stability of concepts and their address locations can be improved by feedback from the inner
representation into the context assessment stage of the sampling sensory apparatus S, which allows recognition
and discrimination of internal memories along side new inputs. This serves both a calibrating, self-stabilizing role,
and it also suggests the possibility of deliberate calibration extension, by matching and linking concepts relative to
similarly patterned concepts, when inputs are subdued. This introspective processing of things, without the anchor
of sensory reality, seems like the likely origin of what we consider to be new ideas. If existing memories shape
new versions of concepts, then conceptual reinforcement may be cyclic:
O1
+e−−→ S (94)
S
−e−−→ O (95)
S
+Rnew|e1,Rprevious
C1 (96)
C1
−Rnew−−−−→ S (97)
C1
−Rprevious−−−−−→ S (98)
This has precisely the form of a Bayesian learning update process for non-empty ei. For empty ei, it represents
thinking or introspection, while input is suppressed37. For now, I will leave this possibility open ended. However,
there is some evidence that this mechanism is active in human brains [19], as in figure 25.
Definition 64 (Introspection) When an observer agent feeds back concepts from long term learning, back into its
sensor and context stream as though they were new input.
37Dreaming and introspection are not exactly the same, as we know from brain research. During dreaming, not only are sensory inputs
suppressed, but long wavelength waves stimulate the brain at a coarse scale, in some kind of annealing fashion.
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Figure 29: Once learnt, the stability of concepts and their address locations can be improved by feedback from the inner
representation into the sampler E, allowing recognition and discrimination.
5.4 Associations defined
Associations are the links between the material agents of conceptual knowledge space. Let’s consider how a
promise viewpoint points towards the origins of associations as a subject of the promises made by these agents.
5.4.1 Semantic addressing
How one enters or stimulates activity in a knowledge network at a suitable location, for thinking about a particular
concept, is a problem where context and association must overlap. Knowing both the symbols and the exact
coordinate address of every concept in memory would be potentially cumbersome. Indices and directories can
be used to short-cut the linking of semantics to locations, but there is also the possibility that memory could be
addressed by its own tokenized content. This is the idea behind semantic addressing, as used in databases and
other key-value stores. The underlying mechanisms of databases make use of a indices and directories to simulate
semantic addressing; however, other technologies, based on hashing, or functional symbolic discrimination, do not
need to use the indirections of look-up tables.
5.4.2 Concurrently active concepts
Semantic addressing is related to conceptual association. An association is a pairing of concepts or data, such
that one is a token representation for the other, such as in a key-value pair. It involves a correlation of some kind.
From promise theory axioms, we know that a promise of correlation can only be made locally by a single agent,
as an independent arbiter [6]. This can take several forms (see figure 30) and explanations below. Associations are
O1
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Figure 30: The tensor forms of correlation, inferable as associations (see definitions in text).
semantic links between concepts. They originate from clusters of promises.
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Definition 65 (Association) An association A is a labelled map between concepts. A simple diadic vector asso-
ciation C1 has a relationship with C2 involves a link between two concepts, and a third concept which is name of
link type/role itself.
A : concept× concept→ concept. (99)
We use the lower-half-arrow notation represent a directed association:
C
named association−−−−−−−−−⇁ C ′ ≡ C A−→ C ′. (100)
Unlike a simple promise, an association a always has a conjugate or reciprocal interpretation a. An association
implies the existence of a directed path between C and C ′.
An association may be the subject of a cooperative promise between agents.
Lemma 26 (Unlabelled concept-association graphs are non-directed) The assumption of auto-reciprocal asso-
ciations means that each association provides bidirectional labelled connectivity in the knowledge graph with a
conjugate label.
The proof follows from the assumption that each association has a mandatory conjugate or reciprocal meaning,
and the existence of a path between the concepts. This means there is a bidirectional association between any two
concepts, but with conjugate labels.
C
a−⇁ C ′ =⇒

C ′ a−⇁ C
C
+adj−−−→ C ′
C ′
−adj−−−→ C
=⇒ C
−adj−−−→ C ′
C ′
+adj−−−→ C
. (101)
Hence there is a non-directed adjacency between C and C ′. The relationship between associations and promises
is complicated. An association is a promise of virtual adjacency between concepts, which are superagent cluster;
however, the meanings of the concepts and associations depend on the promises of the entire knowledge system.
I’ll leave it as an exercise to the reader to imagine this this entire construction (see figure 30).
Example 83 (Associative notation)
T
inside−−−⇁ T ′, (102)
meaning T is associated with T ′, with the interpretation T ‘is inside’ T ′.
Definition 66 (Association structure) A collection of assessments, which may be interpreted by an observer R
as a relative adjacency between two things or concepts, taking the form of a total function A : K → V , (written
k
A−⇁ v). It maps keys K to values V , and is defined over some interior representation belonging to R.
(a) Auto-calibrated association. Scalar association by coincident promiser. A source agent S promises both a
key +k and a value +v to an unspecified agent. Agent R is in scope of these promises and assesses them
simultaneously:
S
+k−−→
R
A? (103)
S
+v−−→
R
A? (104)
R
A:k −⇁ v−−−−−−→ A? (105)
Example 84 (of definition 66 (a)) These are dual or multiple roles, i.e. scalar promises that are associated
by virtue of originating from the same agent: e.g. linguistic compounds like police-woman, bank-teller,
food-truck, leather-jacket, table-leg, car-factory, apartment-building, living-room etc. These are not merely
linguistic compounds but conceptual associations too.
(b) Observed correlation. Bi-scalar association, with key and value observed in separate agents.
O1
+v−−→ R (106)
O2
+k−−→ R (107)
R
−v−−→ O1 (108)
R
−k−−→ O2 (109)
R
A:k −⇁ v|k,v−−−−−−−−→ A? (110)
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R assesses that k and v are simultaneously kept from different dependent sources and associates them with
the name A.
Example 85 (of definition 66 (b)) The observation of correlations between qualities that have not been
promised. Agents are authors, or police, seeing shapes in clouds, or faces on cars, i.e. the association
by the observer, without reference to the outer reality.
(c) Reported association. Vector association, inferred by scalar promise from separate agents.
O1
+A−−→ O2 (111)
O2
−A−−→ O1 (112)
O1
+(O1
+A−−→O2)−−−−−−−−−→ R (113)
O2
+(O2
−A−−→O1)−−−−−−−−−→ R (114)
R
−(O1
+A−−→O2)−−−−−−−−−→ O1 (115)
R
−(O2
−A−−→O1)−−−−−−−−−→ O2 (116)
R
A:O1 −⇁ O2|(O1 +A−−→O2),(O2 −A−−→O1)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ A? (117)
R assesses the promises made by O1 and O2 as simultaneously kept, and infers the association between
these two agents under the name A.
Example 86 (of definition 66 (c)) Observation of a connection, which the agents both promise to have, may
be based on adjacency, causation, generalization, etc: e.g. a person on bike, device plugged in, Mark’s
dog, A supplies B, A depends on B, A and B are partners, the agents ‘know’ each other in the real world,
the agents agree about subject X .. This is a formation of cluster of collaborative molecular roles from
independent atomic roles.
(d) Reported calibration. Bi-vector association through intermediate agent. Generalization of (c).
O1
+b1−−→ L (118)
O2
−b2−−→ L (119)
O1
+(O1
b1−→L)−−−−−−−→ R (120)
O2
+(O2
b2−→L)−−−−−−−→ R (121)
R
−(O1
b1−→L)−−−−−−−→ O1 (122)
R
−(O2
b2−→L)−−−−−−−→ O2 (123)
R
A:O1
L−⇁ O2|(O1 +A−−→O2),(O2 −A−−→O1)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ A? (124)
Example 87 (of definition 66 (d)) The calibration of roles, and innovative mixing. These are promises that
unite agents by a common (matroid) basis element: partners brought together by an interloper or match-
maker, the members of a club, agents authorized to act (e.g. keepers of the password), members of a country,
all agents facing North.
(e) Reported encapsulation. Scaled superagent informs as a function via index/directory lookup table. Gener-
alization of (a).
S
+(k
asserted−−−−⇁ v)−−−−−−−−−−→ R (125)
R
−(k asserted−−−−⇁ v)−−−−−−−−−−→ S (126)
R
k
A−⇁ v−−−−−→ A? (127)
R parrots the trusted association promised by superagent S, about its interior state.
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Example 88 (of definition 66 (e)) An association promised by a single encapsulating agent: e,g. I am a
shopping mall, a city, a community, and these agents are part of my makeup (here is is my internal directory).
The type of exterior promise involved in the simultaneous assessment by R’ need not be mentioned, as it plays no
real role, as long as the promise type matches across the concurrent assessment. Also, as usual, it is understood
that the promises, on which R bases its assessments, may not always be kept. Associations are, consequently, at
least as uncertain as the promises that lead to them.
In terms of physical representation, spacetime proximity (e.g. adjacency, such as in a cellular automaton or
an ionic chemical bond) is a more robust or less uncertain promise of association than say remote correlation
by message exchange (e.g. pen pals or a covalent chemical bond), because it does not rely on the promises of
intermediate agents to glue together the association. In either case, the associative bindings are reinforced by
frequent revisitation, i.e. learned familiarity, increasing trust [5].
5.4.3 Tensor structure of association
Associations are constraints on the spacetime structure of a semantic space. Associations are made of promises, but
not vice versa. As a constraint, an association involves spacetime symmetry reduction, such as a regular ordering
or clustering around anchor points. Concepts-association graphs are a subset of promise graphs.
Lemma 27 (Associations are tensors) All tensor forms may be constructed by involving clusters of N agents.
Referring to paper I, the proof follows trivially; the rank of the tensor is less than or equal to the number of agents
involved in an association. In a mathematical tensor, each collection of indices represents a subjective agent view-
point, which could potentially be transformed into another agent’s perspective, by redefining agents. This is known
as covariance [55]. It is intriguing to wonder if the spacetime properties of memory allow covariance of tensor
representations to play a role in cognitive perspective too. Context may play the role of such a transformation, as
it alters the clustering structures of agents in a knowledge representation, and the promised associations made by
the superagent clusters.
Example 89 (Associative arrays) In a computer, associative structures form directories or index maps (see paper
II). In order to link concepts semantically, there has to be an underlying dynamical addressing of spacetime, which
acts as intermediary. Transforming the addresses, in a way that respects spacetime structure, leads to a different
perspective.
Example 90 (Superagent directory lookup table) A superagent directory is an associative array in which keys
are mapped to promises. Agent directories map interior agent names/addresses to their promises.
Example 91 (Entity-Relation models) In Entity Relation (SQL) modelling, the graphical structure is built from
lookup tables, and addresses are hidden from users, replaced with primary keys. Thus spacetime locations may
be found only by searching, or using an index to map primary keys (see figure 31). Underlying this user interface
legerdemain is a ordinal addressing scheme for referring to the locations: just as a book index maps from keywords
to page numbers, the ordinal page numbering is complicit in making the scheme predictable and efficient. An index
exploits the solid state structure of a space make location predictable. There are then all kinds of structures with
properties that optimize the time to retrieve the item.
Example 92 (Lookup tables) In data science, associative arrays are simple data maps, mapping a domain into
a codomain. As associative data array is a simple mapping between sets. Consider a set of three colour concept
classes: C = {red, green,blue} and a set of data values D = {000000, . . . , FFFFFF} corresponding to these
classes. We may form a mapping M between these concepts and ranges of discrete colour codes in RGB space.
A[red] = {010000, . . . , FF0000} (128)
A[green] = {000100, . . . , 00FF00} (129)
A[blue] = {000001, . . . , 0000FF} (130)
5.4.4 Associations may connect any agent or scale
An association is not limited to a particular kind of agent, as illustrated by these examples.
Example 93 (Functions) Functions association inputs with outputs, e.g. looking up RGB codes for colours:
Colour(c)↔ Codes(d) (131)
Or as an associative functional map function A, with c ∈ C and d ∈ D:
c = A(d). (132)
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Figure 31: Entity relation models in databases allow different types of data to be standardized as tabular templates and then
linked together through data intermediaries forming a map, as long as each instance of a table they has a primary index, i.e. a
coordinate system that can be indexed against.
Example 94 (Associating different schemas) What if we want to keep the different memory types distinct, in
special kinds of memory, and still weave them together into an associative web? i.e. we don’t try to transduce them
all into words, or data values, but keep timeseries, words, image fragments, etc all separate but Entity Relation
theory introduced for database modelling attempted to answer this question [35].
5.4.5 How are associations identified?
Consider how two concepts can become associated, in a memory representation. Referring to equations (90) and
(92), we may add a single promise pair from S to itself, which loops back, to form the association. By continuously
keeping and assessing this promise, the agent can learn the association, as a stable representation in its knowledge
space. An association, intended by the sensor observer S is a promised scalar relationship about two sub-agents,
inside its horizon:
S
±C1
some association−−−−−−−−⇁ C2−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ S (133)
If the association builds on an actual observation of objects O1 and O2, then that relationship would be communi-
cated by the promises of e1, e2, and then one could consider the association to be a conditional promise:
S
±C1
some association−−−−−−−−⇁ C2|e1,e2−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ S (134)
If the association is based on reasoning by the observer then
Observer
±C1
some association−−−−−−−−⇁ C2|e1,e2−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Observer. (135)
To associate concepts, we must have simultaneous triggering of concept clusters. No other information exists to
join two concepts together. Since the concepts themselves are bootstrapped by the equation (134)
Lemma 28 (Simultaneous coincident context) The semantics of association are those of simultaneous activation
of context.
From equations (134) and (135), there are two possible forms of concurrent activation, which are the only con-
current events that contain both concepts as information. Thus the only causal possible relationships are these
two routes. Since exact simultaneity is impossible, coarse graining of simultaneity is an essential requirement to
coarse graining together concepts into associated clusters. This means there is a timescale for association formation
Tassociation ≥ Tinterior.
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5.4.6 Flooding, routing, and association
It is worth remarking that, in order to form concepts by association, concepts may be addressed from inputs accord-
ing to either the flooding or routing addressing methods. Flooding (even within a restricted region) is a divergent
process, which is therefore expansive and leads to possible generalization of concepts. Routing is convergent and
specific, allowing precision. These complementary ‘advanced’ and ‘retarded’ propagation mechanisms are at work
in spacetime networks at all levels.
5.4.7 Autonomy and association (a notational caution)
Consider figure 32. If we represent composition, within a knowledge space, as a promise (case (a)), a literal reading
of the notation
S
+b−−→ R; (136)
appears to claim that the associative label comes between the two concepts it links (case (b)). If this were the case,
the intermediate agent would need complex semantics to observe both S and R and act as a switch to relay the
intention between the two rather than impeding them. As an intermediary, it would be more likely to impede or
distort transmission than represent the other’s intent by proxy [6]. Thus a connection would require the creation of
a new agent and a conditional promise to activate the connection. Associations promised by autonomous agents,
like cells or dumb devices, do not have the internal capabilities to keep advanced promises. If b is realized as an
+b +b
+b
(a) (b) (c)
S SR RS R
Figure 32: A promise of a body +b (a) can impose signal agents, or route the third party without it being emitted/absorbed.
It is not correct to imagine the body provider as an intermediary (b), rather it is a source that must be relayed by the agent who
makes the promise (c), because b cannot promise on S’s behalf.
intermediate agent, then it blocks S’s direct promise, rather than enabling it, and makes no guarantee of a promise
of its own to R. This is both a complication, expensive, and uncertain. A simpler representation, which observes
the principle of autonomy [6], is shown in case (c), in which b serves as the source of the promise body, and S
promises to route it directly to R. In this form, the source of the intention acts as a basis (matroid) agent, which
may be constant, and S has a fixed promise for all b rather than requiring a specialized promise for every b. Thus,
this approach is economically more scalable. All the dynamics are directly between the concept agents. By the
conditional promise law:
S
+b−−→ R ≡>

b
+data−−−→ S
S
−data−−−→ b
S
+data|data(b)−−−−−−−→ R
R
−data−−−→ S
≡>

b
+data−−−→ S
S
+data(b)−−−−−→ R
R
−data−−−→ S
(137)
Theorem 1 (No go for bipartite lattice) A programmable promise graph can not be implemented as a bipartite
graph, by proxy (see figure 32(b)), i.e. S +b−−→ R cannot be represented in the form S x−→ B y−→ R, for b, for any
x, y.
From the discussion above, the proof follows from the fact that a bipartite lattice would not propagate the intended
promises without additional promises to switch on the intermediate node, leading to a recursive deficit in switching.
This suggests that a bipartite lattice is not a viable way to implement associations. In order to make a proxy
representation, we would need
S
+x−−→ R,B (138)
B
+b−−→ B,S,R (139)
R
−x−−→ S,B, (140)
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where x is to be determined. In order to transmit intent +b to intermediate agent B, +x would need to be of the
form
E
def(b)−−−−→ B (141)
B
−def(b)−−−−−→ S,R (142)
B
+b|def(b)−−−−−−→ R (143)
S
?−→ R (144)
for some external control source agent E. The latter is needed to promise intent from S to R, but there is no ?
that can promise the intent to follow B from S. If S = E, there would need to be a direct channel from S to R,
which violates the bipartite structure. Section 5.4.11 illustrates a workaround for this, however, using intermediate
switching agents for more complex linkage; the result is not a direct association, but an implicit association by
reasoning. The routing construction does not violate the principles of autonomy, and can lead to a simple direct
association:
Lemma 29 (Promises may be routed) A promise graph in space can implemented as a conditional routing switch
(figure 32(c)).
This follows from the conditional promise law [6], in which a promise from the basis agent for the association
label acts as the switch.
B
+def(b)−−−−−→ S (145)
S
+b|def(b)−−−−−−→ R (146)
S
−def(b)−−−−−→ B,R. (147)
5.4.8 Quasi-transitive or propagating associations
Intent propagates between agents if there is what we might call a quasi-transitivity as a result of promises made
and kept [79]. In a knowledge network, this may translate into concept associations which propagate if there are
associations that have certain spacetime transformation properties. Associations can correlate causal influence over
two dimensions (scale and location). Let C(n) be conceptual (super)agents at an aggregate scale, labelled by n:
• Vertical scaling associations (North-South) which aggregate or decompose concepts by membership, i.e.
scale resolution:
C
(n+1)
i
+generalizes−−−−−−−−⇁ C(n)j (148)
These associations break scaling symmetry by pinning concepts (see below), or selecting a direction for
scale.
CMy dad
is bigger than−−−−−−−⇁ Cyour dad. (149)
• Horizontal associations (East-West): within each superagent (see figure 33):
Ci
similarity−−−−−⇁ Cj (150)
or between superagents, e.g.
Si
depends on−−−−−−⇁ Sj . (151)
• Vector associations that may result in a quasi-transitive inference, i.e suggest a propagation of intent over a
potentially long range. These are related to spacetime properties (see table 1).
• Vector associations that result in no transitive inference, i.e. suggest short range finite-dimension transitions
rather than spatially extensive properties. These are related to interior state machines (like hidden variables).
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NS
EW
subagents
superagents
Figure 33: The common use of compass directions to refer to a scaling hierarchy of increasing generalization, i.e. increased
coarse graining, while other associative properties happen in the planar scaling layers. This language of N,S,E,W is common
in the networking industry. All the irreducible associations refer to constraints on the scaling and the topology of the space of
agents.
5.4.9 The irreducible positive associations
The irreducible quasi-transitive structural associations are documented in table 1. The generally transitive or
propagating properties fall into the familiar irreducible classes (see table 1). Let A(n) be agents in either a real or
a knowledge space, which may include C(n):
1. Proximity/Adjacency: (space) mutual, classically non-directed relationships represent non-directional role
symmetries that have not been broken. e.g. overlaps with, shares with, associates with, joins, connects with,
relates to, etc.
Asimilarity : A(n)i → A(n)j . (152)
For every Asimilarity : A(n)i → A(n)j , there is also a Asimilarity : A(n)j → A(n)i .
Lemma 30 (Similarity associations are symmetry preserving) The class of similarity associations rep-
resents symmetry preserving transformations, mapping one concept into an equivalent one that may be
reversed by inverting the direction
If s is a similarity association C1
s−⇁ C2, then C2 s−⇁ C1, because A C1
s−⇁ C2−−−−−−→ A =⇒ A C2
s−⇁ C1−−−−−−→ A.
2. Sequence/Dependency: (time) associations that describe causal pathways in a system, whereby one agent
depends on the prior keeping of a promise by another, or builds on the existence of a prior concept. e.g. de-
pends on, reinforces, contributes to, asserts, documents, annotates, expresses, elaborates, extends, involves.
Acausal : A(n)i → A(n)j . (153)
Lemma 31 (Causal associations break equivalence symmetry) Causal associations break the directional
symmetry of mutual semantics.
Selecting a precedence between two concepts imposes a local direction on the map, thus selecting a preferred
direction or concept, and breaking the ‘reflection’ symmetry or equilibrium between concepts.
Causal association may be chained together to represent world lines, because any change in an association
measures time, and selects a preferred direction.
3. Scaling/containment: (boundary enclosure) describes a transformation from one scale to another, in which
multiple concepts at the smaller scale contribute to the larger scale. e.g. the relationship between a collective
agent and a member agent: generalizes, exemplifies, abstracts, models, etc.
Let (super)agents at scale n be represented by A(n) (see paper II), then
Acoarse : A(n) → A(n+1). (154)
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ST TYPE FORWARD RECIPROCAL SPACETIME STRUCTURE
is close to is close to
approximates is equivalent to PROXIMITY
1 is connected to is connected to “near”
is adjacent to is adjacent to Symmetrizer
is correlated with is correlated with
FORWARD RECIPROCAL SPACETIME STRUCTURE
depends on enables
2 is caused by causes GRADIENT/DIRECTION
follows precedes “follows”
FORWARD RECIPROCAL SPACETIME STRUCTURE
contains is a part of / occupies
3 surrounds inside AGGREGATE / MEMBERSHIP
generalizes is an aspect of / exemplifies “contains”
FORWARD RECIPROCAL SPACETIME STRUCTURE
has name or value is the value of property
4 characterizes is a property of DISTINGUISHABILITY
represents/expresses is represented/expressed by “expresses”
promises Asymmetrizer
Table 1: The four irreducible association types are characterized by their spacetime coincidence or adjacency. Note that, in
promise theory, even relationships like ‘is correlated with’ are directed relationships: one may not assume that the assessment
of a mutual property is mutually assessed. Similarly the expression of a property is a cooperative relationship.
Lemma 32 (Coarse grain associations break universal scaling) Coarse graining associations pin seman-
tics at a particular semantic scale, breaking renormalization scaling symmetry.
By naming a specific agent or superagent, e.g.
Canimal
generalizes−−−−−−⇁ Cdog. (155)
we break a generic scale-free relationship.
The formation of superstructure by associative clustering leads to generalizations and new types. General-
ization of instances into conceptual hubs allows self-organized model learning, and increases the scope for
fuzzy matching.
Lemma 33 (Smoothing) If we take a vector field and coarse grain the space so that the points defining the
vector are effectively coincident at the new scale, then we average away the gradients. This is the process
of smoothing and noise reduction. It transforms similarity states into a single thing with representative
semantics, i.e. a common concept.
4. Promise/Expression: (property) if we associate agents, while retaining the special names and characters, it
is like the formation of molecules. This breaks the symmetry of roles between the component agents in a
cooperative association, e.g. represents, is a name for, is the doorway to, etc.
Arepresentation : A(n)i → A(m)j . (156)
Lemma 34 (Representation breaks role symmetry) Representational associations break the symmetry of
mutual semantics, selecting one part to act as a proxy labelling the other.
Lemma 35 (Transitivity no go) Transitivity of associations cannot be promised for arbitrary associations.
The proof follows from the basic axiom that no agent may make a promise on behalf of another. Concepts are
(super)agents, and no agent can promise a property on behalf of another, i.e. that an association will be enforced
beyond itself.
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Example 95 (Transitivity is not assumed) If A promises it is connected to B, and B that it is connected to C,
we simply don’t know whether A is connected to C, either directly or through B. it might be true that there is a
connected path from A to C. This is not a certainty, because B might not allow transmission of anything between
the two. The fact that agents are chained together in relationships is no guarantee of their.
Example 96 (Vertical association limits (hierarchy of generalization)) Vertical associations, which take us from
exemplary THINGs to a generalized class or concept, could be stacked to any depth, in principle. In practice, how-
ever, human faculty for stacking concepts is quite limited: we can typically keep only a handful of ideas in mind
at any one time [3, 96, 97]. Moreover, in any practical system, the apparatus by which associations are made and
classified is finite, and will have to be understood by a human with limited faculties, thus it is not implausible
that these vertical links would be finite in number, and perhaps specialized with distinct semantics that reflect the
transformation staging in learning process (recall the stages in the parsing example 38). For example, a limited
set of stages could lead to the following interpretations:
1. Species in a taxonomy.
2. Things in a taxonomy.
3. Concept hierarchy.
4. Sensor data hierarchy.
Going up the list corresponds to ‘is generalized by’, and going down the list corresponds to either ‘is exemplified
by’ or ‘is composed of’38.
5.4.10 Non-transitive semantics in associations
Not all associations make even quasi-transitive sense. Consider human relationships, like father, daughter, etc. If
we write
Fabian is father to−−−−−⇁ Simon is father to−−−−−⇁ Dawn, (157)
it is by no means true that Fabian is father to Dawn. The father relationship is pinned at a specific short range: it
cannot form a state of long range order. It is, in fact, is a short-range form of association, and a causal precedence
association. Interestingly, it does not propagate, because the concept of father is limited. This now has the direct
implication of that we can state as a general law: that loss of long range symmetry is directly associated with
knowledge encoding, as stated formally in the final conclusions.
father Fabian
Simonson
represents
pr
ec
ed
es
is father to
Figure 34: Constrained association by something like vector addition of irreducible types.
Imbuing relationships with labels that constrain the semantics locally also constrains the propagation of intent.
This is significant: it means that a plain graph theory cannot represent hierarchical semantics, and we need to
understand specifically how concepts, embedded in the associations, further constrain the spacelike clustering of
38It is interesting to note that the brain cortex has neuron column structures that can form hierarchy up to depth 6, and to speculate about
whether this is related [19].
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concepts. If we decompose ‘is father to’ into a causal/precedence association and a representation association (see
figure 34, and recall section 5.4.7):
X
father of−−−−⇁ Y =
(
father
represents
↽−−−−−
)
X
precedes−−−−⇁ Y (158)
father of−−−−⇁ ' represents↽−−−−−⊕ precedes−−−−⇁ . (159)
What this shows is that our understanding of concepts is more complicated than our understanding of space-
time; it involves higher tensor forms. If the father concept were just any old agent, and ‘is father to’ were just a
generic ‘source of’, then the sequence
Fabian is source of−−−−−−⇁ Simon is source of−−−−−−⇁ Dawn, (160)
now makes quasi-transitive sense. Why the father concept does not propagate does not have an obvious spacetime
explanation, but may be addressed from the viewpoint of reasoning (see section 6). Semantics are sometimes
pinned to particular spacetime scales, and cannot be generalized beyond them. Thus, the emergence of semantics
may be associated with spacetime symmetry breaking.
5.4.11 Embellishing associations for deeper inference
To represent higher tensor forms, where associations are more complex than a simple link between two concepts,
we may consider embellished associations. These are constructed by introducing an intermediate concept and
treating the association as an inference (see section 6). Although the direction of a narrative still follows a direction
from a promiser concept to a promisee, other concepts may embellish the descriptions of the associations, as labels.
Thus vectors associations generalize to tensors, with multiple concepts clustered into the association itself.
Example 97 (Rolling context) Context plays a key role in the iterative association of concepts (see figure 35):
Professor plum Mrs Peacock
librarymurder
|cause context
Figure 35: Embellished association is a general tensor.
From-Concept Association Context To-Concept
Professor plum murders with a knife in the library Mrs Peacock
In the next iteration, the context would accumulate the foregoing concepts until they age beyond relevance:
From-Concept Association Context To-Concept
Police arrive the murder of professor plumb in the library
in the library by Mrs Peacock.
What kind of spacetime structure accounts for this graph (see figure 35)? It is a tensor of rank less than or
equal to four:
Ac1c3c4c2 (161)
The only natural object with this structure, which does would not violate the ‘no go’ theorem for bi-partite
causaton, is the context aggregator itself, which would build the embellishments as context. This is not yet well
understood, at the time of writing, but should become clearer with some model building39. The conditional activa-
tion decided by the hub could be based on a summation threshold value or it could be a binary logic. In a computer
system, binary decisions are assumed. In biochemical processes, they seem unlikely40.
39Experiments are underway in the ‘percolibrium’ project.
40Since we cannot extended the number of these simultaneous connections indefinitely, it suggests that there is a limit to how many simul-
taneous concepts can be processed in one go, unless they are parallelized, meaning that a Turing machine trying to simulate the knowledge
process would take longer to understand complex associations than simple ones, proportional to the number of concepts involved.
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Professor plum Mrs Peacock
librarymurder
?
? ?
Figure 36: Embellished association is an intermediate routing hub or switch that allows simultaneous activation of the con-
cepts. The hub plays a key role in knowing such complex associations.
5.5 Context as a conditional switch for associative memory
A knowledge system needs to be able to map associations to contexts, in order to differentiate and nuance usage, so
a semantic space must be able to handle context-specific adjacencies, both to distinguish and coordinatize multiple
meanings. To realize this, associative memory must be switchable. A switch is a device that exploits boundary
conditions in order to link or unlink spatial regions. We can imagine context as acting analogously to the bias
current of a transistor:
Collector
+current|bias−−−−−−−−→ Emitter (162)
Concept
+related|context−−−−−−−−−−→ Exemplar (163)
Context thus becomes a modulator for permanent conceptual and associative memory, in accordance with the
conditional assistance law [6]. From (163), and the rules of promise theory, we see that the promise to deliver
context information must be kept by a distinct agent in order to assist in the keeping of a conditional promise. As
a model for this, we return to figure 25, consider how this makes sense41.
5.5.1 Conditional association and structure of context
Conditionality breaks translation symmetry explicitly, by introducing boundary conditions which modulate the
concept space creating inhomogeneity, and it is associated with switching; thus, now we see a direct link between
switching, memory, and knowledge representation at a fundamental spacetime level. Consider associations of the
form:
C
association|conditional context−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−⇁ C ′. (164)
The associational link is now considered only to be a link if the condition is part of the context of the observer.
Example 98 In tabular form:
From-Concept Association To-Concept Context
Hot characterizes Spain weather
Hot characterizes Chilli food
Hot characterizes Sarah sexual attraction
We see that concepts may have many interpretations that are labelled by context. In ontology, e.g. in topic maps,
associations and concepts are classified into types; this approach was criticized, as it leads to static, impositional
data models that easily form contradictions to invalidate themselves [14, 92]. An approach using conditionals,
where the current context belongs to a set of token characteristics, addresses the deficiencies of a type system,
though it leads to more complex graphs42.
5.5.2 Constructing embellished or contextualized associations
The need to represent the kind of contextualized associations as described in the previous section, has structural
implications for concepts. If we assume the existence of aggregating agents, such as the one shown in figure 37,
then we see that the inputs to an agent from different contextual triggers begin to dominate the links to the concept
41Any superagent capable of assembling a working context can use it as a coded memory address in a routing fabric analogous to a Banyan
switch [98].
42The ideas is similar to the demotion of static schemas in database technology and their replacement with schema-less data formats.
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1
2
4
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S
S
S
S
M
A
(n+1)
A(n)
(+ C)
(−c)
(−c)
(−c)
(−c)
θ
Figure 37: An aggregating agent, whose promise to R1 depends on the promises from a number of source agents is an
ambiguous semantic situation. An aggregation of equivalent sources is essentially a membership relationship in which the
agent M plays the same role as a generalization, mapping from level A(n) → A(n) or from level A(n) → A(n+1).
superagent, shown by the dotted line in figure 38. For each outgoing association from the single concept to other
concepts, conditionalized by context, there must be an incoming bundle of promises to accept context inputs. This
suggests a potentially large asymmetry between inputs and outputs that places a burden on a single agent. A
hypotheical resolution would be to build a concept bundle from interior subagents, say one for each association.
A concept with, say, two outgoing associations (shown by the dotted line in figure 38), would then have two such
basic aggregating elements. This generalizes to more. This, in turn, suggests that the concept forms as a cluster of
several such aggregating switches, linked through a binding basis agent (see figure 38), which demarks the single
concept as a discrete entity.
For each association, promised by the concept agent, there are likely to be several context triggers, arising from
different stages of the sensory inputs chain. Given that agents have limited internal capabilities, there is also likely
to be a limit to the number of contextual inputs that can condition an associative memory link.
member1
member2
Incoming context Outgoing contextualized associations
Concept superagent
Concept
binding element
Figure 38: A concept forms as a cluster of several aggregating switches, joined through a binding basis agent.
5.5.3 Causation and aggregation are not completely orthogonal
The irreducible associations are not without some overlap or ambiguity. Consider the case of an aggregating agent,
like the one discussed in figure 37. This is a structure that is key to representing conditional promises, and thus a
contextualized associations of the form:
M
+C|c1,c2,c3,c4−−−−−−−−−→ R1 (165)
M
−c1,c2,c3,c4−−−−−−−−→ R1 (166)
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The triggering context −{c1, c2, c3, c4} is aggregated by M in order to activate the promise +C of an associa-
tion between M and R1. Another interpretation might place M in the role of a generalization of the concepts
S1, S2, S3, S4. The ambiguity arises because a generalizing aggregate concept may be considered to be caused
(in some sense) by the members that belong to it. However, aggregation usually presupposes that the Si are
symmetrical in their semantics.
• (Symmetry of contexts) Each instance leads to (has a causal influence on) the existence of a generalization.
• (Asymmetry of contexts) A dependency or contributing ingredient is not generalized by the combination of
contributors.
Thus causation is a more primitive association, in some sense. The main difference is that generalization requires
the ingredients to be symmetrical in their semantics. The members of a group need some unifying property (such
as a basis set or matroid element). In practice, a generalization is a membership in a superagentM whose represen-
tative basis is the superagent itself. For source agents that are symmetrical in their semantics, one could imagine
a transformation from one type of association to another, formed as a superposition of semantics, represented by
the angle θ in figure 37. This transformation does not invalidate the irreducibility of the coarse graining associa-
tion. Indeed, it is natural that causal influence would be able to traverse concepts belonging to different levels of
aggregation. Introspective association would tend to level the hierarchy of concepts.
Finally, it is worth noting that the law of dual or complementary promises [6] indicates how ± can be ex-
changed, turning what is context into what is concept, or vice versa. Thus, in a reasoning situation, the roles of
context and representative concepts can easily be thrown into reverse.
5.5.4 Information argument for separation of context
To be more precise about the multiple stages of conceptualization, and their timescales, from quick the identifica-
tion context tokens to long-term associative clusters (in different kinds of memory representation), we consider an
argument based on intrinsic information, as measured by the Shannon entropy. The Shannon entropy is a measure
of information efficiency [9, 64]. Both short term context and long term memory contain information, in the form
of internal links and concepts. We don’t need to now specifically how information is encoded, but we can assume
that it is quantifiable, through a symbolic alphabet, as an informational entropy.
Definition 67 (Shannon entropy of a memory configuration) Let A be some associative configuration, formed
from an alphabet of links between concepts, in a graph Aij of all possible concept agents C and superagents S,
where i = 1, . . . , C + S, and let p(A) be the probability of links being active. We may define the information of
this configuration to be:
S(A) = −
C+S∑
i<j=1
pij log pij . (167)
This intrinsic information may be used to compare the amount of information in short-term context memory with
the amount of information in long term memory.43 An agent or collection of agents responsible for context clas-
sification takes observations about the state of the world, at each clock tick of the knowledge system, and labels a
set of states, which are used to predicate new associations between pairs of concepts. Let’s define these collections
of agents using superagents at a large scale:
Definition 68 (Adaptive knowledge system components)
S = Sensor input agent graph (168)
C = Context agent graph (169)
A = Knowledge/Concept association agent graph (sum of all persistent memories) (170)
We can use information to make a strong statement:
43Physicists and computer scientists define information differently, in a subtle way. Information in physics is about uniqueness of an
experiment within an ensemble of experiments, so it measures the uniformity of statistical patterns across many episodes (external time).
Information in Shannon’s theory of communication is about uniformity of states within a single episode or sample, thus it measures the
uniformity of patterns within a single experiment (over internal time). This is why information scientists would say that information is entropy,
and why physicists say that is it the opposite of entropy!
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Hypothesis 3 (The information resolution of context must be less than that for knowledge) A context-switched
knowledge system, capable of distinguishing non-trivial contexts, with introspective feedback, divides into two in-
dependent agencies C and A, representing short-term context and long-term associative memory, where S(C) 
S(A) and the timescales for acquisition T (C) T (A). This is necessary to have differentiated classes of associ-
ated knowledge determined by context.
The proof of this lies in the following considerations:
• Suppose that the context memory were the same agency as the long term memory plus the new sensory
input, i.e. C = A. The feedback fromA onto itself is now indistinct from the ordinary associations, and thus
the use of total knowledge as a switch for knowledge context is an automorphism with no class distinctions.
This memory must be homogeneous, and therefore does not allow for persistent context distinctions. In
other words, it cannot remember distinct associations as conceptual entities, because C = A. This means we
can rule out C = A in a contextual associative system, and there must be (at least) two agencies. A further
consequence of this case is that the timescale for context evaluation must be the same as the timescale for
knowledge acquisition and retrieval. Since long term knowledge requires several iterations of sampling over
a context to stabilize, with introspection involving both C and A, nT (C) < T (A), for some number of
iterations n > 1.
• Next, suppose instead that S(C) 6= S(A). The average amount of independent information in each context is
then of the order S(A)/S(C) in each context, allowing contexts to be inhomogeneously encoded scenarios
within the total amount of long term knowledge. In order to contain a non-trivial amount of context specific
knowledge, we therefore need S(C) S(A), implying that whatever agency keeps context, its capacity for
concept resolution must be low compared to long term memory. If this condition were not met, the contexts
would merge into one another, and lose distinction, eliminating smart behaviour44. With a lower information
content, context can be addressed and operated at a separate and faster timescale than long term memory
processes, leading to fast short term memory, and slower learning of knowledge T (C) T (A).
Corollary 1 (Short term context is faster than long term association) If C is a distinct agency that is a condi-
tional prerequisite for switching A, then the timescale T (C) for a transition is C must be less than or equal to the
timescale T (A) for a transition of A’s configuration.
Context is an agent’s assessment of the present, or its ‘situation awareness’; this may include an interpreted ‘emo-
tional state’ for the agent; these structural entities can all be derived from basic spacetime considerations, in a
representation independent way45.
Example 99 (CFEngine’s model) The CFEngine software [93] makes use of a strongly similar system, defining
classes based on environment discovery, and using hints about what the user is thinking, e.g. -Dclass. This
replaces a more familiar form of reasoning by first order branching logic. Sensory inputs may be extended in-
definitely to discriminate very specific states. Thus CC represents a kind of short term memory for what the
operational system of machines and human operators is collectively thinking about, or focused on.
Example 100 (Immunology model) Context is provided by antigen presenting cells. Long term memory is pro-
vided by the populations of epitopes on antibodies in lymph nodes and in circulation as memory cells [89, 90].
Example 101 (Genetics and epigenetics) Genetic encoding operates at two levels: there is long term memory
encoded in gene sequences on chromosomes. Then there is an environment of protein networks that activate genes
at specific moments. These encode short term context, within an organism as a learning system.
Example 102 (Do neural networks have fast and slow memory?) In an artificial neural network, layers of neu-
rons are connected into a high density feed-forward network, in which propagation occurs at a single speed. This
fast propagation acts as a context encoding for conditioning the long term memory tokenization. Once trained,
this means that a neural network has only a single timescale. However, when the network is learning, it feeds
sensory data forward as context, to be adjusted by back-propagation over a longer training timescale. This is
the separation of timescales for ANN training. Once the network is trained, it operates purely as an advanced
multi-dimensional sensor at high speed, similar to the way an eye can process visual signals quickly because of
millions of years of evolutionary learning. Similar to the eye, once training has stopped, the ANN cannot learn
anything new, without a separate slow process of adjustment, thus ANNs do not contradict these considerations.
44This may well be an effect that happens as the memory of a smart observer reaches its full capacity, or a critical percolation threshold
between contexts is reached.
45There has been some speculation about the nature of brain consciousness as a state of matter, that makes some connection with spacetime
notions too [99, 100]. That work goes far beyond the scope of the present work however. The extent to which the present structural concerns
are represented in brains remains to be seen, though there does not seem to be any obvious contradiction as far as I can tell.
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The implication of conditional promises in context switching reaffirms the basic separation of learning into
two timescales: a short-term evaluation or classification of the current ‘state of mind’ in a thinking process, and a
long-term linkage between concepts, which can be paged in by the short term modulation. The relative information
also supports the notion that knowledge would converge, by feedback, to a tokenized representation, separate from
detailed sensory input. The question remains, however, as to whether context has to be a completely separate mem-
ory, or simply a distinct agent that transforms long term memory into context? From the foregoing considerations,
it seems that C would be a coarse graining of both A and sensory input S?
In an introspective system, a component of context could derive from fed-back long-term associative knowl-
edge, along side the interpretation of direct observations (see figure 39). However, it also seems likely that context
has a role closer to observation than to accumulated knowledge. The question of how knowledge is bootstrapped
provides some direction here. A memory that has no initial concepts still has to be able to generate context accord-
ing to this architecture. This suggests that context is closer to sensory interpretation than to long term memory.
That hypothesis is further backed up by the argument that contextualization has to happen at approximately the
same timescale as observation; thus, even with feedback from long term concepts, context is the imprint of the
sensory stream onto specialized knowledge. Thus, promise theory makes a simple prediction:
Hypothesis 4 (Separate agent for context adaptation) Context needs a distinct and internally coordinated agent,
of unspecified structure, that promises to quickly summarize the current state of the the external sensory input and
recent history, for use in selecting the relevance of context-dependent relationships between the representations
above. The agent may promise only limited capabilities, meaning that context has to focus on particular parts of
the sensory input in practice.
Because the only mechanism for coupling of concepts is their simultaneous activation, and activation is assumed
to be modulated by context, the prediction is that conceptual memory is built on a hierarchy of timescales, not on
a hierarchy of a priori semantics. In a knowledge space, associational adjacency is conditionality on a context. It
is thus entirely reasonable to expect to find different kinds of memory for different purposes, supporting different
recognition mechanisms and timescales just as we make different kinds of data store in computing.
Associative
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coarse feedback
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Figure 39: Context discrimination leads to different versions of a concept, according to sensory input and coarse feedback.
Context assessment needs to be fast and disposable, i.e. short term. The formation of associations, or contextual relationships
to other memories and concepts, can be slower, to achieve higher certainty. The integration of experiences into a network of
associated concepts could perhaps be interpreted as a form of quality control. Once concepts have been learnt, over long times,
they too can be used to build more robust contexts, feeding back into the perception of new states.
Example 103 (Scientific method as a learning system) The scientific method is a learning system that acts at
the level of a society.
• S: the sensors are the scientists who study the world.
• C: the context is the papers and the theoretical and experimental results.
• A: the long term knowledge is the cultural memory and literature.
At the scale of a society, the observation horizon is formed by a changing population of scientists, who produce
noisy inputs, because they are constantly in flux, like the disposable cells in a single organism. Since scientists
come and go much more quickly than the literature A, the results could appear unstable. However, there is a
stability mechanism for S arising by social interaction. This leads to norms and cultural inertia, which may drift
slowly over time, but offers a more evolutionary timescale that allows A to stabilize.
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5.5.5 Context atoms: coarse grained compression to awareness of ‘now’
To remain viable, as a fast switching discriminator, a context classifying agent must assemble from input and long
term memory and compress or tokenize state in ‘real time’46. The coding of irreducible associations, discussed
in section 5.4.9, enable long term concepts to aggregate hierarchically (though not mutually exclusively) into
superagent generalizations. The names or identities of these generalizations would be suitable compressible coarse
grains for use in context too. In a similar way, input sensors could perform a partial coarse graining automatically
as part of their function. This is how one may dissect deeper specialized knowledge into multiple categories, in
real time, without them becoming so many as to merge into one another, i.e. S(C)  S(A), from section 5.5.4.
We know, from spacetime physics, that structural stability relies on the ability to separate scales by assuring weak
coupling or full decoupling between contexts47.
Samples are themselves signal agents, which encode data, and are associated with the spacetime locations of
the sampling points. Thus, given the assumption that the variety and size of the external environment greatly
exceeds that of the observer, samples need a notion of context in order to support adaptation. They cannot easily
be attributed meaning without the annotation of context.
What might context atoms look like in practice? The table below shows some examples that lend themselves
to specific kinds of sensors:
Coarse grained sensory context atom sensor type
day, time, location spacetime
light, dark, red, green, blue sight
hot, cold, free, constrained touch
salt,sweet, sour, savory, etc taste
open, closed bridge
blocked, open, snowed under road
available, unavailable shop supplies
parking, parked, shunt, cruising transport
inside, outside sense of self “me”
In spacetime terms, context is associated with coarse boundary information about an observed scenario. Knowl-
edge is accumulated gradually by observation with continuous introspection. This is integrated relative to an
already accumulated notion of ‘self’. Similarly, in the sensory data collection, one always associates the concept
of “here and now” with a sensed context, calibrated by the long-term accumulated experience. The evolving se-
mantics of “here and now”, developing over time, are what leads to higher semantics of associations, i.e. that
which goes beyond ‘concurrent activation’.
It seems likely, given the sheer volume of sensory inputs, and possible feedbacks, that only a partial prioritized
context would be used to encode and retreive memories48. Thus, one would expect a reasoning engine with limited
processing capacity to ‘miss’ in comprehending certain concepts, if by chance a partial context led reasoning
astray. Concepts associated with coarse grained context may well only converge into coherent clusters over many
averaged experiences and long times. Thus the alphabet of context one could access, at any given moment, might
be much smaller than the actual potential resolution of a sensory input system.
Example 104 (Some human context concepts) The separation of human senses lead us to distinguish spatial
concepts from other variations in the environment. The elements of context may include measures that we do not
consider to be spatial, but which fit easily into a concept of semantic spacetime:
Sense Dimension
Sight time, space, colour.
Sound time, space, pitch, timbre.
Touch time, space, composition, temperature, pressure, humidity.
Smell time, composition.
Taste time, composition.
46Realtime is self-defining here, as the perception of the observer is only as fast as it can evaluate context. Evolutionarily, it can only adapt
to its environment and be ‘smart’, if its internal clock is at least as fast as its environment.
47Some contexts might be triggered by all concepts, affecting all parts of memory equally. This might happen when a concept is not clearly
related to an existing concept in the current context. Then context together with feedback from long term concepts cannot narrow a focus
to a specialized area, and thus might tend to map to all or no areas. Such unspecific stimuli might be what animals experience as emotional
sensations.
48We humans tend to focus one particular sense at a time, when we are reasoning; e.g. we concentate on sounds instead of sight, or touch
instead of looks, taking these one at a time in order to ‘concentrate’.
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Example 105 A sequence of sampled music can be labelled at a variety of scales. The sampling of a piece of
music is digitized (or packetized) into a sequence of standardized, temporally ordered samples that capture the
dynamics of the sound. The semantics of these samples are that they promise a representation of music according
to an agreed encoding convention that may be used by any promisee to reproduce the intended meaning of the
performance. Each packet sample may be labelled with:
• The time and location of recording.
• The relative times (i.e. order) of the discrete sound samples, from the perspective of the observing agent.
• The data values of the sampled sound representation.
To reproduce the music, we don’t need to know the spacetime location of the original sampling process, but we do
need to know the relative spacetime arrangement of the samples, so as to retransmit them faithfully over the scale
of the total sample, during playback. This suggests a minimal data representation of the form
(ordinal sequence label, data value)
i.e. (time stamp, digitized sound frequency, amplitude)
5.5.6 Spacetime template patterns for efficient recognition and recall
Optimizing the use of space and time to to encode specialized patterns, suggests that certain patterns or ‘fabric’
topologies for memory might assist in the identification and discrimination of sensory forms. Directional patterns
could benefit from directional sensors; visual sensors that measure relative positions would benefit from a coordi-
nate grid representation, etc. This is one more way in which the structural properties of knowledge are affected
by the structural properties of spacetime: they are constrained by them. The earlier discussion of grid cells, place
cells, directional cells in biology are an example of this (see section 4.3.5).
Example 106 (Efficient fabrics for mapping semantic context into long term memory) The Sparse Distributed
Representations (SDR) [19, 61, 71, 72] provide a plausible (even likely) mechanism that could evolve in biologi-
cal systems. The connection between running timelines and context are best developed in studies of linguis-
tics [20, 101], and the notion of a state of mind in contemporary artificial knowledge systems need not be ex-
trapolated too far to explain the whole of free will and consciousness [10], but it is clear that there are common
characteristics that open an avenue of plausible investigation.
Directed networks, including Bayesian networks and neural networks [17, 44] are a natural area of study, as they
form generic discriminating structures. As branching, rather than converging processes, they may not be efficient,
but they can be generic, and they automatically route connections. Routing structures are an attractive model for
knowledge addressing, because a flooding of a bus would be inefficient and would block the system with a strong
coupling to a single timescale T (A) (see section 4), with inputs constrained to the width of the context bus.
5.5.7 Stability of contextual knowledge and weight maintenance (sleep functions?)
It seems plausible that ‘state of mind’ may be considered a fair synonym for context: i.e. a collection of contem-
poraneous or coincidental signals and concepts associated by simultaneous or concurrent inputs. The number of
sensory inputs feeding into that state thus plays a role in determining whether a rich enough context can be found
to refining and tokenize concepts, and provide robust conceptual representation in long term memory; similarly
in determining the number of independent degrees of freedom by which sensations can be felt or imagined by the
observer49.
Lemma 36 (Concepts are distributed) Different aspects of a ‘thing’ may end up being encoded in quite different
parts of a semantic space (e.g. a brain). Localization of concepts is not guaranteed.
If multiple sensory inputs bring simultaneous activity into data summarization, different impressions may not all
converge to a single localized region to form a coherent representation as a ‘thing’, and an observer equipped with
a knowledge bank will be thrown into confusion. Thus, a knowledge representation needs to be able to handle
multi-dimensional parallel assessments of context as an addressing scheme for concept storage.
Because context acts either like a multi-switch, or as a network of signal concentrations that form a basis
for routing like in ANN, the routing mesh needed to coordinatize concepts has the structure of a directed graph,
49It seems plausible that emotional sensation is no more than a particular state of mind. In an organism with myriad sensors, an emotional
sensation could be complex, an approximate facsimile of that entire complex sensory apparatus. For a system with few sensors, an emotion
would be little more than a feeling of hot and cold. In humans, emotions can feel intense, presumably for this reason.
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Figure 40: Self-calibration, where previously learned patterns are used as a measuring stick for new observations, leading to
a convergent result. If there is no convergence, we remain confused about measurements.
from the simplest signal wire to a very complicated routing fabric. Two dynamical processes may be at work in
associative knowledge representation: iterative learning (cyclic repetition, as in figure 40) [30, 102], as in section
2.2, and directed flow through discriminating fabrics. The latter have been studied in [41]. What is known, from
such studies of the underlying graph dynamics, is that all of these structures and processes may be unstable to
perturbations.
Lemma 37 (Instability of associations) Knowledge may be unstable to perturbations.
Annealing, smoothing
emphasised
Recent concept
old concept
Figure 41: De-emphasizing recent memory to stabilize the associative graph, by locally diffusing importance scores with
post-processing (like stimulated coherence in physics).
Instability is combatted by regular maintenance, at a spacetime scale that matches potential perturbations. This
is the essence of Shannon’s error correction theorem, and the maintenance theorem [7]. In sensory learning and
context awareness, it makes sense for a knowledge system to bias inputs in favour of what is happening right now,
rather than paying too much attention to the past. However, if taken to the extreme, focus on too short a timescale
would lead to ignoring long term experience in favour of ad hoc spikes of activity in disparate locations. Agents
that experienced many different contexts over long times, but only a few on short times, would be constantly
destabilized by a fickle accumulation of new unbalanced inputs. In order for memories not to become too biased
in favour of the present, some form of annealing or smoothing of the memories may be needed to compensate for
these biases (see figure 41)50.
Hypothesis 5 (Annealing of knowledge) A form of low frequency (long wavelength) process that is de-focused
relative to the spatial scale of a concept representation (so as not to cause damage to individual memories), is
needed to smooth out associative link strengths in a dynamically learning knowledge representation, to apply a
fair weighting policy on memories.
The need for such a process makes complete sense from a spacetime viewpoint, but semantically it seems specu-
lative. It is only by unifying both viewpoints that it becomes a very plausible stabilizing maintenance mechanism
for a learning system, analogous to time series smoothing51.
50It is fascinating to speculate as to whether this is the (or one of the) function(s) of dreaming in animals.
51In the field of cybernetics, the idea of building a brain as a controller has been discussed for nearly a century, in different forms. Ashby,
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5.5.8 Sensory perception: from context to reasoning
We associate intelligence with adaptation based on reasoning. It is therefore instructive to think about how tok-
enized context can lead to knowledge representations that support reasoning. These forms should emerge, rather
than being imprinted by design. This topic is a bridge to the next section about automated reasoning and inference
from knowledge representations.
There are two obvious reasons for wanting to study the emergence of reasoning structures. The first is prag-
matic: the less supervision a learning process requires to think about context, the more impartial and valuable it
is. The second is more related to understanding how our arbitrary semantic spacetimes (including brains) may
actually work: no one is obviously born with a large hardwired conceptual ontology, so we have to explain how
ontologies emerge through learning [14].
The semantics of spacetime meet the semantics of observational input in the concept of streams. Streams are
ordered samples of data that form the basis for data acquisition, repetition, and thence stable knowledge (figure 45).
A key question, in the formation of practical knowledge representations, is: how can we automatically annotate the
a collection of data, to bring about an automatic emergent semantic model, i.e. not design an information model,
but a model of associative meaning? We return to this practical subject more fully in section 6.7. The process has
to involve a series of dynamical transformations, which correspond to spacetime structures. Schematically:
Sensing→ Agentization(basis)→ State→ Association graph, (171)
i.e.
Arrival process semantic coordinatization−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Matroid basis→ High level graphs. (172)
New impulses are recorded and recognized, then they are consistently routed to certain ‘empty’ memory agent
locations. These take on the role of proxies, in order to represent the incoming signals and eventual join them up
into concepts52. Encoding of concepts and associations into a physical medium is a spacetime process: it involves
coordinatized spatial location of agents for pattern encoding, and sequential as well as cyclic time patterns for
coding and decoding with repetition for iterative confirmation. It is a process by which scaled knowledge ‘symbols’
are constructed from pre-adapted sensors53, attending to a separation of timescales. Without such a separation, a
confusion of semantics would result.
Through the separation into context and associative concepts, we can now explain how a set of coarse char-
acteristics, named or labelled quickly, may lead to the formation of a switched network, connecting or isolating
concepts only under specific circumstances, stimulated from the environment and from introspective feedback. A
bus of context reaches into long term memory, acting much like a transistor bias, or network routing fabric, but
with semantic addressing forming the interface to coordinate tuple addresses. Any spatial structure with this quick
approximate response to its surroundings can thus store contextual memories.
In the next section, we consider how this leads to associatively connected routes through a knowledge space.
If one starts at some context relevant location, and traces neighbouring concepts by association, focused pathways
and divergent trees (explosions from a starting point) can spread out, activating related concepts in order. This may
be perceived as reasoning, explanation, or brainstorming, depending on how focused the result seems to be. How
we get from associations to storylines and what we consider to be rational logic is the subject of the next section.
Example 107 (Named Data Networking (again)) The Named Data Networking example, used earlier [15], has
the structure of a routing network, based on semantic addressing rather than on explicit spacetime coordinates, but
does this make it also a representation of concepts, i.e. a knowledge representation (see figure 42)? A knowledge
representation lies inside a single observer. Based on the figure from example 65, we may draw two horizons that
represent where we consider the observer to be, in alternative interpretations of NDN as a knowledge space. We
can say immediately that NDN forms a fabric that switches data based on specialized sensors.
The observer sensors are the sources of data that transmit data by name. It is most natural to choose the outer
horizon as the boundary of the observer. Thus the sum of all receivers is the ‘mind of the observer’, in this proposed
mapping, i.e. ‘interest space’ is where concepts could be encoded.
in particular, discussed the notion of designing a brain based on the continuum feedback principles of his day [46, 103]. In his work, he notes
the separation of reflex responses and centralized control feedback. He also identifies the reliance of learning on a selection criterion that leads
principally to stability of knowledge. This suggests a separation of scales balancing dynamical convergence with modulation, very like the
discrete version here.
52This process is sometimes called reification in computer science, but this terminology is closely associated with the Resource Description
Framework [104] for the semantic web [105], and related technologies [106], so I shall avoid using it.
53A semantic ‘symbol’ may be represented by any convenient clusters of agents, they needn’t be represented as a non-overlapping alphabet
of agents, though there will always be a transformation to such a picture, in principle.
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Figure 42: Is Named Data Networking (NDN) a knowledge representation supporting concepts and associations?
If the router keeps transaction logs, then it has a kind of memory of simultaneous activation of receivers that
showed common interest in a piece of data at the same moment. However, there is no exterior correlation between
data files, as there is no spacetime model relating files and data streams to a single model, so the a meaning of
such a correlation would be dubious. Because all data have to have a unique name in NDN, the ‘sensors’ (or
data sources) are unlike the sensors that provide data streams in organisms or knowledge systems, as the named
data never change: they are frozen in time. However, we could instead define sensors that point to aggregations of
similar things, e.g. different versions of a document, or chunks of a video stream. The aggregation of these can be
understood as the naming of superagents in the observer’s exterior.
Can we map concepts and associations to NDN structures? A concept would have to be mapped to a resting
place for related data in the space of receivers. The clustering of receivers with similar receipts could be interpreted
as a concept, however these are not linked except by common routing (like coins sorted into categories by a
machine). An association would be a link between two concepts. There are no structures that join the receivers
together except the routers. Correlations between the interests of autonomous receivers are the most tangible form
of semantic link. Unlike a true knowledge space, there is no way to promise persistent associations. Data interest
may be indirectly associated through the routing hub’s ephemeral promise to forward inputs, but these links are
neither persistent nor.
In conclusion, NDN does not form a knowledge representation, even though it is a semantic routing fabric.
It’s function is not be form a memory of the world, but to disseminate data in a fluid gaseous state. Chance
correlations could be observed between receivers, analogous to concepts, but the lack of context or permanent
association prevents them from iterative associative learning.
5.6 Spacetime representation of scaled concepts
Let’s consider how invariant and tokenized representations emerge from scaled agent clusters and irreducible as-
sociation.
5.6.1 Examples of irreducible positves
To see how the irreducible types can lead to plausible encodings of concepts, through spacetime associations, it is
helpful to look at examples. By reducing to the most elementary forms, we end up with a kind of pidgin language,
but this seems like a good start that mirrors how language begins. Let’s characterize the irreducible associations
generically, without trying to nuance the expressions, to see if we can make ideas comprehensible by reduction:
Type Verb Prepositional association Spacetime interpretation
1. approaches near similarity/distance
2. follows before/after causal/ordered
3. contains inside/around scale/aggregation
4. expresses instead of boundary structure (name)
Let’s try to combine these into more complex concepts, br reducing them to triplets of the form:
(concept, irreducible association, concept) (173)
These examples may not be the only possible representations (if they were, they might be fragile), but they are
hopefully plausible and maximally simple, avoiding higher tensor forms in the interest of low cost simplicity.
Example 108 (Scaled conceptual cluster reductions for inference) Consider the following linguistic represen-
tations of common concepts:
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1. “She is sitting on the roof”
This is a description of a static atemporal state. We could argue that these capture the situation:
(she, near, roof)
(she, is contained by, roof)
However, they cannot easily be distinguished from other similar events. Two different versions irreducible
concepts may apply to this situation. Either is approximately true, and the superposition of them, in provides
more specificity. Being inside a roof might sound odd, but we have no trouble thinking of someone being
inside the boundary of a roof, as a two dimensional space that marks a three dimensional volume. Our visual
apparatus is used to projecting images and concepts into two dimensional frames, which has the effect of
blurring these distinctions ‘metaphorically’.
A recursive approach offers a more precise representation than this simple direct representation, and illus-
trates how grammatical recursion helps to sort out the represenation of events.
(she, expresses, sitting on roof)
(sitting on roof, expresses the role, sitting)
(sitting on roof, expresses the attribute, on roof)
2. “She climbs onto the roof”
This is a description of a temporal process, leading to a future state.
(she, expresses, on roof)
(she, expresses, climbing onto) (climbing onto, expresses role, movement towards)
The superposition of these two association paths captures the idea. Alternatively, a interpretation that
includes causal transition may be included:
(she, leads to, on roof) (she, causes, on roof)
3. “Acid burns stuff”
This is a description of a temporal process.
(acid, leads to, burning)
(acid, expresses, burning)
(acid, leads to, burned stuff)
The challenge here is in linking the concept of burning (a verb) to a pair of things: acid and stuff. The use of
adjective clusters ‘burned stuff’ as an independent agent is one solution. This has the form of a superagent,
linked by context. One solution is the use of aggregate superagent clusters to employ recursion:
((acid, near ,stuff), expresses, burning)
((acid, near ,stuff), leads to, burning)
4. “Alice looks good”
This is description of state.
(Alice, near, good)
(Alice, expresses,good looks)
5. “The dog who loves adventure”
This is an explication of state, with an additional twist.
(Dog, near, adventure)
(Dog, expresses,love of adventure)
(Love of adventure, has role, love)
(Love of adventure, has attribute, adventure)
What is new here is that it introduces emotion into the expression. The use of ‘love’ may add weight or
priority to this property above others. It suggests a dimension of representation that is otherwise missing in
the simple spacetime focused discussion here.
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6. “People must obey the law”
This is an explication of desired state, which introduces a temporal aspect pointing to the future.
(People, near, law)
(People, express, obey the law)
(Obey the law, has role, obey)
(Obey the law, has atribute, the law)
(Obey the law, depends on, the law)
The notion of force, expressed by ‘must’ is not a spacetime concept, but could be captured by the final causal
annotation. It refers to a desire, which has an emotional component, and also a future (temporal) component.
This is an intention, a goal, or a desired state.
These formulations may not seem linguistically familiar, but they are logically fair approximations to what we
mean by more habitual expressions. It is possible that there may be value in distinguishing refinements of these
wordings as independent associative link types, e.g. refinements of the form
X ‘leads to’ Y from X ‘affects’ Y
X ‘expresses’ Y from A ‘has property’ Y
may be necessary distinctions or merely scaled refinements, in the long run, in order to separate causal ordering
from the notion of generalized influence, but parsimony suggests otherwise at this stage of understanding. What is
important and striking is how few concept types are needed to represent most conceptual scenarios, and how these
shadow spacetime relationships. More explanation of these cases, with examples, is given in [107].
5.6.2 Noun and verb concepts
Some concepts suggest an understanding of time relative to contextual ‘now’.
Future
follows−−−−−⇁ Context/Now follows−−−−−⇁ Past (174)
Concepts may be both things or processes (nouns or verbs, in linguistic terms). These have distinct semantics.
Although, ultimately, everything must be encodable as spacetime patterns, elemental spacetime concepts are not
enough to represent the full spectrum of meanings we would expect of knowledge representations. However, they
do take us much further than has previously been realized.
The results of the previous reduction exercise look remarkably close in form and idea to the programme of
cognitive grammar by Langacker [20]. Emotional priorities are another dimension that needs serious consideration,
even if these are indirectly encoded through spacetime structures too.
5.6.3 Irreducible positves and negatives (encoding NOT)
The well known aphorism that ‘absence of evidence is not evidence of absence’ is a a basic property reflected in
promise theory in the form: the absence of a promise is not the promise of an absence. The same is not true of
complementary sets, or the Boolean algebra used in information technology, and leads to a sometimes parodically
deterministic belief that absence of information is simply not even taken as an option.
The human interpretation of ‘not’ we seek is not a notion of set complementarity, but rather a complementary
intent. We could express this by:
human NOT
expresses NOT−−−−−−−−⇁ body set complement. (175)
This is easy to see. If we divide the world into that which is carrots and that which is not carrots, then promising
to not like carrots is not the same as promising to like the complement of carrots (everything else). Thus, when
we say ‘X is NOT a generalization of Y ′, we do not mean that X is a generalization of the complement of Y
(NOT Y ); rather, we intend to add a specific note to disregard the assertion that X is a generalization of Y from
consideration.
The question arises as to how we represent this in a knowledge network. Promise theory guides us towards the
form of (175), by defining the a promise of NOT b ≡ ¬b to be the deliberate intent to not keep the promise of b.
This guides us to represent NOT on a par with the positives, i.e. for each positive irreducible association, there is
a mirror association that expresses the negative.
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Lemma 38 (Negative association) For each promisable association in the irredicuble types, there is a corre-
sponding association type formed from the negation of the association promise that represents a denial of an
association.
C1
A−⇁ C2 (176)
∀A∃A′ : A′ = ¬A (177)
C ′1
¬A−−⇁ C ′2 (178)
The proof of this follows from definition of negative promise [6]. Let the promise of an association be b =
C1
A−⇁ C2, e.g. from (124), so ¬b = ¬(C1 A−⇁ C2) implies the intent not to associate, i.e. ¬b = (C1 ¬A−−⇁ C2). So
this suggests the existence of four more (effectively independent) types of irreducible association for the negation
of intent:
• Does not generalize,
• Does not lead to,
• Does not express,
• Is not close to.
More explanation of these cases is given in [107].
5.6.4 Emotional origin to logical negation?
There is a certain emphatic (even emotional) appeal to NOT statements, such as we mean them humanly. This is
not captured by the dispassionate binary nature of logical complementarity. For example:
• I am not your friend.
• X is not next to Y .
• X is not represented by Y .
It is interesting to speculate whether the origin of this reasoning attribute lies more in an emotional reaction than
in a direct programming of embedded logic. For logic to result from an emotional outrage would be ironic to
many. We may only properly understand the nuances of reasoning once emotional weights can be incorporated
into storylines.
Negations are very specific targeted promises, whose subject is a denial rather than a logical complement. It is
the binary nature of Boolean representation that muddles these ideas together in modern information technology.
If we represent such associations for each of the irreducible types, then the question arises what happens if nodes
make both promises? It is interesting to speculate whether the origin of this reasoning Clearly, it makes sense for
opposites to coexist in different contexts54, for instance:
Alone
generalizes|company−−−−−−−−−−−⇁ isolated (179)
Alone
does NOT generalize|electricity−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−⇁ isolated (180)
These two coexist in different usage patterns, with unambiguous semantics. However, the semantics of the follow-
ing seem problematic:
Alone
generalizes|company−−−−−−−−−−−⇁ isolated (181)
Alone
does NOT generalize|company−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−⇁ isolated. (182)
These are mutually exclusive, in a logical sense. However, in a non-deterministic system mith Byzantine causation,
it could be difficult to prevent the formation of simulatenous links, so it is important to understand the effect of such
contradictory promises. Could this mean indecision? Indecision would be more likely (and cheaply) be represented
by the absence of a relationship altogether. The response to this ‘entangled’ Schro¨dinger’s catlike state might be
equally spurious, sometimes exciting one possibility and sometimes the opposite. This suggests that reasoning
may itself be stochastic in nature in a sufficiently complex system, and that stability of reasoning emerges from
larger scale aggregation rather microconnectivity.
54Contexts play the role of different Kripke or Everett universes.
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5.6.5 Invariant representations and its relationship to tokenization
The issue of how a knowledge representation can cope with all the angles, perspectives, and distortions inherent in
pattern recognition, in multiple dimensions, has led to the idea that brains store imagery and other sensory expe-
riences in ‘invariant representations’ rather than as libraries of rasterized screen shots. An invariant representation
implies the decoupling of a token representation from acquired data patterns.
In mathematical physics, invariances and covariant transformations base invariance around the existence of
symmetry within a single configuration space. For a semantic spacetime, tokenization (i.e. the association of a
single point with an invariant meaning) is the simplest invariant form. Invariance is thus immediately supported by
the tokenization discussed earlier, and the invariance of semantics is closely associated with spacetime structural
stability under accretion (see figure 43). The extreme end of this idea is that a single neuron might actually encode a
person or THING; and, while this might sound extreme, it has received some empirical support [38,108], suggesting
that there is indeed some kind of matroid basis element representation going on in a brain (see also the discussion
by Hawkins [19]).
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Figure 43: Scale/invariance diagram template.
What remains to be understood in a learning representation is how sensory inputs accrete into generalizations
under the irreducible associations, and these superagent structures become associated with concepts. Understand-
ing this process in a fully emergent system like gene networks or a brain is a tough problem, but not an impossible
one (see, for example, the techniques of bioinformatics [109]). For the annotation of expert input, in a human-
artificial intelligent cyborg approach, one can simply insert agents amongst a mixture of partially learnt and manu-
ally inserted concepts and associations. This hybrid approach becomes possible (even practical) now that we have
a simple spacetime representation with only eight irreducible relations. The main challenge lies in linking the data
patterns to the concepts seamlessly.
Example 109 (Aggregation to invariants) Figure 44 illustrates an example of a scale/invariance diagram, in
which sensors recognize a plate by matching sensory inputs to learned data patterns and associated attributes
expressed within a knowledge representation of a plate. Initially, the focused sensory experience of a plate is too
small to single out a plate from other possibilities (e.g. flying saucer or frisbee. However, once the context of being
in a kitchen is established, the concept of kitchen feeds back into context by ‘introspection’ singling out the plate,
by context labelling, as the likely match.
The goal for stable invariant representations must be towards increasing spatial aggregation and increasing (slower)
timescale. Pattern similarities that could lead to association into clusters include:
• Digitization into similar symbols alphabets q.
• Same name or property expressed.
• Similar changes in sensory inputs dq (rising/falling).
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Figure 44: Scale/invariance diagram example for recognition of a plate in the context of a kitchen.
• Correlation and coactivation (timescales on dq).
• Same function or purpose of a thing verb/noun representation.
• Matching the same pattern (epitope matching) [89].
• Common activation context (origin path).
• Dividing up and recombining at random (random recombination).
• Spatial search paths (sequence).
• Stable time-sequences and spatial aggregations.
Appendix B shows a further example based on more extensive system monitoring sensors.
6 Inference, logic, and reasoning in semantic spaces
The ability to associate a sequence of concepts into a narrative path is what we call reasoning. Reasoning takes
many forms [86,110–115], and depends intrinsically on scale, because concepts scale like any other kind of agent.
A narrative argument at one scale may make no sense at another. Since Boole’s work [110,111], Hilbert’s challenge
[116, 117], and the arrival of digital computers, Boolean algebra and first order logic, have come to dominate our
thoughts about what is meant by reasoning. It has become a mathematized form of arithmetic, for the specific
purpose of making decisions. However, these are crude forms of reasoning compared to the processes by which
humans reason. To approach human forms of reasoning, we need to think more carefully about how concepts and
associations are woven into narratives.
6.1 Reasoning from learning
Several common forms of reasoning express pathways that connect concepts. Classic steps in reasoning include
the following:
• Induction: generalization based on specific instances (concepts from exemplars). These are represented by
the coarse graining associations between concepts (figure 33):
Cdog
is generalized by−−−−−−−−⇁ Canimal. (183)
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Underlying this are spacetime promises of the form of superagency (see paper II):
Adog
inside−−−→ Sanimals. (184)
The process of induction is an N : 1 mapping from exemplars to generalizations.
• Deduction: inferring exemplars from identification of types. These are represented by compositional asso-
ciations:
Cdog
has property−−−−−−⇁ Cwaggly tail. (185)
In a promise model, the superagent representing ‘dog’ makes a number of exterior promises, such as ‘waggly
tail’. The process of induction is an 1 : N mapping from generalizations to exemplars.
• Abduction: Inferring a theory from an observation (learning or model building55). These are represented by
compositional associations:
Cwaggly tail
characterizes−−−−−−⇁ Cdog. (186)
These are retrofitted inferences of identity, analogous to the matching of receptors56. The process of induc-
tion is an N : 1 mapping from exemplars to stories or models of explanation.
• Causation: Inferring the prerequisites for the occurrence of a concept57. These are represented by causal
associations,
CLights
depends on−−−−−−⇁ Celectricity. (187)
(188)
which, in turn, arise from underlying conditional promises:
Alight bulb
+shine|power−−−−−−−→ Aobserver. (189)
Apower socket
+power−−−−→ Alight bulb. (190)
It is important to remember, when reasoning, that effects may have multiple causal predecessors.
• Free association / lateral thinking: the exploration of concepts that are closely related to another, by some
definition. These are represented by similarity or proximity associations, and spacetime adjacency promises.
Cdog
is similar to−−−−−−⇁ Cwolf. (191)
This kind of reasoning is saying: if you are thinking about ‘dog’, then what about ‘wolf’ as a similar case.
In other words, do you need more examples of your concept, without actually going to a new level of
generalization58.
6.2 Associative model of reasoning
We return to the model of a knowledge system as the interaction between a single test user and its exterior world,
via sensors that channel their observations into a collection of internal agencies to represent knowledge in a concept
space (see figure 45). Recall that the model is about separating timescales into short and long term recall. Sensors
collect data and transform it into short term context. Context already possesses the semantics of its sensors, and
collectively stimulates concepts by some unspecified form of approximate addressing. Meanwhile, the activation
of concepts can trigger semantically close concepts which feed back into context as memories and mix with the
input stream to trigger even more related concepts. Thus, there is a cumulative exploration of the space of concepts,
55This is the approach used in Bayesian learning, or machine learning.
56Machine learning is all about abduction. Abduction can be applied to any structure. Induction goes further by discretizing into qualitative
attributes and concepts.
57This is simply a definition of causation, as used pragmatically in the physical sciences. It assumes ‘intention from within’, but does not
imply any notions of free will or the many other complications that arise in a more general philosophy.
58It is like Amazon’s referral engine: users who bought X also bought Y .
88
SHORT LONG
Now
Associations
Non−determined
(interpretation)
Context
Assessed situation
DETECTION DISCRIMINATION LEARNING
Cyclic−determined
Intent/belief
(measured)
SENSORS
Concepts
Figure 45: Short term memory caches the state of ‘now’ from sensor results, but the semantics are pre-supposed. Long term
memory builds up the semantics slowly over time, so that it can be used to interpret sensors as context. Modulation of slowly
varying long term memory by quickly varying short-term memory allows us to switch large amounts of information into play
(that otherwise takes a long time to assimilate) quickly, depending on context.
based on a ‘state of awareness’59. In order to be able to use these techniques, sensory inputs first have to trigger a
concept or observe a THING, which in turn triggers an association to a property, a question, or even a lateral guess.
A linearized sequence of inferences may be accumulated into the idea of a story or narrative [14, 118]). A
narrative is closer to what we think of as everyday human reasoning than is generally credited in the literature.
This approach is based on the idea that much of what humans consider to be ‘smart’ is based on storytelling, a
tradition that goes back to the earliest forms of communication. A story is a converging network of associations
that passes through a number of specific concepts of interest, including the subject or topic of the story. By tracing
a selected path of associations linking the subjects forwards or backwards, we can can divine both predictions of
consequences and possible related causes about the subject. Associations are based on the causal and structural
spacetime associations represented by the irreducible types60, so we already know that they encode spacetime rela-
tionships and causation. The concept of stories is thus of great importance to understanding the role of knowledge
and inference in smart behaviours (see figure 46).
Definition 69 (Story or narrative about C) A directed acyclic graph that passes through C, and whose preced-
ing association is of a single irreducible type. The story begins with a set of axiom concepts and ends with a set of
conclusion concepts.
There may be several associations passing through C, but those of different types represent different stories. All
C
C4
ConclusionC
C3
2
Axiom set
1C
Figure 46: A story is a directed graph that converges towards a single thread at the subject of interest (i.e. it may fan out in the
past).
forms of reasoning start from an initial concept or set of concepts, converging towards a single storyline.
Definition 70 (Equivalent narratives/stories) If two sequences of associations have the same axiom set and final
conclusions, then they may be considered equivalent alternative tellings of the same story.
Since stories belong in the space of concepts, they exist independently of the learning process. A story may have
been learned wholesale, or inferred from independent sensory input events, or even imagined by introspection. The
concepts spanned by a story may have been learned at any time prior to the formation of the story.
59This is how CFEngine policy engine, and knowledge map was constructed, with sensors evaluating to short term classes that trigger the
long term encoded ‘policy’.
60Since the first work about promises and knowledge [69, 119], I have still to find any related work on the importance of stories to human
thought.
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Example 110 (Can we short-circuit learning?) Is a story, learned wholesale, e.g. from a book, or around a
campfire, a proper substitute for a sensory learning experience? The amount of information within a story, based
on a context-concept-association representation, is significantly less than the information that was involved in the
original learning process, through sensory recognition and repetition. Suppose, instead, that the story was not
experienced directly, but merely passed on as a linguistic rendition, e.g. by reading a book: now, the information
in the tokens of the story may be transmitted exactly, from the book to the reader, and provide the same information
to different recipients. It might seem that identical knowledge could be passed on. What may not be the same,
however, is how the concepts used in the story link up in the network of the receiver prior to the telling, thus
extending beyond the telling of the story itself. This may differ between the storyteller and any given story receiver.
The degree of similarity in the final state depends on the extent to which the observer already has all the dependent
concepts in place to being with. Since the story modifies the network of concepts in the listener, the initial state
before the story and the final state after may not correlate at all well between storyteller and story receiver. A
full sensory learning experience will undoubtedly lead to more associations being formed around the storyline in
memory, but this depends on both the initial state and the unique sensory experience of the receiver. In short, it is
impossible to say what effect either the storytelling or sensory learning might have on different observers.
Example 111 (Stability of chained neural networks) Neural networks (ANN) are pattern discriminators, which
approximate functional mappings, and learn by supervised training. They have no other rational reasoning ca-
pabilities, so any attempt to solve an extended reasoning problem with ANN has to be solved in multiple stages,
by turning a series of tailored discriminators into a series of transformation functions. One approach is to chain
together multiple pattern discriminators in a directional hierarchy [19, 52], where early layers transmute sensory
input into a reduced dimensional (tokenized) form, and later layers identify combinatorics of these reduced forms.
This is a machine learning representation of the concept learning schema described in this section.
If independent neural nets are strongly coupled, in such an array, then they are effectively a single tightly
coupled network, with each network Na’s hidden layers trained independently by data sets Da, but coupled as a
single structure. If there is no separate training, they are a single neural network, capable of discriminating only
a single input to output association. Each layer must be trained independently, else the combined network is just
a deeper single pattern discriminator. In such a system, the stability of a reasoned outcome builds on the stability
of all the layers. A later layer that depends on a previous layer, inputs the modulations of the earlier layer and
outputs a contextualized result to a later layer. This output is used in two ways: during operation and during
training. Referring to section 4.1.2, we can describe the timescales for deterministic operation.
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data
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aN bN
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modulate
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Figure 47: Each layer in a serial network may be altered by operational modulations or by retraining. Earlier layers promise
to modulate later layers, and each layer promises to retrain from datasets, on different timescales.
• T (mb) ≡ T (Nb +mb(da)|ma,db−−−−−−−−−−→ Nc) the time it takes a layer to operate, transmuting input from layer a to
layer b, where b > a. The promise is a conditional one, depending on both the modulation of the previous
layer ma and the training data of the present layer db.
• T (Db +∆db−−−−→ Nb) the time in between changes of training data ∆da for the layer from world sources.
• T (db) ≡ T (Nb −∆db−−−−→ Db) the time to accept and process changes of training data ∆da by the layer Na.
The switching will be semantically and dynamically stable (quasi-deterministic) iff
T (db) T (ma), b > a (192)
as described in section 4.1.2. The world must not change substantially during the training of the entire reasoning
process, else the result will be invalid before a conclusion can reached, and the work done in training will not be
reusable, i.e. it cannot keep up its evolutionary fitness for purpose. This is an evolutionary constraint: the more
primitive senses should be basically fixed compared to the plastic later stages. This is certainly true in biology,
where basic senses are encoded genetically, and brain learning of what there is to see is nurtured.
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The training of later layers must depend on the training of the earlier layers, thus the earlier layers must
behave consistently over the time it takes to train the later ones. This means that the networks should not change
significantly, or
T (Da) T (Db) a < b (193)
i.e. later stages may be more plastic than earlier ones.
However, in order to modulate later layers successfully, during training, (later layers learn from repeated
invocations of earlier layers), the operation time of an earlier layer must be significantly shorter than the training
time of the later layers, else learning cannot be repeated a sufficient number of times:
T (ma) T (da), (194)
which is consistent with (192). If these inequalities are not met, the training of one layer will be rendered unstable
by a change in an earlier layer.
6.3 Couch’s rules for inference
Alva Couch made the observation that the irreducible positive associations lead to connected stories of decreasing
certainty with increasing length [118]. The essence of these rules was based on the irreducible spacetime structures
described earlier, and the uncertainty from semantics is introduced semantically rather than quantitatively (as, for
example, in statistics). From the irreducible associations, the following examples illustrate the idea:
1. If there is a route from A to B, and from B to C, then there might be a route from A to C.
2. If A is inside B, and B is inside C, then A might be considered inside C.
3. If A depends on B and B depends on C, then A might depend on C.
The appearance of ‘might’ signals an increase in uncertainty61. There is no guarantee of the conclusion, because
the semantics of the agents need not be uniform; nevertheless, the outcome is possible or even plausible. For
instance, we might throw our hands up at 2 and say that the second of these must allow us to say that A is inside
C. However, what if we open up C then we find only B because B is opaque? How could we know that we
are supposed to open B too? And when are we allowed to stop opening boxes? It is a perfectly valid semantic
point of view that C is not really inside A, because being inside suggests being able to see or touch the boundary.
Whenever autonomous agents becomes intermediaries for a process, one cannot be certain that they will behave
uniformly62. With these rules in mind, the process of inference over arbitrary associations lies in the ability:
• To interpret associations as aliases for the irreducible association types, so that we can always reduce chains
of arbitrary associations to chains of the irreducible types.
• To form triangle reductions that condense multiple concepts or associations into fewer based on the irre-
ducible associations [118].
Inference, based on the irreducible associations, is a powerful tool for working in tokenized form. Simple search
algorithms may be used to generate stories. While not all these stories emerge immediately in well-formed human
readable language, the essence of a skeletal story does emerge from simple promises or rules about parsing the
association graph. This is an indication of the potential simplicity of reasoning, but at the same time the complexity
of linguistic expression.
6.4 Stories and narrative reasoning
The importance of stories, as defined, is much deeper than a cultural memory of tales told around a campfire.
Stories form patterns of functional relationships in spacetime: in other words, they are the map between algorithm,
reasoning, and machinery. We use them for reasoning by following pathways until we find concepts that match the
criteria of a question. Stories lie at the heart of processes, algorithms, and also what we humans mean when we
speak of explanation and understanding.
Definition 71 (Understanding or explanation of C) The ability for an agent tell a story that converges on C.
61The actual rulesets were much more specific and detailed than these, based on a particular model implementation, but this captures the
principle.
62One way to be assured of homogeneity is for them to promise homogeneity.
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Definition 72 (Depth of understanding of concept C) The network distance, or number of associations between
concept nodes that precede the concept C in an explanatory story.
People differ in what standard of depth they consider to be sufficient to understand something. Yet these simple
definitions capture the basic essence of what is commonly meant by humans concerning imagination and under-
standing.
Example 112 (When do we really understand something?) Alice may say that she understands atoms, by telling
the following story: atoms are made up of protons, neutrons, and electrons. Later, she may change her mind and
add another level of predecessor: atoms are made up of protons, neutrons, and electrons, and protons and neutrons
are made up of quarks. The number of levels of explanation in terms of associations to other things may continue
indefinitely (turtles all the way down).
During the parsing of a story, the context of a knowledge agent’s mind is modified by the successive details of the
story: new context is refreshed as the stages of the story are revealed. This context may condition the associations
to particular concepts, and feedback into the stream. Thus the accumulation of context helps to build a case for an
‘answer’ or ‘conclusion’ to the story.
Lemma 39 (Story limits) If a concept C has at least one association, there is a story. There is no limit to the
possible length of a story.
6.5 Story types, classified by their promises and spacetime associations
We may classify stories into different types, according to the type of irreducible linkage they use.
Example 113 (Episodic history) A sequential timeline story (history) such as:
1. John got up
2. John went to work
3. John had lunch
4. John came home,
5. etc
may be represented at a story formed from time markers joined by precedence associations, each of which is
attached to a concept associated with the event. This is a simple, regular molecular chain: First we notice that the
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Figure 48: A timeline history: ordered molecules of timestamps and associated happenings.
story is made up of promises, not associations, and that each promise precedes the next.
pi1 : John
got up−−−→ observer (195)
pi2 : John
went to work−−−−−−→ observer (196)
pi3 : John
ate lunch−−−−→ observer (197)
pi4 : John
went home−−−−−→ observer (198)
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The first is a change of state, i.e. it is a scalar promise. The latter three contain both verbs (links) and nouns
(agents), i.e. they are vector promises. To turn these into associations, we separate out the concepts. In the first
case, this involves introducing a ‘state’ agent, as in the example for ‘blue’ in figure 5. The timestamps act like
road signs guiding the story forward and preserving the order. They need not be numbered, provided they preserve
their solid state order. The result is a spacetime crystalline phase in the form of a chain. Without forming these
molecular pairs, the concepts have no ability to become associated only for this one example. It would be wrong
to permanently associate up, work, lunch, and home with a precedence relationship: what we want to express is
what happened in the context of this episode.
Example 114 (Conceptual story) Look at the knowledge space or concept network in figure 49. This shows the
concepts in the mind of an observer “me”. By exploring at random, with a god’s eye view of the mind of “me”,
we can infer that “me” works for the police, and that there has been a theft at the village bakery, somewhere in
Oxford. The extent to which this picture is available to the individual agents is not important, because we know
Me
jane
john
theft
sourdough
wholegrain
bread
crumbs
wool
sarah
bakery
village
Oxford
police
works for
works in
located located in
visits
friend of
likes/wears
stick to
leads to
e.g.
e.g.
makes
works at
happened at
Figure 49: Knowledge space belonging to “me”.
that knowledge and concepts lie in the distributed network of concepts, not in any viewpoint located inside it (there
is no neuron that knows what we are thinking: ideas are something that emerge at a larger scale).
By sensing the exterior world, police person “me” observes that Jane has crumbs on her sweater. The concepts
of Jane and crumbs and sweater are thus activated simultaneously as the current short term situation context. By
following causal links, we find a specific story about Jane, from “my” perspective is shown overlaid on figure 50.
crumbs stick to−−−⇁ wool is liked by−−−−−⇁ Sarah friend of−−−−⇁ Jane visits−−⇁ bakery occurrence of−−−−−−−⇁ theft.
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Figure 50: A story about Jane.
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Figure 51: Quasi-transitive inference altering associations.
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Figure 52: Another way for the scaling of agency to represent composite concepts.
In this example, we see how the scaling of agency and inference of quasi-transitive association, mimicking basic
spacetime concepts, allow us to anthropomorphize inanimate things, and attribute intentional language to simple
inanimate THINGS. This is a natural extension of the overlap between human and non-human concepts in an
associating network.
If stories are as important as they seem to be, our understanding of reasoning in computer science has to change
(see figure 53).
Conclusion
Theorem proving, logic,  reasoning ...
Axioms, starting point
Figure 53: Logic is not a succession of inevitable mandatory steps, but rather a sequence of axioms promised and conclusions
accepted on the trust of the axioms.
6.6 Inferences from algebra of association: type symmetry transformations
Another class of stories are those that allow combinatoric inference. If we return to the example of family roles,
we see that some associations do not require an inverse to be promised: they simply follow as facts and require no
additional documentation, as both directions are properties of the ‘mind’ of an observer. However, promises have a
different logic, and do need reciprocal confirmation, because they originate from independent agents that may not
agree.
• Promise logic: Suppose exterior agents make promises:
JOHN
+father of−−−−−−−→ JANE (199)
JANE
+daughter of−−−−−−−−−→ JOHN (200)
JOHN
−daughter of−−−−−−−−−→ JANE (201)
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John promises that he is Jane’s father, but Jane does not confirm. This could mean that he is lying, and an
observer would not be able to trust the promise without some corroboration. However, Jane promises that she
is John’s daughter and John confirms, so an implicit confirmation is in fact given. Because the relationship
between father and daughter is an independent linguistic fact, this is sufficient to conclude that the missing
promise is given63. Thus, we may infer:
JANE
+daughter of−−−−−−−−−→ JOHN implies JANE −father of−−−−−−−→ JOHN. (202)
These two promises are not independent. Similarly, daughter, son, and child are not independent vectors:
{+male,−daughter} → father (203)
Perhaps we need to use conditionals to vectorize
+daughter = +child|female (204)
+son = +child|male (205)
(206)
Note that these are conditional promise relationships, not associations.
• Association logic: Unlike the case for promises, knowledge, i.e. that which has been learnt, has already been
trusted and inferences may be predicted, even if they haven’t been observed. This is because associations are
all inside the mind of a single observer. The representation might be formed of independent agents, but we
can assume that the knowledge is likely consistent. This is how ontology arises. So, assuming that the family
concepts are known to the observer, we can make some inferences about named reducible associations that
would not necessarily follow for promises. This is because we are assuming that all the promises may be
taken as given.
son
Fabian
Simon
father
male
daughter
Dawn
parent
parent
gender gender father
father
female
gender
(a) (b)
Figure 54: Different models of the same associative information, one using names, the other using roles. The named version
looks simpler, but the associations conceal a new concept: father, so they must be reducible.
As noted in section 5.4.10, we can break complex associations down into irreducible parts64. Let’s return to
the father-child example (see figure 54). The basic associations act as transformations (functional vectors)
that enable immediate inferences to be made:
Father
precedes−−−−−⇁ {son, daughter, child, . . .} (207)
There is another association to gender, so it is possible to relate the inverse to the context of the gender.
– For gender neutral, the inverse of father is child.
– For gender male, the inverse of father is son.
– For gender female, the inverse of father is daughter.
63It is still possible that they are both lying, but there are stronger grounds to trust the promises now. Also, an adopted daughter may lead to
further semantic quarrels about the reciprocity of the relationship, but this serves to illustrate the principle, and I’ll leave the remainder as an
exercise for the reader.
64This is a hypothesis, demonstrated in a few cases. It remains to be proven as a theorem.
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We can proceed in this way to deconstruct the complex association ‘is father to’ as ‘male’ and ‘precedent’,
except male is a role association like ‘father’, so it makes little difference which we choose. What is useful in
terms of spacetime inference is that the causal precedence is represented, as this can be used for potentially
transitive reasoning.
• Combining vertical and horizontal association
Deduction:
general concept likes−−⇁ fish (208)
general concept
has exemplar−−−−−−⇁ particular example (209)
infer: particular example likes−−⇁ fish. (210)
The reverse inference cannot be made:
particular example likes−−⇁ fish (211)
particular example
is generalized by−−−−−−−−⇁ general concept (212)
infer: general concept likes−−⇁ ???? (213)
Induction:
THING
moves−−−→ A? (214)
thing
is characterized by−−−−−−−−−⇁ motion (215)
motion
is affected by−−−−−−−⇁ force (216)
infer: thing is affected by−−−−−−−⇁ force (217)
6.6.1 Questions and answers: contextual stories
A facility that we associate with smart behaviour is the ability to answer questions. Answering questions is similar
to the process of deduction. Learning answers to questions is like contextualizing input. The reverse is like
contextual recall (see figure 55).
context
question (Q)
answers
Figure 55: Questions matched to answers for each context of the question is a 1:N process.
Definition 73 (Question) A proposition about a subgraph of concepts and associations (called the query set Q),
or a prompt to tell a story involving the mentioned concepts and associations.
Definition 74 (Answer) A response to a question, proposition, or situation, defining a query subgraph Q of con-
cepts and associations, i.e. the telling of a story about the query set, in which the query set plays the role of the
subject of the story.
Answers may be given in terms of generalizations and stories about concepts stated in the question. It is not
necessarily true that the query set maps to the axiom set of story. These would be learned by induction or abduction
over time. When we answer a question, we are asked to reply with a story matching the context of the question.
Question answering is thus a form of (or at least related to) deduction.
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6.6.2 The storytelling hypothesis
The central importance of storytelling to reasoning and problem solving suggests that no knowledge system can
be considered self-adapating without this capability. So, it seems natural to highlight this by mirroring the context
adaptation hypothesis, we can now add a promise that must be given in order for a knowledge representation to be
capable of knowledge-based reasoning.
Hypothesis 6 (Separate agent for story inference and navigation) In order to extract knowledge introspectively
from a knowledge representation, there must exist an independent mechanism or agency capable of searching and
following paths surrounding a concept and feeding back the narrative.
It is fascinating to speculate on the relationship between this narrative engine and the phenomenon of consciousness
in sufficiently complex knowledge systems.
6.7 Semantic commentary of structures
In spite of the successes of machine learning, and pattern recognition, humans excel at learning, and each individ-
ual carries vast reservoirs of knowledge and experience. Some level of understanding can be passed on without
extensive experiential training, through books, stories, or by encoded as expert systems, in order to be built on
by learning or compounded by other multiple sources. In the modern approach to so-called artificial intelligence,
much effort is expended to accomplish pattern recognition by expensive supervised training. This need not be
pursued to the exclusion of the fruits of human knowledge. Given a data set, from some kind of sensor, it may still
be helpful for experts to annotate the data, based on their broader contextual understanding of what is intended and
what is accomplished. This can be done by annotating keys and values to explain the semantic significance, at a
level that can be used for reasoning. This is a form of documentation, and may be applied to any data process to
enhance the interpretation of sensory data.
Example 115 (Semantic annotation of learning networks) Unsupervised learning, with no initial boundary se-
mantics, have no way of developing semantic concepts over time. Without external guidance, a network that
gathers data may see patterns cluster into agencies that resemble concepts, but the names of those concepts are
unknown. Learning systems need grounding in the human realm to give meanings to their discoveries that we can
understand. The quick and simple way to assign meaning to an artificially learned network of concepts is to have
human curators name and comment on the structures. This is exactly what happens in the training of human brains
from birth.
There are two forms of semantic grounding that allow animals to learn the same concepts: i) is the evolutionary
hardcoded information that has been groomed by selection, and ii) is the reservoir of social norms and writings
that stabilizes behaviours and passes on names in a long term memory from generation to generation. Mass culture
plays a key role in the development of knowledge. If we continue to give society tools to communicate in private
channels, closed rooms, cliques and tribes, it seems likely that society would lose its ability to pass on certain kinds
of knowledge by equilibration with a mass norm.
Example 116 (Semantic commentary) Consider a fragment of programming pseudo-code:
string animal_of_the_day = "vegan lamb replacement";
string text = "Mary had a little " . animal_of_the_day;
integer result = count_words(text);
Using the core association types, we could annotate:
• animal_of_the_day is a member of string.
• text is a member of string.
• result is a member of integer.
• count_words is a member of functions.
• count_words is a member of integer.
• result depends on text.
• result depends on count_words.
• text depends on animal_of_the_day.
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Hence we may infer that result depends on animal_of_the_day through the following story:
1. result depends on text and count_words().
2. text depends on animal_of_the_day.
3. By inference rules: text may depend on animal_of_the_day.
We don’t know this for certain, because we don’t know whether count_words() actually promises to use text.
However, we can say that it is possible.
Using this approach, one can generate semantic networks, as concept graphs, which are more efficient to construct
and update than techniques that only employ probabilistic networks for machine learning. The coordinatization
of documents allows a practical annotation mechanism to be implemented as a technology (see the example in
appendix A).
6.8 Summary
Setting aside the many deep technical issues in realizing concept networks, the basic processes of knowledge
representation are represented schematically in figure 25.
• Knowledge is acquired by learning from sensors and by thinking (introspection): an iterative process of
associating ideas to understand and react to the world.
• Concepts and associations form a tokenized model, analogous to language, of what is sensed and understood.
• Concepts and associations form a semantic space, with four irreducible association types.
• Concepts grow in significance the more often they are revisited.
• The iterative generation of context from combining sensing and introspection drives an observer’s clock
sense of time.
These ideas can now be applied to a multitude of representations, to help understand the process of adaptation, and
harness technologies for improving the value of learning to organisms or materials at all scales.
7 Smart spaces
The concept of a ‘smart space’ may refer to any kind of structure in space and time that mimics or otherwise
represents knowledge-oriented behaviours. This may be at any scale, e.g. it could include new kinds of material,
buildings, homes, vehicles, towns, etc. Thus it readily encompasses systems we do not normally associate with
intelligence. In the human realm, the aim of ‘smart spaces’ is to enhance the experience of people living in or
around them, or bring a positive benefit to society. In an industrial capacity, the aim might be to allow specialized
functional spaces (like factories, farms, etc) to become more self-sufficient in operation and adapting to contextual
challenges. In this latter view, smart spaces are a form of cybernetic organism, or what is currently referred to as
artificial intelligence. Smart spaces may be addressed from three perspectives:
• Smart environment: where space records knowledge about its exterior interactions with occupants and
environment, and may be equipped to react and interact more intelligently. If the occupants are humans,
then this is a form of ergonomics, i.e. a fitness for purpose strategy.
• Smart occupant: where occupants of a space are equipped to interact more intelligently with the space they
occupy. If the occupants are humans, then this is a cyborg strategy.
• Smart organism: as a single system in which some agents are mobile and others are fixed, but all work
cooperatively, over some bounded region.
Smart need not imply the direct insertion of information technology, as is sometimes assumed in technology circles.
It might simply refer to the ability to build valuable stories between initially unrelated concepts within the space,
including connecting people, functions, and businesses together to adapt to new challenges. From the foregoing
discussion, it should be clear that smart behaviours can emerge in all kinds of representations, without necessarily
trying to bend systems to human ways of thinking. The immune system remains a powerful example of how an
assembly of ‘dumb’ agents exhibit smart adaptive behaviour.
98
Several interpretations are possible. Should we consider occupants (human or otherwise) to be part of a process
(as in a factory), or as guests (as in a hotel), or even as intruders (as in an immune system), or as symbiotic
partners in the space (as in a shopping mall). For example, we could think of a smart home as providing a service
to its residents (like a hotel), or as an autonomous smart building embedded within an external region acting
cooperatively to share resources and minimize waste. Systems are often strongly interactive, thus boundaries may
have fluid meanings, and clean cut roles could be difficult to decide a priori. A smart space might balance all these
viewpoints simultaneously.
7.1 Interactive spaces
In studying semantic spaces, we have a choice:
• Consider how to make tools that enhance the abilities of humans.
• Consider a structure (e.g. a city, a house, a material etc) not as a external thing to be learned about in the mind
of an observer, but as representation of a mind itself, looking onto something else or perhaps introspecting
about itself.
From the perspective of the latter, we see adjacencies not as distances but as associations, places as concepts, and
the environment plus its visitors as sensory stimuli. What might this space now be thinking about? If an imaginary
deity were to look down on the mind of a city, would it appear to be smart? If so, at what scale? Would it appear
as a single organism, or as a swarm of interacting organisms [65,120, 121]? Who is it, in reality, who judges these
behaviours, and on what basis?
We may thus pose the question: what is the relationship between smart spaces and semantic spaces? Why
should we care about such questions? One answer is that our brains are such a smart spaces that we want to under-
stand. Another is to ask whether we could improve our interactions, to better utilize knowledge, by the formation
of new structures that go beyond the scale of an individual human: teams, costumes, rooms, communities, cities,
etc.
Example 117 (Where is the memory of a community?) In the past we have assumed that the memory of a com-
munity was the memories of the people within it, and that their personal relationships formed the adjacencies to
pass on stories representing concepts to others. Later, we built non-human structures to remember: imagery, art,
monuments, tombs, statues, writing, books, libraries, architecture, institutions, cultural habits, and so on.
Example 118 (Social networks as smart associations) A social network represents an association between parts
of a space of possibilities, mediated by humans. It forms a part of a knowledge representation. Links between
members of a social network lead to clustering of interests, i.e. concepts. Recommendations by one member of a
group get passed on to others until the group represents an interest in that topic, while at the same time expanding
the concept to overlap with other issues. Social networks lead to mixing of concepts, and humans act as message
carriers in the organism of a space/city/etc. Parts of the concept cluster may come at the topic from different
angles, triggered by different atoms of context during a concurrent activation.
7.2 What does smart mean?
Smart is an assessment made by an exterior observer. It is based prejudicially on our understanding of human
capabilities and ingenuity: we define our own idea of smart by our ability to use resources as tools, to turn learning
into practical and useful behaviours, to innovate by combining resources into new functions, to save time and
effort or optimize processes. We believe that people who ‘see more’ are smarter. From the perspectives of scale
and relevance, there are two pragmatic criteria that suggest ‘smart’:
• When we perceive an action as helpful in a given context (fit for our present purpose).
• When the outcome arrives ‘just in time’ to be useful in that same context (anyone can come up with some-
thing too late).
A smart space is about facilitating interaction that leads to economics benefits, including advancement, innovation
and happiness. Emotional aspects of systems may not be discounted as long humans make the assessments.
In the preceding sections, we’ve looked at how spacetime itself can encode the basic elements of knowledge
and reasoning. This may or may not be sufficient to justify calling a space smart. An independent assessment of
‘smart’ is a matter of perspective: each individual observer decides whether they experience something as smart or
not, relative to their own expectations. Finally, given our ability to enhance systems using Information Technology
(IT), could we make a space even smarter? We might posit that a space could be considered smart if it could
answer yes to a number of questions that include the following:
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1. Does the space have some interpretation of sensory input, i.e. does it interact some a world beyond it?
Any space that is bounded, and which interacts with an external agency has the capability to exchange
information. Where do we draw the line? Identifying the agents on the perimeter, what promises do they
make, and how do these reveal the world as a sensory experience? Are there new agents and sensors that we
can equip the space with the extend these capabilities?
2. Does the space have a capacity to learn and encode concept and associations?
Any space, which can represent different internal states, possesses this capability, but does it have associative
and temporal memory, it is plastic in its contextual adaptation? Can it mix and combine ideas into new ones
(innovation), and is it fast enough to apply its learning in interactions with real time changes in its exterior
environment? Can we extend its capabilities with artificial means?
3. Do the normal dynamical processes of the space tell stories about itself?
Is there causal linkage between remembered events, forming a meaningful narrative? Can a space reason
independently, through its own processes? How could this reasoning benefit occupants or users? How we
answer that question probably depends on our expectations. There are very simple examples of reasoning
that we call algorithms:
Example 119 (Mechanical reasoning) The stopcock in a water closet (the switch that fills up the water
closet tank and stops filling when it is full) is a reasoning system. It has a sensor, which is the water level.
The sensor forms a sense of context: full or not full, and transduces this into a switched on a water valve.
Thus it understands two concepts: full (represented by the switch being open and the valve closed, which
usually implies that the tank is filled with liquid) and not full (represented by the switch being close and the
valve being open, for any other condition).
4. Does the structure of spacetime alter the way new sensory inputs are perceived?
Do pre-existing concepts feed back into the sensory stream, acting as anchors for new ideas or external
interactions to strengthen and expand upon?
Smart appears to be something to do with a plasticity to challenges, and innovating quickly around them, with
approximate goals. In promise theory language, we could define smart like this:
Definition 75 (Smart promise or function) We perceive an action as helpful in a given context (fit for our present
purpose). The action arrives ‘just in time’ to be useful in that same context (anyone can come up with something
too late).
7.3 Promise view
Given that we can relate promises to knowledge representations, from a promise theory viewpoint, we may begin
by asking the usual questions about the cases of interest, defining inside and outside of what we take to be the
semantic space, marked by its horizon.
1. What or who are the operational agents inside and outside the semantic space?
In an arbitrary space, we can find agents, with diverse capabilities, at all scales. Atoms, molecules, bacteria,
viruses, people, tools, vehicles, machines, building, regions, malls, warehouses, shops, streets, shop signs,
road signs, public structures, monuments, bridges, districts, parks, cities, countries, planets, etc.
How are these agents ordered and addressed?
• Should we distinguish between the semantic space and its occupants at all, or simply treat a system
as self-contained, with some agents mobile and others fixed? If so, the occupants would be formally
outside the space in our model (even though the occupants of a smart house are within it from a normal
spacetime perspective).
• What processes happen inside the space?
• How does the space sense and interact with across its boundary or with its occupants, however they are
defined?
• Who or what is doing the thinking in the system, to judge ‘smart’?
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2. What promises do the agents make to one another, in what context?
Proximity, bonding, services, or how may we interpret these as knowledge of associations, by one of the
four irreducible types or any possible alias of those.
3. What phase(s) are the agents in?
Gases, bacteria, animals, people, and vehicles are usually in a gaseous phase, as they move around and
environment that is fixed with solid bindings. There are anchored places, forming concepts, with freely
flowing messengers to associate them.
4. What are the important scales for their interactions?
For a knowledge representation, scales are pinned by the scale of sensory apparatus. A smart space interacts
with its exterior through such sensors.
Example 120 A smart material may feel pressure on a surface; a smart city may experience trade and
migration on a timescale limited by surface area of transport hubs; a smart house is built for 1-10 people
who have a fairly predictable size and speed. Dependencies (like transportation and interface surface)
condition what happens inside a space on what happens outside it.
Based on the principles of promise theory, using only agents and promises, one may now begin to map behaviours
encoded in different spacetime media to challenges faced by a space formed from a collection of such agents.
Inside the observer horizon, we can build the notions of concepts and associations on top of these. From this, if
there is a plausible similarity between such behaviours and the behaviours we understand as smart in organisms,
then it is fair to say that we have understood the meaning of an analogous smart space.
7.4 Benefits of a knowledge representation in real space
7.4.1 Memory
The ability for a functional space to remember something depends on the shaping of structures within its observer
horizon. Any persistent spatial configurations and spacetime processes (orbits, loops, interactions) may be used
to represent an addressable memory inside the horizon, and this, in turn, can be used for learning. The speed
and spatial capacity of memory are determined by all the spacetime scales of the agents. Memory could be short
term and long term, coarse or refined. Realizing a knowledge representation in real space, is a process of iterative
learning, by direct analogy with learning by an individual, resulting in:
• Concepts: formed from any agents or patterned clusters of agents.
• Associations: links, by adjacency, or by realtime processes, e.g. transportation or messenger.
Example 121 (City memory 1) In a city, short term memory is found in the locations of mobile agents like people,
cars, taxis, work crews, or in the mutable states of agents, e.g. the state of traffic lights, the number of cars in a
parking lot, or the stock levels in a shop. The wear and tear on roads and public infrastructure recalls its usage.
The memory of sunshine could be the worn-away grass from walking or playing in the park. This imprint might be
associative, as it joins locations the start to the end of the track. On longer timescales, buildings records cultural
history. The locations of parks and monuments. In buildings, allusions to Greek styles or familiar forms (doorways,
windows, etc) root function in historical memory associations.
Example 122 (City memory 2) A cloud of pollution is a spacetime trace that recalls a process or event that
caused it. If the process continues, it will be replenished and the trace will be learnt by becoming persistent,
e.g. smog. If it is ephemeral, it will be quickly forgotten. Long term memories may survive as chemical traces
in concrete or trees. Other external sensory events may leave memories over time, e.g. an earthquake may result
in a change in building codes, and stronger buildings. This would be the memory imprint of the concept of an
earthquake.
Stored memories must also be recalled in order to be of value. In other words, recognition has to be mutual.
Example 123 (Vestigial structures) Greek columns on the face of a building recall Greek culture or symbolize
grandeur, but the allusion is meaningless unless it has resonance with observers’ and their shared ability to rec-
ognize the allusion. Similarly, the presence of a phone box, or disused railway tracks, or wartime bunkers.
We may also grow accustomed to the Greek facade and relearn its significance without any direct transmission
of intent. These are memories encoded in structures, without a doubt, but they do not make a city smarter unless
they assist other processes in the space in overcoming challenges.
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It may be agreements, rather than promises alone that lead to memory. In every learning relationship, there is a
mutual interaction leading to a local Nash equilibrium [3,122]. This is why bidirectional iterative relationships are
the key to knowledge.
7.4.2 Sensor types and dimensionality of context
On the outside of an observer horizon, space may extend into dimensions other than the obvious spatial dispersion
of locations joined up by vector promises; at each scale, there may be interior scalar promises, at embedded
locations that encapsulate their own semantics; these can always be transformed into a representation which uses
vector links to link them to an other agent. Human sensory perception probes not only spacetime but additional
dimensions of description, like heat and light, etc. Tables 2 and 3 shows a few sensors that could be interpreted as
inputs to a smart civic region.
Coarse grained sensory context atom sensor type
day, time, location spacetime
light, dark, red, green, blue sight
hot, cold, free, constrained touch
salt,sweet, sour, savory, etc taste
open, closed building door
open, closed building window
open, closed, partial building window blinds
open, closed city bridge
blocked, open, snowed under city road
available, unavailable city shop supplies
parking, parked, shunt, cruising city transport
inside, outside sense of self interior/exterior
incoming, outgoing external transport
supply, demand external trade
energy/money usage external trade/accounting balance
Person by face spacetime pattern
Vehicle by number or appearance spacetime pattern
Pollution cloud spacetime pattern
Flooding spacetime pattern
Weather spacetime pattern
Table 2: A few sensors that could feed into a large scale civic smart spaces.
Sensor Spacetime scale / usage
Smart phone information
Lidar Laser ranging, 100m
Radar 1000m
Microwave Astronomical and atmospheric
Gyroscope Orientation
Microphone Audio analysis
Camera 10m
Edge detection Computer vision, object classification
GPS positional tracking
Seismic used in oil and gas, geological sink hole discovery
Sonar deep sea
(f)MRI brain and body
Neural net pattern recognition Trainable
CANbus
Table 3: A few sensors that could feed into generalized smart spaces.
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Hierarchies of encapsulation have always been an important way of separating scales, and decoupling concerns.
It is this process of aggregation (rather than fragmentation) that enables economical scaling. Current information
technology has access to a growing array of sensors, at all scales, to measure increasingly specific semantically
distinguishable patterns. In addition to simple physical sensors for scalar promises like heat, humidity, light, etc,
agents who interface to the exterior world can also act as sensors for the interior (see figure 56), and, of course,
there are artificial information channels, including sophisticated neural networks that can be trained to recognize
almost any complicated pattern, representable as ordered collections of agents, with tensor structure, that promise
a wide range of characteristics. What we need to ask, in order to design appropriate future technologies, to exploit
information, is how should we organize the spatial interactions in such a way as to make desired outcomes and
processes efficient.
India
power company
courier
building Y
business
messenger
customer
law firm
building X
ExteriorCity
Figure 56: A city as a knowledge space. A business interacting with a remote customer acts as a sensor viewing the exterior
world.
7.4.3 Spatial reasoning with concept and association structures
If a space is smart, in the sense of representing concepts and associations about its external interactions, then what
do the internal structures of a space say about those external structures, and at what scale? The sensory scales in
table 2 show examples. While each space has a maximum spatial scale, limited by its size, we could extend probes
almost indefinitely at smaller scales by equipping a space with measuring devices, or at larger scales, through
satellite observation, to create something analogous to highly extensive nervous systems65.
Do the conceptual features of the space enable it to think for itself, or merely serve up data for human con-
sumption? In the words of the analogy, do they have an active functional significance or merely a passive archival
significance? Do they trigger new ideas and associations (processes) by virtue of being there (see the Tsunami
example 125, where the concepts became processes)?. This is what is meant by introspection.
Example 124 (Can a smart city think?) Could a city really possess a memory analogous to a human, or a com-
puter? Memory is everywhere: from the patterns of worn grass, recalling a hot summer in the park, to the
architecture of the buildings that recall historical and cultural periods and artefacts. Could it behave like a simple
organism? I believe this is also plausible. First, a computer memory is not like human memory: it is a linear
transcription of data, with an encoding into language, or video, or some other kind of media formatting. Computer
memory is based on a model of the sensors and retrievers. When we record or play video, there is a model of a
wide-screen television involved in the coding of data; there is no interpretation of the data. That kind of mem-
ory may exist in humans too (at least for short term memory) but beyond that, there is a long term summary of
experience that transmutes raw feeds from sensors into an approximate spacetime invariant model, using a lot of
summarization, interpretation, and conceptualization. Crucially, it is possible to mimic some of the behaviours of
65The huge extent of human sensory nerve bundles is no doubt responsible for the powerful and complex sensations we experience, both by
direct stimulation, and via the coarser emotional states that are based on them. In simpler machines, the analogy of emotional sensations would
be limited in expression by the palette of sensory inputs it has to draw on to represent sensation.
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human cognition to imagine ‘smart’ behaviour by imagining a series of transformations from raw sensor data to
generalized concepts and associations between them.
Flood protection
Damage, water, earthquake
Self−defense, barriers
Coastal
buildingsTsunami 
continuous learning/improvement
Figure 57: Learning about Tsunami in a smart city: flood defenses are the first line of memory that accumulates.
Example 125 (A cognitively responsive smart city?) Imagine a city by the sea, which is vulnerable to storms
and Tsunami. To image a cognitively smart city, we may ignore the humans living in it, and just think in terms of
abstract processes (see figure 57). How would the city remember a Tsunami? The sensors would be the coastal
structures, which would be flooded or destroyed. Over time, the response to learning a bout Tsunami would be the
building of flood defenses. This is cumulative learning loop, and results in a memory imprint: the flood defenses.
As these are being built, the patterns are learnt and summarized, recorded in books and documents. The events are
symbolized in movies, etc. Associations form between Tsunami and related concepts: an alarm system to trigger
flood defenses and alarms on earthquakes is built. This is the physical encoding of an association between the
concept of earthquake and Tsunami. So now there are specialized sensors capable of transmuting raw data into
learning, over time, through the construction of new hardware in the city. Memory, concepts and associations have
been encoded in the physical structures of the city.
The test of a memory lies in the recall. To be somewhat like a human memory, recall should be triggered by
the occurrence of an earthquake, or the imagination of an earthquake. So now consider what happens: when an
earthquake happens, it triggers an autonomic Tsunami warning, and flood defenses activate. This signal changes
the behaviour of the city and the processes of recall are activated. If something like an earthquake occurs, then it
might trigger the alarm too (a false alarm, to be sure, but nevertheless a semantically related event that triggers
the memory of a Tsunami). Finally, the city could simply be dreaming, with no inputs to the earthquake or tsunami
detectors: if something accidentally triggers the alarm, or if all the alarms are deliberately tested by sending a
planned theta wave of activations across the city, then the defenses are once again activated as if in rehearsal, and
the memory is recalled. The autonomic response of the city configuration is the key to triggering a memory based
on a change of configuration.
Example 126 (Memory at different scales (encapsulated specialists)) If concepts are not represented directly
by the civil engineering of a space, e.g. buildings, parks, transportation, and bridges that encodes information
about the outside, then is there documentation in processes, books and institutional habits? Would it be a smart
city that paid attention to the wear and tear of usage in the park lawns, and altered its behaviour to build paths
along these trails?
The irreducible association types map to the basic processes in spacetime:
Irreducible Association Semantic function in smart space
Causal association Sequential spacetime processes, data storage
Containment Conceptual generalization and accumulation
Molecular composition Compound roles, identities and names
Proximity Lateral association and approximation
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Example 127 The factories supply an external region around them, and response to their needs so the internal
state of the industrial region mirrors the sensed supply or demand.
Associations can be dynamical Stories that play out as processes
• Agents and processes associated by compatibility of promises
• Ability to align for a common purpose
• Mixing concepts to bring about innovation
• Identification of similarities alternatives (functional thesaurus)
• Speed of recognition: awareness of situation.
7.4.4 Temporal reasoning with pathways and stories
Processes and connected pathways that join concepts via associative connections, within a smart space, lead to
stories, as described in section 6.4. Stories enable semantic predictions, by relating compressed tokenized concepts.
Example 128 The arrival of a load of fish or fruit to a town market stimulates processes that activate the town
and mirror the external process of harvest.
Here are some examples:
Example 129 (Episodic story) An example story about a single agent, represented in city processes:
1. A person eats breakfast,
2. then drives to the mall,
3. then goes shopping,
4. then eats lunch,
5. then sees a movie.
An episodic story describing the world-line of an agent within the space. This represents a kind of process, but
one of limited significance to the whole city or its outside environment. The story describes the process of a part
in a machine, because it is about the orbits of only a single agent. What we could say is that the single agent
introspectively binds together the concepts of breakfast, mall, shopping, lunch and movie as a single concept,
whose significance remains to be decided.
Example 130 (An associative story) Associative stories can reveal dependencies and be useful for diagnostics,
see figure 56. For example, a law firm in the city fails to perform an important transaction because:
1. The law firm is located in building X
2. The building is connected by courier to a business client
3. The business client is located in nearby building Y ,
4. Building X depends on power from an exterior company.
5. A power failure in building Y prevents the business client from receiving word from a customer in India.
These associations are causal in nature, and lead to direct predictable consequences [118] within the city, e.g.
perhaps loss of business for the city. Still, the processes of the city do not represent the world beyond.
Example 131 (Exterior agent stories) Consider a view of a city in which the internal structures are direct repre-
sentations of the outside world (see figure 58).
1. Many suppliers deliver to a supply chain hub in the city. The supply chain hub encodes the tokenized concept
of supplier/supply.
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supplier 1
spain
france
supplier 2
supply
france goods
spain goods
transport
company
transport
delivery
marketplace
City Exterior
food
food
clothing
Figure 58: City structures are a facsimile of the world outside, thus encoding concepts of the countries beyond in a knowledge
representation using a marketplace.
2. The suppliers are variously from France of Spain, depending on context. Simultaneous activation means
that suppliers from both France and Spain become variations of the same concept, but also that France and
Spain get represented as separate entities in the city: a French food market and a Spanish food market.
3. The generalization of these is the concept of a market.
4. The city observes that deliveries depend on the transportation of goods by lorry. The shipping company
has its own support depot and business office in the city, mirroring the external activities. Thus the memory
concept of transportation is encoded by the local office. This is associated with the supply hub, by mutual
activation, when the lorry arrives at the hub, with the logo of the transport company.
Example 132 (An interior agent story) An example story represented in city processes:
1. A person eats breakfast,
2. breakfast contained coffee
3. coffee was purchased from coffeehouse
4. coffeehouse belongs to a franchise
5. the franchise is owned by the coffee group.
This is a pure pathway in a semantic graph. The story significance of the story is in the eye of the city, e.g. it might
be of benefit in diagnosing a connection involving the person concerned to a particular batch of coffee, as a way
into an abduction process. For instance, the coffee might have made some other people ill; it would therefore be
further associated with a story about visits to a hospital for medical attention, etc.
Example 133 (A process story) The arrival of snow from outside a city is a sensory experience that could trigger
drifting and road blockage (see figure 59). That is associated with snow clearing (or perhaps later flooding). Snow
forms the context for these associated concepts and the city may recall and even enact several stories. The story
roads
snow
drifts
plough
flooding
clear
Figure 59: Sensory activations and concepts for a city associated, leading to several possible stories.
may be extrapolated further by association and generalization to make predictions like occurrences of flooding or
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hypothermia, etc. These predictions can have actionable consequences: perhaps roads, bridges, or airports are
closed.
These examples show how the processes of agents, in a sense, tell their own stories, within the contexts of a city that
faces an outside world. People and vehicles, as mobile agents, act as messengers, binding city concepts together,
or acting as sensory stimuli. As they move, leakage and random motion around the conceptual focal points leads
to an effective blurring and association of ideas.
Irrespective of whether one buys into to notion of a smart space without information technology, it is clear
to see, from these examples, how information technologies could be used to bring plausible depth to this story,
whether for the benefit of an abstract space (region, city, building, etc), or for the people who inhabit it. By
designing appropriate sensory probes (detecting specifically interesting semantics, rather than just raw physical
observables), one gives immediate relational meaning to context and long term memory.
7.4.5 Locality, centralization, and economies of scale
Not all smart spaces are equal. Some may have more knowledge than others, but we can recognize, measure,
and perhaps improve smartness by understanding how it occurs. Concepts form localized clusters, represented as a
promise graph, via all of the agents and their interactions. In semantic knowledge space, concepts may be localized
as single concept agents. This does not imply that the physical agents, which represent such concepts, have to be
localized in a single location. Culturally, there is a tendency to centralize and focus on clear locations: cognitively,
we prefer low entropy structures to represent isolated concepts, because they are easily identifiable; this may lead
to practical bottlenecks in accessing the knowledge or location.
Contextualization has the effect of dissecting a single concept into several smaller parts. Collective central-
ization of any shared service or function is an expression of identity: it allows us to visit, recognize, and learn
to know things, as if they were themselves agents, with their own personality66. Thus, humans can use the same
mechanisms that we evolved, to learn and know other humans, for learning and knowing other abstract things.
Example 134 (Where is a city’s knowledge?) Does knowledge lie in a city, or in the people who live in the city?
The answer we discern from this discussion is that it lies in both. The interactions between people and things are
part of processes that lead to new concepts and associations. As automation takes on more of the jobs that drive a
city, more of the knowledge will be encoded in processes that belong either to the city, or to a placeless repository
of information.
Easy access to functional services that we depend on suggests localization. Close proximity promotes speedy
access, but context switching can also provide fast routing to a conditional part. Connection, or adjacency, may be
arranged in two ways: either by topological and geographical proximity, or the availability of messengers to act
as go betweens. Specific concepts or functions may be available to us through either one of these mechanisms.
Communication and transport play a central role in enabling processes to associate agents.
Example 135 (Cities or communities?) Traditionally we think of cities and geographical communities, but the
development of modern communications has rendered this a less useful definition. When a city resident moves
beyond its geographical domain, does he/she leave it behind, or carry it with them? In other words should we say:
space/city =
∑
agents ? =
∑
locations ? (218)
Many processes, like taxation and personal health issues, are connected to our place of residence. What happens
when we are no longer within our home geo-political domain? How distributed can a representation of a process
be? Could we transform a static adjacency into a mobile utility? It is interesting to speculate on how smart
adaptations could evolve the city’s sense of awareness to cope with this.
Example 136 (Partitioning: rooms and districts) Limiting concept scope helps us to grasp concepts with less
processing. We make buildings for specific purposes: shops, houses, museums, offices, etc; we also make districts
around specific economies of scale: shopping malls, financial districts, red light districts, etc. As we embed a
concept in a larger framework, i.e. as a region of space gets bigger, central points become harder to visit due to
congestion of pathways, unless there are direct routes. Scale therefore plays a deciding role in identifying concepts
and making use of knowledge. The Dunbar limits place bounds on how large human work groups can become
while remaining effective.
66This is how humans ‘know’ each other and know things: we form a relationships with them as if they were characters in a story, hence our
tendency to anthropomorphize concepts.
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Example 137 (Implicit learning in a space) On a street, in jazz city, during the context of daytime, the sun shines
on the north side of the street, and south side is in shadow all day long. Over time, sun worshipers gravitate to the
sunny side of the street, while night birds flock to the shady side. Thus the street remembers the concept of sun, and
associates shops, clubs, and services with the happy sun people on the north side, by concurrent activation.
Example 138 (Economies of scale in smart cities) Recent work on what makes cities work and grow identified
the economics of infrastructure at a key part of the scaling [123, 124]. What smart knowledge base could assist in
facilitating economies of scale in a city?
Economies of scale relate to specific goods or services. To scale these by introducing more agents involved
in the keeping of promises, some measure of coordination is required. A calibrated source concept provides the
semantic basis for making a quantitative promise. The association is semantic but the physics lies in the real world
representation.
7.4.6 Central controller versus brains
For many, the intuition of what ‘smart’ means suggests a reasoning brain’, or some central guiding intelligence.
We imitate some of the the symptoms of human intelligence by using algorithms and processes, with the help of
machinery that is mechanical or computational, as if trying to place a homunculus within as the deus ex machina.
This form of mimicry uses spatiotemporal memory to emulate behaviour through processes rather than through
static structures. Our attachment to brains is clearly a liability in automating processes. Human brains are quite
over-qualified for many of the tasks to which we apply ourselves: far simpler mechanisms can easily cope with the
state spaces and constraints of isolated processes in, say, manufacturing or quasi-stable repetition (e.g. autopilots).
If smart implies quick and timesaving, then devices much simpler than ourselves may be called smart.
Turing’s halting theorem tells us that we can simulate any computable result with a brain with a central Turing
machine eventually, but this is not to say that a brain is a Turing machine, works anything like one, or that such
a simulation would work at even close to the same timescale67. Of intelligence, we expect agents that adapt
continuously and cumulatively to their context, or have awareness of sufficient local state. The emergent behaviour
of an immune system exhibits smart behaviour, repairing us when we are sick and mostly sleeping when we are
well, yet it is the most decentralized of systems in our bodies [90].
Example 139 (IBM’s True North ‘cognitive computing’ architecture) In 2014, IBM introduced an extensible
hardware programmable chip architecture called True North [125], with a parallel cloud simulator ‘compass’.
The modular design and inbuilt routing capability allows users to build massive deep layered neural networks
with a quasi-deterministic event driven input scheme based on data oriented signal agents called ‘spikes’. As
a programmable fabric, this architecture enables massive learning capability, with connectivity approaching the
scale of a human brain, and at low power. So far demonstrations have been limited to quite simple, traditionally
recognizable tasks. Crucially, this architecture shows how non-von Neumann architecture computational fabrics
may be built as relatively dumb (but programmable) semantics spacetimes at a low level.
Example 140 (Smart organization) Many firms adopt hierarchical forms of organization. Large firms may have
up to 10 or more layers of management, arranged in a hierarchical tree. Can a management hierarchy act as a
trained neural network, i.e. a learning space that has its own knowledge representation?
The structure shown in figure 60 is drawn deliberately to suggest a layered neural network structure, with the
‘top’ of the company to the left. Customer demand is the sensory apparatus of the organization, which enters
through top level management and sales (the customer facing part of the organization). The inputs get handed
down through product managers and developers to final outputs, which represent the products or services of the
company. These, in turn, feedback back around to the inputs allowing the company to ‘think’ as a continuous
iteration of products and services68 This has the superficial structure of a semantic learning network, in which
concepts are represented both by agents and clusters of agents. Unlike what one would normally consider to be
a neural network, the agents are humans (or perhaps processes), which are themselves already quite complex
networks, so the learning capabilities are quite different to an artificial neural network structure, made from dumb
agents.
The assumption here is that there are tight horizontal connections, and no vertical connections in the layers.
In a real organization, the layers also collaborate as teams, not as individual nodes. This may help or hinder the
learning. Since, in a human organization, one assumes that the nodes are not dumb threshold devices, but contain
67Ironically, once we’ve finished constructing automata to mimic smart behaviour, the proxies which enact programmed patterns often seem
very dumb to us, because they are frozen into behaviours that are little more sophisticated than the opening and closing of a flower in response
to sunlight.
68In modern parlance, this process is called Continuous Delivery [126].
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significant memory each, there is useful equilibration and redundancy by having intra-layer connections. What we
must have is stronger interlayer connections to forward learning and connect inputs to outputs.
The hierarchical structure represents a directional routing structure, or an aggregator of information, if the
agents promise to faithfully forward information up or down the hierarchy. In some companies the elements of
the layers do not map to all the elements in the next layer. There are branches for ‘separation of concerns’,
sometimes called a silos, in which each branch attempts to represent a different concept. From a semantic space
viewpoint, this is a mistake, as it tries to hardwire concepts rather than learning them. Concepts like ‘customer
type’, ‘trends’, ‘competitors’, etc, may be distributed throughout the layers in a neural network (without necessarily
being named explicitly). In a branching hierarchy, the associations between layers are encoded only through
their ‘direct reports’ or managers, leading to association pattern (b) in figure 30, which is the observation of a
coincidental correlation if a branch manager imposes coordination on the sub-managers, and may be reported
calibration (d) if the sub-managers promise an agreement with their mutual manager What is missing from a silo
operators
operators
operators
developers
developersproduct
manager
product
manager
CTO
SALES
CEO
developers
developers
customer demand
product
outputs
Figure 60: Is a hierarchical organization like a learning semantic space? The structure is potentially similar if there are strong
links between layers, without siloing.
topology, or purely branching network (which is a classic computer science class hierarchy or spanning tree), is
the ability to learn and freely associate ideas. All ideas are related to a single concept representation, which is
reified as the top manager (CEO).
Example 141 (CRISPR gene editing) Clustered regularly inter-spaced short palindromic repeats (CRISPR) is a
gene editing technique for scanning and locating specific codon sequences in the genome. With centralized intent
at a large scale, and distributed cells containing centralized DNA at a small scale, decentralized molecular agents
attached to immune cells can edit the genomes of diseased cells, in a semantically specific way [127].
7.4.7 Innovation in smart spaces
The processes of innovation haven been studied from a promise theory perspective elsewhere [128]. The key
elements of innovation are the random mixing of concepts, followed by outcome gestation and selection. Mixing
of ideas can be a quick process, catalyzed by accessible localization (e.g. centralization); the latter is a slower
process, in which something is built from the new plan, functional parts align with a recombined mixture of
promised concepts, and it is then subjected to a selection process (testing), in order to judge its fitness for purpose
(see figure 61)69.
In a smart space, the agents that define the space innovate by interacting with their exterior to learn new
ideas. This might be the occupants of the space interacting with it, or the environment beyond it. To facilitate
this interaction, catalysts can be provided to match-make the association of compatible concepts. The efficiency
of this process is accelerated by a large contact surface, so larger spaces could be smarter than smaller ones.
Matchmakers and go-betweens thus have roles to play in making a city or space smart. This kind of ‘thinking’ is
what a knowledge space does when it focuses more on acquired memories and attempts to combine them into new
ones.
• Spacetime mixing of agents is an important part of recombination. Mixing is most effective in a gas phase,
provided agents are brought together to form combinations, but could also be mediated ‘pollenated’ in a
solid phase by messengers.
69This is functionally equivalent to the mixing of DNA to form a zygote.
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Figure 61: Innovation happens by mixing ideas.
• Outcome selection requires an oriented notion of a goal, or promised outcome and a judging agent, or simply
failure.
Could an inanimate space (at any scale) help humans or organizations work together, just by virtue of how it
bounds, facilitates, and shapes their interactions?
Independent researcher Meredith Belbin has studied human collaboration through teamwork, and has identified
nine abilities or roles (kinds of promise) to be played in a team collaboration (regardless of how many people
there are in the team) [129]. In Belbin’s view, human dynamics require roles for: plant (a creative ideas person
who solves problems), shaper (with the drive and courage to overcome obstacles), specialist, implementer (a
practical thinker), a resource investigator (who knows where to find help), a coordinator (an arbitrator), a monitor
(who judges progress, team worker (someone concerned with the team’s inter-personal relationships), and finisher
(someone analytical who does quality assurance). Belbin does not claim that all these roles must be taken on by
different agents (people in this case), but that these functional roles define the promises that need to be kept for an
effective teamwork. So, should we expect to find these promised roles in smart spaces too? In terms of spacetime
processes, these incorporate learning or memory (specialist), mixing (plant, coordinator, finisher). the limitation of
Belbin’s model lies in assuming human involvement, and human psychology, the following of a plan, and a notion
of progress towards a goal.
Example 142 (Revised simple view of a smart company) In example 140, we represented an organization in
the form of a neural network, deliberately, in order to contrast a simple flow discrimination network with an
organizational hierarchy. Now let’s make a more realistic sketch. A company has an outside world, with users,
customers, competitors, which it interacts with through sensor-actuators, represented roughly by sales and support.
These sensors forward their observations to the internal representations of the company: the people who remember
the relationships, including developers and operations people, i.e. the memory agents (see figure 62).
Unlike the previous example of the flow network, where agents were imagined as driving a company from a
helm, this model is more fatalistic: inputs are passed to both developer and operations agents to be interpreted.
Neither is above the other in a preferential hierarchy. Data from the outside world about successes and failures
are applicable to both equally, and they will also share associated impulses with one another.
The agents in a company are not dumb switches, they are already significantly established networks of knowl-
edge themselves. The training of the nodes over time corresponds to their schooling and experience in doing their
jobs, as well as adapting and modernizing individually. A hybrid structure like this cannot be understood in pre-
cisely the same terms as an atomic knowledge representation: it is a hierarchy of superagents, each of which is
a learning knowledge representation. The question is whether the organization as a cooperative whole may be
considered a learning knowledge space. The stability of the organization depends on it being able to handle the
perturbations from the sensors (fix bugs and operational issues, i.e. keep its business promises) much faster than
the time it takes to train the internal nodes in their basic functions of interpreting the sensors. However, there is a
second rate of learning, which is the operational knowledge, learnt ‘on the job’, which is formed in real time from
context activations. This fits with the model of knowledge representation presented in section 5, but it does not fit
well with a neural network discriminator structure, since the latter is mainly about recognition of known patterns.
Even these simple considerations seem to indicate that a company, which interacts with the world, cannot be
steered by a single helm, in a quasi-deterministic hierarchy, else it will be unable to represent the operational
knowledge it acquires through interactions. A flatter organization, where all knowledge workers are closer to their
customers leads to a more reliable knowledge retention.
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Figure 62: A company as a knowledge represent ion.
7.4.8 Auto-reasoning and searching for answers
The ability to construct a coherent narrative from a collection of parts is what we call reasoning. This could be
addressed in a tokenized (story) representation or in an implicit learned network representation such as example
137. The aim of a smart space would be to improve the likelihood that a space, when faced with a challenge or
question, would automatically evolve towards a state representing a reasoned outcome. This need not guarantee
the correctness of an answer, only the convergence towards the best answer it could find. For example, in the case
of the Tsunami challenge (example 57), the responses of the city unleashed a chain of processes that automatically
protected the city. This exhibited a primitive form of autonomous reasoning. Reasoning that happens on a larger
scale would not be clearly visible to the occupants of a city, and may take place on a much slower timescale than
they normally observe. Thus, a smart city might not be apparently smart to human concerns.
The use of information technology to enhance spaces, using special sensors and training, is clearly a popular
idea today. In recent years, it has also been popular to answer questions by trawling ‘big data’, i.e. unspecific
sources of sensory information collected from a wide range of sources, in hope of discovering interest concepts
and relationships by introspection, whence to pursue reasoning based on these. Finding answers is a form of
pattern recognition, in semantic patterns (stories and narratives) built from data patterns that reveal interpretations
(concepts).
Are we making the best use of knowledge? People, machines, spaces, and communities all learn, but not all
do much to propagate or facilitate the application of their expertise. The smartest part of searching lies in setting
up the boundary conditions, i.e. in posing the right question: what pattern are we looking for, and at what scale?
Scale plays a special role in reasoning. If we search for a structure that operates at a scale much larger than our
sensory experience (like a city), it is entirely possible that behaviours might emerge that we would be entirely
oblivious to, because the benefits are not directly apparent at the scale of our own sensory apparatus. Generalized
clustering techniques, like Principal Component Analysis [17,130] can find conspicuous patterns, but cannot attach
significance to them. It is the latter process which is the most expensive long term approach. Intelligent assistants
might identify relationships that we missed with our limited human faculties, but human expertise can offer helpful
input without having to go through expensive training, using a semantic network or topic map approach.
8 Summary
Parsifal: Ich schreite kaum, doch wa¨hn’ ich mich schon weit.
(I scarcely move, yet already it seems I have travelled far.)
Gurnemanz: Du sieh’st, mein Sohn, zum Raum wird hier die Zeit.
(You see, my son, here time becomes space.)
– R. Wagner, Parsefal
In these notes, I have tried to sketch out how to apply spacetime concepts to practical questions about the
semantics of data, and how data become knowledge. The aim is not to examine a particular approach to knowledge
representation or learning, or to describe and test a particular technology, but to rather expose the general structural
aspects, using a minimum of assumptions based on Promise Theory. This includes the emergence of what we know
as concepts and how they network into larger knowledge representations.
This effort began, motivated by observations concerning IT infrastructure [30, 87, 118, 119], and this later
carried over into the possibilities for future large-scale infrastructure. It has since assumed much wider scope.
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Throughout the notes, we have been homing in on the conclusion that knowledge is represented principally by
concepts encoded through patterns that manipulate the various aspects of spacetime symmetries. This suggests that
information and knowledge representation are fundamentally connected to the structure of semantic spacetime,
and few other concepts are really needed (see section 5.4.10). This simple insight takes one remarkably far,
and qualifies as a basic law: ‘All representations of knowledge have semantic content proportional to the loss of
spacetime symmetry.
The detailed mechanisms for encoding of concepts, associations, and semantics can be identified with space-
time scaling, directed adjacency, and boundary interactions. A key requisite is that there be memory, with pre-
dictable and repeatable addressability over distinguishable spacetime locations. Addressability is needed for se-
mantic continuity: recalling and updating knowledge. Although a database is a semantic space, knowledge is not
a database, but a continuous process, and a clean separation of timescales is essential for the dynamical stability of
that process (see figure 63).
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Figure 63: Timescales overlaid onto a scale/invariance diagram.
A number of hypotheses emerged from basic promise theoretic considerations during this study:
1. The weights or significances of patterns are in inverse relation to intrinsic information of their representation.
2. Usable knowledge requires a minimum level of dynamical stabilty.
3. Context must be evaluated faster and promises less information than the derived knowledge it modulates.
4. Context evaluation suggests coordination by an independent agent.
5. Knowledge maintenance, by partially annealing of learning weights, is needed for long-term stability.
6. Story inference and navigation suggest coordination by an independent agent.
The representation of concepts and associative pathways, as spacetime structures, builds on basic irreducible asso-
ciations of spacetime:
• Nested containment (scaling).
• Causal history (pre-requisite dependency).
• Composition, i.e. cooperative refinement.
• Similarity (proximity).
With the benefit of a semantic spacetime viewpoint, many apparently complex semantic issues reduce to combina-
tions of these spacetime associations, and effectively a memory of what, where, and when.
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Semantic tokenization is key to compressing cognition. We are most familiar with this in the context of lan-
guage representation. In stable situations, we can achieve this tokenization with high levels of probability, but that
is a best case scenario. The ability to learn and crystallize concepts from ‘big’ noisy data, is strongly constrained
by the capabilities of the memory used, and hence the properties of the semantic space. Tokenization solves three
issues:
• Reduction of the dimensionality of sensory data (token formation).
• Compression of sensory information to a symbolic form of low information (context).
• Mapping variable inputs to an invariant representation (conceptualization).
This tokenization, which emerges as central to concepts, is not intentionally a ‘linguistic’ construction. It emerges
from the sequential nature of coarse grained input (both of which are just spacetime concepts). However, I believe
that the resemblence to language is not spurious. Tokens or symbols emerge from concurrent semantics of a sensory
stream. The discreteness of symbols emerges from the approximation of concurrency across multiple sensory
threads. Simultaneity of semantics is an implicit seed for binding sensory properties into prototype concepts.
The result is that there is a mutual affinity between this view of knowledge representation and familiar models of
linguistics (cognitive linguistics on the interior representation and generative linguistics on the exterior).
Present day artificial intelligence research has most recently focused on the advances in neural network for
‘deep learning’ [52, 131, 132], where one uses directional networks to learn patterns, such that weighted connec-
tions encode pre-trained semantics. While fascinating, to be sure, this approach may not be the cheapest route
to technological solutions: machine learning ignores several issues, like the problem of explicit tokenization, and
the opportunities to merge human and machine knowledge, in order to focus on trying to engineer its emergence.
It makes weak contact with existing human concepts, like knowledge bases and libraries, and then only through
arduous and expensive training. There remains the possibility of improving on this, by direct human input at the
symbolic level (like words of encouragement from a teacher), in order to imagine ‘cyborg’ systems, at all scales,
which might make the best use of both humans and machinery. The spacetime approach described here may help
to put exploit these pieces and bring them together.
Although it would be impossible to bring rigour to a subject of this scope, in a single series of notes, no matter
how detailed, I hope that there is sufficient material here to bring some clarity to a few of the larger questions
around artificial reasoning, and help formulate more of the key questions theoretically. I find it compelling that
the most fundamental of spacetime notions leads to a simple unified way of framing the subject across multiple
disciplines.
This completes the initial overview of semantic spaces as representations for organization and cognitive rea-
soning, and perhaps opens a door to a more complete notion of artificial intelligence. When all is done, the simple
outcome of this work seems to be that our most basic learning and abstraction capabilities have their origins,
plausibly, in the fundamental structures and processes of space and time.
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A Coordinatization of data streams
This shows a coordinatization of a multi-dimensional document, which could be used to describe and document
its interpretation, without alteration, post hoc.
{
"kind": "Service",
"apiVersion": "v1",
"metadata": {
"name": "myapp"
},
"spec": {
"ports": [{
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"port": 8765,
"targetPort": 9376
}],
"selector": {
"app": "example"
},
"type": "LoadBalancer"
}
}
Dimension/Region ( 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, ) ->
Dimension/Region ( 2, 1{, 0, 0, 0, ) ->
- path/proper time location[0]("kind")
- path/proper time location[1](:)
- path/proper time location[2]("Service")
- path/proper time location[3]("apiVersion")
- path/proper time location[4](:)
- path/proper time location[5]("v1")
- path/proper time location[6]("metadata")
- path/proper time location[7](:)
Dimension/Region ( 2, 2{, 1{, 0, 0, ) ->
- path/proper time location[0]("name")
- path/proper time location[1](:)
- path/proper time location[2]("myapp")
Dimension/Region ( 2, 3{, 0, 0, 0, ) ->
- path/proper time location[0]("spec")
- path/proper time location[1](:)
Dimension/Region ( 2, 4{, 1{, 0, 0, ) ->
- path/proper time location[0]("ports")
- path/proper time location[1](:)
Dimension/Region ( 2, 4{, 2{, 1[, 1{, ) ->
- path/proper time location[0]("port")
- path/proper time location[1](:)
- path/proper time location[2](8765)
- path/proper time location[3]("targetPort")
- path/proper time location[4](:)
- path/proper time location[5](9376)
Dimension/Region ( 2, 4{, 3{, 0, 0, ) ->
- path/proper time location[0]("selector")
- path/proper time location[1](:)
Dimension/Region ( 2, 4{, 4{, 1{, 0, ) ->
- path/proper time location[0]("app")
- path/proper time location[1](:)
- path/proper time location[2]("example")
Dimension/Region ( 2, 4{, 5{, 0, 0, ) ->
- path/proper time location[0]("type")
- path/proper time location[1](:)
- path/proper time location[2]("LoadBalancer")
Dimension/Region ( 2, 5{, 0, 0, 0, ) ->
Dimension/Region ( 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, ) ->
Dimension/Region ( 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, ) ->
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- path/proper time location[0](@)
A mixed format:
{{{one { two, three } four <alpha> text ... </alpha> }
\section{section1}xx
Nothing happenings
\section{section2}
[windows1]
<greek>
<alpha>
AAA
</alpha>
<beta>
BBB
</beta>
<gamma>
CCC
</gamma>
</greek>
[windows2]
xiug
Dimension/Region ( 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, ) ->
Dimension/Region ( 2, 1{, 1{, 1{, 0, ) ->
- path/proper time location[0](one)
Dimension/Region ( 2, 1{, 1{, 2{, 1{, ) ->
- path/proper time location[0](two)
- path/proper time location[1](three)
Dimension/Region ( 2, 1{, 1{, 3{, 0, ) ->
- path/proper time location[0](four)
Dimension/Region ( 2, 1{, 1{, 4{, 1<alpha>, ) ->
- path/proper time location[0](text)
- path/proper time location[1](...)
Dimension/Region ( 2, 1{, 1{, 5{, 0, ) ->
Dimension/Region ( 2, 1{, 2{, 0, 0, ) ->
- path/proper time location[0](\section)
Dimension/Region ( 2, 1{, 3{, 1{, 0, ) ->
- path/proper time location[0](section1)
Dimension/Region ( 2, 1{, 4{, 0, 0, ) ->
- path/proper time location[0](xx)
- path/proper time location[1](Nothing)
- path/proper time location[2](happenings)
- path/proper time location[3](\section)
Dimension/Region ( 2, 1{, 5{, 1{, 0, ) ->
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- path/proper time location[0](section2)
Dimension/Region ( 2, 1{, 6{, 0, 0, ) ->
Dimension/Region ( 2, 1{, 7{, 1[, 0, ) ->
- path/proper time location[0](windows1)
Dimension/Region ( 2, 1{, 8{, 0, 0, ) ->
Dimension/Region ( 2, 1{, 9{, 1<greek>, 0, ) ->
Dimension/Region ( 2, 1{, 9{, 2<greek>, 1<alpha>, ) ->
- path/proper time location[0](AAA)
Dimension/Region ( 2, 1{, 9{, 3<greek>, 0, ) ->
Dimension/Region ( 2, 1{, 9{, 4<greek>, 1<beta>, ) ->
- path/proper time location[0](BBB)
Dimension/Region ( 2, 1{, 9{, 5<greek>, 0, ) ->
Dimension/Region ( 2, 1{, 9{, 6<greek>, 1<gamma>, ) ->
- path/proper time location[0](CCC)
Dimension/Region ( 2, 1{, 9{, 7<greek>, 0, ) ->
Dimension/Region ( 2, 1{, 10{, 0, 0, ) ->
Dimension/Region ( 2, 1{, 11{, 1[, 0, ) ->
- path/proper time location[0](windows2)
Dimension/Region ( 2, 1{, 12{, 0, 0, ) ->
- path/proper time location[0](xiug)
Each of the addressable sections of this sensory data stream can now be annotated with a specific meaning, either
by representing as a pattern or as a specific address in the data ‘document’.
B Invariant representation by spacetime aggregation example
Figure 64 shows a scale/invariance diagram for a hypothetical cloud system monitoring system. Data are collected
from sensors, described at the bottom left of the diagram, on individual computing nodes (where only one is
shown). The data are aggregated and memorized locally, as timeseries or state caches in order to characterize a
stable (and thus approximately invariant) normal state. Changes to what has been learned to be stable normal state
are classified as anomalous high or low deviations, which are themselves invariant characterizations of a changing
state.
At any given time, invariant characteristics may or may not be active, depending on context. The tokenization
of context must therefore be complicit in the invariant representation. Invariance does not mean something which
is unable to change dynamically, but rather stability of interpretation. As we move to the right of the diagram, the
concepts become ‘larger’ in scale (space and time) and thus more stable semantically and dynamically. They ac-
crete more support from sensory data, derivative characteristics and even external annotation (such as that provided
by the technique shown in the previous appendix). Overlapping concepts, taken in clusters may represent specific
phenomena, e.g. thrashing be exhibited by a change in load average, free memory, and several other characteris-
tics dynamical deviations. The roles played by change, in delimiting regions of stabilty, are likely key to finding
semantics boundaries. Each independent grouping or clustering of agents can be given a new name and represent
a new concept, following the indentification of autonomous agents in promise theory.
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Figure 64: Scale/invariance diagram example.
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